The Singularity of the Self : The principles of personal identity in Levinas' descriptions of the pre-ethical level of subjectivity by Shah, Feroz Mehmood
  
The Singularity of the Self  
 
The principles of personal identity in 
Levinas’ description of the pre-ethical level 
of subjectivity  
 
Feroz Mehmood Shah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MA Thesis in Philosophy at IFIKK, HF  
 
Supervisor: Arne Johan Vetlesen 
 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO  
 
15.11.12 
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
 
The Singularity of the Self  
 
The principles of personal identity in 
Levinas’ description of the pre-ethical level 
of subjectivity  
 
Feroz Mehmood Shah 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MA Thesis in Philosophy at IFIKK, HF  
 
Supervisor: Arne Johan Vetlesen 
 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO  
 
15.11.2012 
 
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Feroz Mehmood Shah 
2012 
The Singularity of the Self 
Feroz Mehmood Shah 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Trykk: Reprosentralen, Universitetet i Oslo 
V 
 
Abstract 
Emmanuel Levinas is commonly treated as a first and foremost ethical thinker. In this essay I 
want to offer an alternative reading of Levinas’ first main work, Totality and Infinity, by 
shifting the attention from the singularity of the Other, to the singularity of the self. I will do 
this by presenting a reconstruction and analysis of the two main principles of personal identity 
that are to be found in the book. On the ground achieved by these analyses, I claim that 
Levinas is defending a “minimally existentialistic” self, an understanding of subjectivity that 
shares crucial premises with the existentialist tradition, even while criticising it. I also discuss 
the merits and limitations of the vitalistic vocabulary Levinas employs. Finally I claim that 
the great importance attributed to the subject in Levinas’ philosophy, along with his 
understanding of the synthesis of the active and the passive characteristics of the subject, 
leads Levinas into an ambiguous understanding of the status of the singularity of the Other. 
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Concerning citations 
Most citations in this essay relate to the list of references attached after the essay. When 
referring to most French books and articles I often refer to both the English and the French 
edition. The page in the English edition is listed first, while the page of the French edition 
appears after the slash. Due to the amount of references, two books is simply denoted by the 
main letters in the books’ titles. That concerns Emmanuel Levinas’ book Totality and Infinity, 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 The “minimally existentialistic” self 
In Emmanuel Levinas' first major work, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, he 
launches a dramatic attack on the history of western philosophy. Guided by the idea that this 
tradition is dominated by a tendency to totalisation – that is, favouring the general over the 
particular, or the universal over the singular – he wants to show that philosophy should rely 
on different premises than it has done so far. In fact, by proceeding with an immanent 
critique, he wants to show that the historical contributions to philosophy already rest on these 
premises, even though the philosophers themselves have failed to acknowledge it. These 
claims are rather sweeping, and anyone familiar with Levinas’ work will recognise the, at 
times, tendentious diagnosis and dramatic tone that characterises his writing. But based upon 
his readings of the history of philosophy he builds an extensive understanding of metaphysics, 
which touches upon a wide range of philosophical topics, be it in epistemology, religion, 
language or ethics. In this essay I shall explicate the central argument of the book at hand, 
namely Levinas’ notion of subjectivity. I will concern myself with the subject as Levinas 
discusses it in Totality and Infinity before he introduces the notion of responsibility, and I 
want to defend an understanding of this subject as a “minimally existentialistic” self. By the 
somewhat clumsy phrase “minimally existentialic” my intention is to highlight the existential 
aspect of Levinas’ description of the self, at the expense of the more metaphysically 
committing description of the self Levinas offers in relation to fecundity. The term 
existentialistic is not to be understood as coinciding with the sense in which Sartre and 
Heidegger uses it, but rather to consist in a set of premises they all have in common. The 
reading of Totality and Infinity offered in this essay will diverge from most presentations of 
Levinas’ thought, since it won’t be concerned with ethics and the singularity of the Other. In 
this essay, I will try to offer a coherent reading of Levinas’ thoughts on the singularity of the 
self, and show how these thoughts share many premises with the existentialistic tradition. 
Towards the end of this introduction I will return to the phrase “minimally existentialistic” 
and describe the main characteristics of Levinas’ account of subjectivity. But initially it is 
important to get a more general grasp of Levinas’ project in the book, and make some 
methodological distinctions.  
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Levinas claims that the totalising manner in which philosophy has traditionally been 
conducted has lead to conclusions that are not only phenomenologically inadequate, but also 
ethically insufficient. He tries to explicate this by showing how a number of situations and 
objects that have hitherto been deemed unphilosophical, in fact provide the basis for 
philosophy. As this is first and foremost a work of phenomenology, Levinas tries to rework 
the notion of phenomena so that it can include these situations and objects, and he goes on to 
describe how they disrupt any philosophical system that tries to exclude them. These 
disruptive objects or situations occur in different guises in Levinas’ works, but the most 
known is perhaps associated by the notions of ‘the Other’ or ‘the Face’. However, it can also 
be recognised in the notion of ‘there is’ and in his phenomenological description of different 
existentials, such as of insomnia. The particular trait that characterises all of them is that they 
are irreducibly singular, and thus cannot be totalised. Our main task in this essay is to see how 
Levinas claims that the subject is primarily characterised as a singularity through a set of 
principles of identity. But in order to get a proper grasp of Levinas’ philosophical project and 
his conception of the history of philosophy and of what is at stake, we need to consider briefly 
a few key concepts of his philosophy. I will do this by highlighting some of the important 
points offered in the important preface to Totality and Infinity. The preface is the only place in 
the book where Levinas explicitly discusses methodology and this is where he introduces 
several of the concepts and themes that will be important in the subsequent chapters of the 
book. Without the context established by the preface, it is easy to lose sight of the overall aim 
of the book.  
1.2 The situation of philosophy 
A peculiarity of the preface is that Levinas begins by describing a situation that he does not 
return to until the later parts of the book, and then only for a few chapters. This situation is 
that of war. This is one of the first major claims in the book, and it guides Levinas’ outlook on 
the history of philosophy. He describes our tendency to totalisation as war and violence, and 
sees this as posing a threat to morality: “The state of war suspends morality; it divests the 
eternal institutions and obligations of their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional 
imperatives” (TI, 21/5) It is not just any morality that is in question, but a morality with 
eternal institutions and obligations and unconditional imperatives. Even though this is not an 
essay on ethics, it should be noted here that Levinas seems to argue for a sort of ethical 
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realism, which claims that we relate to the world and other beings as having a meaning and 
value that is not bestowed upon them by us. We are always already engaged in relations that 
guides us and demand reactions from us. But for now it is important to clarify what kind of 
war Levinas is talking about here. Much has been written on the relation between Levinas' 
philosophy and the events that shook Europe in the twentieth century
1
, and by talking about 
war, he is, without doubt, referring to concrete military war, to armed conflict. But there is 
also a metaphorical dimension to his use of the notion of war, namely as violence in its 
broader sense, and perhaps foremost, the violence of the philosophical thought. The core of 
this claim is that a certain comportment of reason – which Levinas names “politics” – drives it 
to complete itself, at whatever cost: "The art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every 
means – politics – is henceforth enjoined as the very exercise of reason. Politics is opposed to 
morality, as philosophy to naïveté” (TI, 21/5). For Levinas this is most apparent in the way 
epistemological presuppositions have regulated philosophical endeavours in a manner that 
excludes a wide range of questions. It should be underlined that Levinas, by criticising the 
exercise of reason, is not taking an irrationalist stand, rather he is criticising a philosophical 
bias in favour of the theoretical. Levinas is of course not the only one to criticise the 
prioritisation of the theoretical in philosophy, and among his associates at this point are 
Martin Heidegger and the existentialist tradition, with whom he often engages. The theoretical 
bias is one of the most important ways in which the tendency to totalisation is expressed, and 
which is discernible in the philosophical striving towards systematisation. Levinas’ question 
might be formulated like this: Is it possible that a certain way of exercising philosophical 
reason might lead to the ignorance of certain premises that underlies all thought and which 
again leads to morally inadequate consequences? Levinas answers this question with an 
unambiguous affirmation, and the premise that is most extensively discussed in Totality and 
Infinity is that nature of subjectivity. Grounded on a reinterpretation of subjectivity, Levinas 
then goes on to readdress the different relations the subject engages in, among them the 
relation with ‘the Other’. 
If a certain form of philosophising is to be understood as violent in the metaphorical sense, 
and the subject is among the threatened, what is the manner of this violence? At the core of 
this threat is the subject’s sense of identity. This topic is first discussed in terms of peace, and 
                                                 
1
 Levinas comments upon this in a interview with Philippe Nemo, named ”Secrecy and Freedom”. The interview 
is reproduced in Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 
17. printing (2009). 
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Levinas draws an important distinction between two types of peace, namely “the peace of 
empires” and “messianic peace”. The former is the result of war: “The peace of empires 
issued from war rests on war. It does not restore to the alienated beings their lost identity” (TI, 
22/6). What is threatened by totalising philosophy is the way it understands the subject, and 
the manner in which this subject’s identity is constituted. I want to argue that Levinas offers 
multiple principles of self-identification, apparent in the different relations the subject 
engages in. The problem with the peace that follows after totalising philosophy is not that the 
subjects have no identity, but rather that the identity is bestowed upon them. This is most 
apparent in theories in which the subject is understood in light of a structural whole it takes 
part in, a whole which is greater than the subject itself. Levinas emphatically expresses the 
violence he claims the subject is submitted to: “a casting into movement of beings hitherto 
anchored in their identity, a mobilization of absolutes, by an objective order from which there 
is no escape” (TI, 21/6). What Levinas is challenging is not the value of explaining human 
behaviour – it should be obvious that there are multiple occasions in which such explanations 
are essential – but that this should not replace the subject’s identity which has its origin in the 
subject itself. The “messianic” peace Levinas defends tries to restore this latter kind of 
identity, and the first part of Totality and Infinity is dedicated to this topic. By way of 
existential analyses, Levinas shows how this identity is irreducible given that we accept the 
first-person perspective. In this essay, this identity is first examined in terms of psychism, 
which shows how personal identity is derived from the subject’s self-relation. Then it is 
examined in terms of enjoyment, which is the identity that is developed through the subject’s 
world-relations. The third important relation, the relation to the Other, or to Infinity, will be 
discussed only briefly in this essay, and then mainly as a contrast to the other relations. The 
identity of the subject is one of the core ideas of Levinas’ ethical thought, but apart from the 
question of how the subject relates to the Other, and the related question of whether the 
signification of the Other results from an analogy from the self or by revelation, the questions 
of morality is beyond the scope of this essay. 
1.3 A defence of subjectivity 
At this point we might ask ourselves why Levinas is so concerned with safeguarding an 
existentialistic or vitalistic understanding of the subject. In what way does his understanding 
of personal identity rebut the violence he claims is inherent in the more objective 
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understanding of the subject? The theme of war and violence strikes a dramatic tone that 
pervades the work, something which has inspired many readers to highlight the ethical 
questions the book raises. In an interview with Philippe Nemo, Levinas expresses a similarly 
dramatic motivation for his thought. On a question concerning the inspiration from Bergson in 
his work, he claims that it is particularly apparent in “the fear of being in a world without 
novel possibilities, without a future of hope, a world where everything is regulated in 
advance; to the ancient fear before fate, be it that of a universal mechanism, absurd fate, since 
what is going to pass has in a sense already passed” (Levinas 2009, 28). But Levinas is also 
motivated by more subtle and metaphysical reasons, to which he devotes major parts of the 
book. By defending the irreducibility of the personal identity, he claims that it is a necessary 
condition for understanding human action, a notion that Levinas understands in a quite broad 
sense. What is at stake in Levinas philosophy may be understood in light of his implicit claim 
that how we understand being in general and the human being in particular, guides our 
understanding of morality. Only insofar as we properly understand the subject, may we 
achieve an adequate understanding of morality. Levinas’ defence of the minimally 
existentialistic account of the subject leads him to readdress a wide range of philosophical 
questions, among them the notion of truth and the relation between theory and practice. Most 
of the questions he raises are already thematised by his own philosophical generation, and the 
generation of their teachers. Thus, the most prominent voices in Levinas’ book are those of 
Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, but the inspiration of a wide range of philosophers – among 
them Plato, Kant and the German Idealists, Bergson and Rosenzweig – resonates in the text. 
The different philosophical influences constitute a problem for anyone who engages in a close 
reading of Levinas’ work, as he only on a few occasions explicitly refers to the philosophers 
he engages with, even though the tone of his discussion is often polemical. For the reader it is 
often essential to identify the philosopher in question in order to properly understand the 
content and extension of Levinas’ claims. In this essay I will only identify the references on 
those occasions where such an explication importantly contributes to the topic at hand, and 
then, it will mainly be limited to the three former philosophers: Husserl, Heidegger and 
Sartre.  
1.4 Terminological distinctions: “Same/Other”, 
“interiority/exteriority”  
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Before we continue and address the question of subjectivity, it is important to examine 
another few concepts that Levinas introduces in the preface and which constitute the key 
concepts of his work. These are two interrelated pairs of concepts which are used in a 
somewhat ambiguous sense throughout the text. The first pair is that of “the Same” and “the 
Other” and is a well-known part of the philosophical vocabulary that has its roots in Plato’s 
dialogue The Sophist. It is related to the other pair of concept, that of “interiority” and 
“exteriority”, which is forcefully given philosophical signification by Levinas in this work. 
Levinas introduces the concepts of exteriority, the Same and the Other in a phrase where he 
expounds the consequences of totalisation and war: “It establishes an order from which no 
one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior. War does not manifest exteriority 
and the other as other; it destroys the identity of the Same” (TI, 21/6). The Same is primarily 
to be understood as the human subject, more specifically the “I” of philosophy. The Same 
constitutes the point of departure for Levinas’ philosophy, a premise importantly influenced 
by Husserl’s phenomenological investigations and Heidegger’s claim that any philosophy has 
to take its course through the understanding of Dasein – Heidegger’s critical understanding of 
the human subject
2
. The notion of the Same as the “I” might be understood in two different 
senses: a limited and a broader sense. Totality and Infinity is written as a pseudo-
genealogical
3
 account of the self. This self is initially shown to be enclosed in its own world, 
a separation which is important for Levinas’ metaphysical project. Subsequently this self is 
shown to relate to the world, but only insofar as it answers the self’s needs. At this point the 
world is disclosed as something available to the subject, ready to be represented or consumed. 
                                                 
2
 I will continue to use Heidegger’s term ‘Dasein’, when discussing his philosophy, but will be using the term 
‘subject’ when discussing Levinas’ philosophy, as he refutes multiple of the premises and conclusions of 
Heidegger’s criticism of the historical understanding of subjectivity. When the discussion requires me to treat the 
two positions simultaneously, I will treat the terms as synonyms. 
3
 This term is intended to capture Levinas’ way of presenting his argument, which is written as a genealogy. The 
prefix pseudo- is to capture the sense in which this does not constitute a proper genealogy, but is rather to be 
understood as a narrative style, moving from simpler descriptions to more complex ones. In Totality and Infinity 
he starts by understanding the subject as psychism, moves on to understand it as enjoyment, before ending up in 
a full-blown ethical subjectivity. Such a genealogical approach is even more apparent in his earlier works, such 
as Time and the Other, where Levinas shows how a subject that is ethically responsible raises up from an 
existence that is anonymous – the Levinasian il y a. Such an approach is called pseudo-genealogical, as Levinas 
claims that these analyses are supposed to show different layers of subjectivity, all present at the same time. But 
by analysing them separately, he can show how they contribute differently to the constitution of the subject, and 
how these different layers are interrelated. 
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This leads to a broader notion of the Same – the “I” and the world to the extent the “I” relates 
to it in this manner, which Levinas describes as egoistic. The term “the Same”, is closely 
related to this understanding of the self, but Levinas often uses it in two distinguishable 
senses. The Same can on the one hand be understood as a force which organises the world 
around itself, but on the other hand, it can also be understood as both including the “I” as this 
force and the world as already organised. The two distinguishable notions –the Same as a 
force or as a field – are expressed interchangeably by the same term, without the distinction 
being pointed out. The notion of the Same is contrasted with the notion of the Other [Autre] 
which is intended to distinguish a radical alterity. The other par excellence is the human Other 
[Autrui]. One of the crucial questions of Levinas’ philosophy is whether the Same – the 
subject – may engage in a relation with the other – primarily as another human being – 
without undermining its radical alterity. Is it possible for the philosophising “I” to relate to 
another human being, without reducing the other to its understanding of itself, or without 
including this other in the world as organised at will? In this essay I will – with the intention 
of clarification – replace the ambiguous term of “the Same” with the terms “I”, “self” and 
“subject”, which will be used interchangeably. These terms are all intended to highlight the 
personal or singular aspect of the human being, and will be developed throughout the essay. 
At this point it is also important to repeat a question that has already been introduced above, 
and which will be discussed later in the essay, namely the question of whether the other is to 
be understood as a revelation or as an analogy from the self. Is the irreducible identity of the 
self and the irreducible alterity of the Other comparable? The problem lies in that while the 
notion of identity has a more univocal sense – it is the identity produced by the subject itself – 
the notion of alterity is more ambiguous. On the one hand it might be understood as being 
produced in the relation between the subject and the Other – thus highlighting Levinas’ 
implicit claim that any philosophical claim takes its course through the subject – while on the 
other hand it might be understood as being produced by the Other’s self-expression – thus 
highlighting the similarity between identity and alterity as the notion of identity as self-
identity is often described as being able to raise one’s voice and to protest. The question 
might then be raised in another manner: Is it possible that the protestation of the self – which 
Levinas’ describes as egoistic – is also a protestation in defence of the Other? I will return to 
these questions towards the end of this essay.  
The second pair of concepts, closely related to the first, is that of “interiority” and 
“exteriority”. These terms are initially to be understood in relation to a system, or an 
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organised field. As such, they express one of the essential aspects of Levinas’ understanding 
of the history of philosophy. The tendency to totalisation, Levinas claims, has its basis in that 
a system tries to incorporate as much as possible into its organised account. Such a system 
becomes a problem at the moment it tries to include those things that cannot adequately be 
incorporated in this account. In the Levinasian history of philosophy, Hegel’s philosophy of 
the spirit is the prime example of such a totalising account. As a contrast to interiority, 
exteriority is that which remains on the outside of the system. But interiority is also used two 
more distinguishable senses, closely related to the two senses of the Same. On the one hand it 
might be understood as the inner life of the “I” – what we have called psychism – and on the 
other hand it might be understood in the broader sense in which the “I” engages with the 
world, thus being close to what Husserl tried to express with his notion of Life-World and 
Heidegger with his notion of Being-in-the-world. In this essay I will only use interiority to 
express the inner life of the subject, and it will be used interchangeably with, in addition to 
other terms, psychism. As for the notion of exteriority, I will generally use it to refer to 
entities that are not the object of representation or construction, and I will refer to the Other 
with the term “radical exteriority”. 
Even though the dualistic terms we have just discussed might seem to endorse a Cartesian 
dualism between the Ego and the world, this is not the case, since Levinas is informed both by 
Husserl’s phenomenological critique of this dualism by his concept of intentionality, and 
Heidegger’s radicalisation of this critique by his concept of Being-in-the-world. But this 
matter is complicated by the fact that Levinas wants to show the limits of the intentional mode 
of relating to the world – as it cannot adequately relate to the Other – and of Heidegger’s 
analysis of Being-in-the-world – as it upholds a subject which is too involved in the world. 
There is a dualism in Levinas’ philosophy, but that is not between the “I” and the world, but 
between “I” and the Other. This dualism is not a substance dualism, but a phenomenological 
one, intended to highlight the presence and reality of entities that cannot be approached 
intentionally – the Other – and the personal identity of the self, which distinguishes it from 
the world it is still always engaged in. This latter aspect will be discussed as separation, 
closely interrelated with identity. 
1.5 A proper understanding of transcendence 
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A final term has to be introduced as it reoccurs innumerable times in Levinas’ philosophy, 
and that is the notion of transcendence. The notion of transcendence he wishes to defend is 
often discussed in terms of eschatology, but Levinas quickly brushes aside any association 
this word may conjure to the religious ideas of the Apocalypse or the teleological ideas of the 
end of history. Rather it is intended to express the breach with the totalising tendency.  
Levinas introduces the idea of transcendence as eschatology in order to distinguish between 
two concepts of transcendence. On the one hand it is transcendence in the minor sense as the 
transcendence of the subject towards a world. Even though the philosophy is replete with 
philosophical accounts of such transcendence, Levinas claims that it is inadequate as it is 
limited by either the self’s organisation of the world, as expressed in classical German 
idealism, or by being conditioned by a preceding organising principle, as Heidegger’s account 
of Being. The proper understanding of transcendence, on the other hand, is intended to 
capture a way in which the self may relate to the Other, without undermining its alterity. This 
notion of transcendence is closely related to Levinas’ idea of Infinity, which he derives from 
Descartes’ third meditation. He describes this in metaphorical terms: “It is a relationship with 
a surplus always exterior to the totality, as though the objective totality did not fill out the 
true measure of being, as though another concept, the concept of infinity, were needed to 
express this transcendence with regard to totality, non-encompassable within a totality and as 
primordial as totality” (TI, 22/7) The relation to the Other, understood in light of the idea of 
Infinity, is characterised by being a relation to something that cannot adequately be 
encompassed by thought. Even though Levinas borrows the notion of Infinity from Descartes, 
it is clear that it is intended to serve a different purpose. For instead of trying to prove God’s 
existence, Levinas wants to defend the claim that there are such things that we do have an 
idea of, but which always exceeds the idea we have of it. This is not to be understood in the 
limited sense in which we approach objects; we have to approach it repeatedly in order to 
adequate our idea of it. Rather, it is to be understood in a more radical sense since, in so far as 
we talk about the Other as the human Other, we are talking about an entity which can express 
itself and defend its expression; or as Levinas would say it in describing his peculiar term “the 
face”: “[it is the] exceptional presentation of self by self, incommensurable with the 
presentations of realities simply given” (TI, 202/221).  
By claiming the reality of such entities that are inexplicable in relation to a totality understood 
as a systematic or contextually determining whole, Levinas engages himself in a discussion 
that is broader than a specifically ethical one. It is essentially a particular view of the subject 
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he wants to defend, a view that does not give prevalence to theoretical and epistemological 
presupposition. Rather it is a subject which engages with the world in a practical way, but 
which yet retains a separation from the world it engages in. This essay will centre the question 
of separation, which Levinas interprets as concerning personal identity. The Levinasian 
notion of transcendence is supposed to capture the way in which such a separate subject 
relates to radical exteriority – a relation which stands as the motivation for Levinas’ 
philosophy. 
1.6 Method and intention 
The larger part of the extensive literature on Levinas mainly discusses his contribution to 
philosophical ethics. This is justified by the fact that Levinas’ writings are full of discussions 
of ethical questions and that Totality and Infinity itself is characterised with an ethical 
vocabulary. In this essay I want to deviate from the common way of analysis, and offer an 
alternative approach to Levinas’ thought. What I shall do is to take a step back and examine 
the arguments he uses to prepare the ground for his fully worked out and properly ethical 
thoughts. Based on the assumption that Levinas, rather than offering a particular ethics in 
Totality and Infinity, shows us how ethics is a dimension that pervades all philosophical 
investigations, I want to examine how the notions of the identity and separation of the subject 
is developed, as these notions play a crucial role in Levinas’ thoughts on the ethical relation 
between the subject and the Other. But the notion of ethics used in Levinas’ sense is different 
from the way ethics is usually understood, both in meta-ethical and in normative discussions. 
Ethics, in Levinas’ work, is rather to be understood in light of core philosophical problems, 
whose relevance is broader than ethics, such as the role and limits of our theoretical and 
practical relations to the world. I agree with Simon Critchley in that to the degree Levinas’ 
work is an ethics, it is a sort of proto-ethics
4: “he is seeking to give an account of a basic 
                                                 
4
 Critchley himself does not use the phrase, but it occurs in several places in the commentary literature on 
Levinas, but is used in two different main senses. John Llewelyn uses this phrase throughout his book The 
Genealogy of Ethics, in order to distinguish Levinas’ sense of ethics from the more traditional way of 
understanding ethics. Proto-ethics thus encompasses the whole of Levinas’ thought as it is expressed in Totality 
and Infinity, as the ethical – the relation with infinity or the Other – pervades both epistemological and 
ontological considerations. Thus, proto-ethics understood in this sense understands Levinas’ philosophy as 
exploring the ground of ethics in its traditional sense, but without offering a distinct normative theory itself. 
Diane Perpich uses the term in a different sense in her work The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Here the term 
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existential demand, a lived fundamental obligation that should be at the basis of all moral 
theory and moral action” (Critchley 2002, 28).   
My effort to examine one of the major preconditions for Levinas metaphysical thoughts, 
namely the notion the identity of the subject will be done by offering a close reading of 
Levinas’ first major work, Totality and Infinity, and this book constitutes the limits of the 
investigation. This methodological approach is motivated both by a sense of lack in the 
already existing commentaries of the book, and by the nature of Levinas’ book itself. Anyone 
familiar with Levinas’ writings easily recognises his hyperbolic style and sweeping analysis. 
As the former to some extend serves the philosophical purpose of avoiding essentialistic 
claims concerning the Other and the idea of Infinity, the language will often seem misplaced 
and inappropriate if we lose this purpose out of sight. I will avoid using his hyperbolic 
language, and will only refer to it when I intend to highlight what purpose it serves. As for the 
sweeping analyses, I intend to place several of his arguments within their appropriate 
philosophical context. By choosing a close reading, it is easier to identify the context of the 
arguments at hand, something that is not exactly helped by the fact that Levinas seldom refers 
directly to the philosophers he engages with. I want to make these discussions more explicit, 
and this will on some occasions mean that I will limit the scope of Levinas’ arguments. On 
other occasions, his arguments will be shown to have an impact beyond what is apparent from 
the text itself. It should be noted that identifying the quotes and references latent in Totality 
and Infinity is an immense task, and a systematic account of these references would go 
beyond what is possible in this essay. I will only try to explicate the reference on the 
occasions when Levinas touches upon the key topics of this essay, namely those of 
subjectivity, and then it is primarily limited to the philosophy of Husserl, Bergson, Heidegger 
and Sartre.  
Another asset of the close reading is that it more easily allows us to understand Totality and 
Infinity as offering a coherent argument, rather than simply a series of loosely connected 
arguments. Depending on whether – or in what way – one sees the different sections of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
proto-ethics designates what is explored before the ethical meeting with the Other in Levinas pseudo-
geneological account of subjectivity and our existence in the world. Here proto-ethics thus encompasses, among 
others, the notions of psychism, enjoyment, dwelling and the discrete other. In this essay, I use the term in its 
former sense. The term “meta-ethics” could have been used, but as Levinas’ interests to a significant degree 
diverge from what is often associated with meta-ethics, such a use seems inappropriate.  
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book as interrelated, the thoughts offered in the book might be interpreted in different ways. 
The choice of examining the notion of subjectivity is guided by a remark Levinas offers in the 
preface, where he claims that the book is a defence of subjectivity (TI, 26/11). It should be 
noted that even though I understand Totality and Infinity primarily to be concerned with this 
notion of subjectivity, that does not mean that Levinas is not addressing other important 
issues. Of these, I will argue that the most central ones are those that attempt to explicate in 
what way we might think alterity in a way that does not undermine this alterity, and in 
elucidating his notion of Infinity. But both of these issues are guided by an overarching task 
Levinas seems to have set himself, namely the attempt to reassess some of the fundamental 
assumptions of the Husserlian phenomenology and the philosophical tradition of which 
phenomenology itself is a part. The way he goes about this task is, as he specifies in the 
preface, through the phenomenological method. By attempting to broaden the scope of 
phenomenology by using the joint method of descriptions and transcendental arguments, he 
takes as his point of departure the notion of subjectivity and the directly related notion of 
consciousness. Thus, even though Levinas addresses multiple issues, they all seem to be 
bound to the fundamental question of how the human subject should be understood. By 
placing the arguments offered in the book in the philosophical tradition of subjectivity, I 
therefore, contrary to the bulk of the vast literature on Levinas, intend to argue that the main 
issue of the book is not strictly ethical.  
The main task of this essay is to examine and explicate the different ways in which the 
identity of the self is constituted, and the different distinctive traits this entails for the subject. 
Closely related to the question of identity is the correlation between the dependency and 
independency of the subject. This correlation is intended to capture the way the subject is both 
limited by facticity, yet retains a separation, which is expressed through spontaneity and 
freedom. Through explicating this core issue, a number of questions arise, which I will deal 
with systematically in order to see in what way they relate to the issue of subjectivity. Among 
these is the question of how Levinas’ conception of our being in the world, differ from 
Heidegger and Sartre. How does Levinas describe our being in the world compared to 
Heidegger’s notion of Geworfenheit and Sartre’s notion of facticity? A related question is 
how Levinas criticises the existentialistic notion of authenticity and tone and pathos of the 
existentialist writings. I want to show how closely Levinas’ notion of subjectivity often comes 
to several of the core existentialist claims, yet in what important ways he diverges from 
existentialism as a whole.  
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There are multiple premises that constitute the important background for Levinas’ work and 
that are shared with amongst others, Heidegger and Sartre, and that warrants the term 
existentialistic as a description of Levinas’ philosophy. First of all, they all claim that there is 
something distinct about the human being which separates it from the being of everything else 
Secondly, they deny Husserl’s attempt to work out a pure phenomenology and his epoché, by 
claiming that there cannot be a consciousness divested of a world. A third claim follows from 
the second, and that is that the human subject is always already engaged in the world that it is 
located in. A detached perspective on the subject in question is unachievable. Fourthly, and 
finally, as a consequence of these claims, they all consider the proper approach to 
understanding the human subject to be that of analysing concrete experiences. With these 
general similarities in place, there are some crucial differences that warrant the qualification 
minimally existentialistic. As will be apparent, Levinas refuses to accept the claim that the 
subject is characterised by a concern for itself. Similarly he dismisses the notion of 
authenticity, claiming that it validates egoism, and tries to reorient the important questions of 
philosophy to be that of the concern for the Other. This leads to a different vocabulary and 
pathos, which distinguish Levinas’ writings. Furthermore, Levinas is not concerned with the 
question of alienation of the world, but rather tries to show how we are at home in the world 
we inhabit. And finally, rather than claiming that the subject’s temporality indicates the 
dislocation of the subject – the way the subject is characterised by a non-coinciding with itself 
– he claims that the subject is coinciding through the principles of identity and separation. All 
of these questions will be thoroughly discusses throughout the essay, but a final remark is in 
order concerning the term vitalistic. I will sometimes use the term “existentialistic” and 
“vitalistic” interchangeably, as they both denote a set of issues. By the term “vitalistic” I am 
not referring to the metaphysical thesis about the organisation of living and non-living beings. 
Rather, I am using it in the same sense as Charles Larmore does in his book The Practices of 
the Self, as denoting a specific vocabulary in describing the subject – a vocabulary of “life” 
and of “living”. Such a vocabulary pervades Levinas’ writings, and coincides with the 
existentialistic premises outlined above. 
The main task of this essay is thus to offer a coherent reading of the notion of the singularity 
of the self in Levinas’ work Totality and Infinity. Even though this investigation is limited to 
the singularity of the self, at the cost of the singularity of the Other, I want to introduce this 
latter notion towards the end of the essay, in order to show the impact the notion of the 
singularity of the self may have on the ethical readings of Levinas. This latter discussion will 
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of course be quite limited, as it is a topic that has been widely discussed and that alone would 
make up a complete thesis, but I consider the value of discussing these two notions together to 
justify these limitations.  
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2 Levinas’ approach to philosophy 
2.1 A transcendental method 
In the introduction, we looked at some of the claims Levinas puts forth in Totality and 
Infinity, and we shall now briefly examine how he intends to defend those claims. Levinas’ 
remarks about methodology are sparse, but he does discuss it explicitly at one point in the 
preface. There he makes it clear that he will follow a method that might be described as 
transcendental: “the way we are describing to work back and remain this side of objective 
certitude resembles what has come to be called the transcendental method (in which the 
technical procedures of transcendental idealism need not necessarily be comprised)” (TI, 
25/10). In the quote Levinas offers some explanation of what he considers a transcendental 
method to be, but some further comments should be made. First of all, when Levinas says he 
will use a transcendental method, I understand this to mean that he will offer transcendental 
arguments. In my understanding of the core of a transcendental argument, I follow Robert 
Stern and Charles Taylor. According to Stern, the transcendental arguments proposes 
necessary conditions to the possibility of some state of affairs: “The first, and perhaps the 
most definitive feature, is that these arguments involve a claim of a distinctive form: namely, 
that one thing (X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of something else (Y), so that (it 
is said) the latter cannot obtain without the former. In suggesting that X is a condition for Y in 
this way, this claim is supposed to be metaphysical and a priori, and not merely natural and a 
posteriori” (Stern 2007, 3). Put into words more fitting for our task: by a transcendental 
argument a philosopher presents a generally accepted situation or state of affairs, and 
subsequently searches for the necessary preconditions for the possibility of this situation. 
Multiple other possible criteria for transcendental arguments are suggested, but following the 
multiplicity of strategies used by the diverse philosophers who have utilised such arguments – 
among others Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and more recently Putnam and Davidson – these are not 
considered to be constitutive of a transcendental argument (Stern 2007, 2–3). One trait that I 
want to highlight is that transcendental arguments usually take their starting point from 
experience, and the arguably most paradigmatic transcendental argument, Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the categories, is an example of this. By departing from a private 
or shared experience, the transcendental argument is usually understood as an attempt to rebut 
the sceptic, by only taking for granted that which also the sceptic might accept (Stern 2007, 
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4). Levinas’ transcendental arguments also takes its departure from experience, and then often 
from the first-person perspective. But rather than applying this strategy in order to argue 
against a sceptic, Levinas considers it to follow from his phenomenological commitments to 
concrete experience. Taylor offers some further qualifications which limit the scope of the 
argument in a way that seems to apply to Levinas. Taylor’s general understanding of the 
transcendental arguments is quite similar to Stern’s, but the terms he uses are different: “The 
arguments I want to call ‘transcendental’ start from some feature of our experience which 
they claim to be indubitable and beyond cavil. They then move to a stronger conclusion, one 
concerning the nature of the subject or the subject’s position in the world. They make this 
move by a regressive argument, to the effect that the stronger conclusion must be so if the 
indubitable fact about experience is to be possible” (Taylor 1997, 20). But, Taylor claims, 
these arguments do not defend an ontological thesis, but rather a thesis about self-
understanding: They say something “about the nature of our life as subjects” (Ibid., 26), or, as 
he puts it later, “about the subject of experience and the subject’s place in the world” (Ibid., 
33). Thus, adapted to Levinas’ philosophy, the transcendental arguments do not aim at 
proving the sceptic wrong, but rather showing the form any account about the subject must 
take, given that we accept the first-person perspective. The limited scope of Levinas’ 
argument will be discussed further in the subsequent chapter. 
2.2 A phenomenological method 
In the preface Levinas offers another remark about methodology where he specifies that he 
will follow a phenomenological method. Levinas’ close relation to the texts of Husserl and 
Heidegger indicates an affinity with phenomenological questions, as does much of his 
terminology. But already from the start it is apparent that Levinas will diverge, as does 
Heidegger, from the traditional Husserlian phenomenology’s preoccupation with 
intentionality: “[T]he presentation and the development of the notions employed owe 
everything to the phenomenological method. Intentional analysis is the search for the 
concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines them are nevertheless, 
unbeknown to this naïve thought, revealed to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by this 
thought; there horizons endow them with a meaning – such is the essential teaching of 
Husserl. What does it matter if in the Husserlian phenomenology taken literally these 
unsuspected horizons are in their turn interpreted as thought aiming at objects! What counts is 
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the idea of the overflowing of objectifying thought by a forgotten experience from which it 
lives” (TI, 28/14). What Levinas does in the paragraph at hand is to introduce a distinction 
between the letter and the spirit of Husserl’s texts. In Totality and Infinity Levinas turns his 
attention towards those “forgotten” experiences, which we should not understand as objects in 
the proper phenomenological sense. These experiences will be treated in this essay in terms of 
psychism and enjoyment and we will examine the broad spectre of experiences that 
constitutes our sense of identity. By this move, Levinas is situated closer to Heidegger’s 
account of phenomenology than Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The closeness to 
Heidegger’s philosophy is most apparent if this is understood as an existential 
phenomenology, rather than an ontological phenomenology. Much of Levinas’ philosophy is 
directed as a criticism of this latter form of phenomenology, which he claims gives prevalence 
to a general idea of Being, rather than particular beings. I will not discuss this polemic further, 
but rather turn my attention towards the difference between existential and transcendental 
phenomenology. An existential phenomenology understands the subject as a being that is 
already in the world, rather than as a transcendental ego that is, somehow, radically outside 
the world. Such an existential phenomenology offers an analysis of the ways of being in the 
world, and thus understands the subject as something that is already engaged by a certain 
interrelation with the world. This account of the task of phenomenology stands in a sharp 
contrast to Husserl’s traditional phenomenology as it appears in his Ideas and Cartesian 
Meditation, which rather offers analysis of the pure consciousness, without regard to any 
relation to the world or indeed to whether it is a human consciousness or not (CM, 25–26).  
2.3 Levinas’ arguments 
There is an affinity between the phenomenological and the transcendental approach, apparent 
in that fact that Levinas always moves from concrete experience to the conditions of that 
experience. But anyone familiar with the text will recognise that it is not a text that 
continuously moves “backwards” towards increasingly fundamental structures and conditions. 
Rather the text is written as if there are certain situations which breaks with the continuous 
life we live, and which expose a more fundamental level of subjectivity on which our 
experiences and the concrete situation in which we find ourselves seem to rest. This ground is 
a minimal notion of subjectivity, to which he adds further characteristics until he ends up with 
a full-blown notion of subjectivity. This rebuilding is written in a narrative style that has been 
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described as pseudo-genealogical. The different characteristics are not to be understood as 
being developed at chronologically different points in a subject’s life, but are rather to be 
understood as being present at all times. The pseudo-genealogical account is rather to capture 
different levels of complexity.  But it should be underlined that Levinas never defends a 
notion of a minimal self, which would constitute a unified point from which every other 
characteristic of subjectivity is derived. Rather he wants to show how the different 
characteristics of subjectivity are co-dependent. The reconstruction of the notion of 
subjectivity is motivated by the need to adequately account for the experiences of rupture, 
which have already briefly been introduced as the relation to the elements and the Other, and 
of experiences such as insomnia.   
Throughout the book Levinas offers multiple arguments in which the development of 
different characteristics of subjectivity is shown to be necessary. Two of those who offer a 
transcendental reading of Levinas and who bring forth different transcendental arguments in 
his work are Leora Batnitzky and Theodore de Boer. Batnitzky highlights the way the ethical, 
in Levinas’ special understanding of it, constitutes a transcendental condition for his notion of 
subjectivity: “Totality and Infinity’s structure suggests a transcendental argument of sorts. If 
we take as true the description of the separable self, then we must recognize that the separable 
subject is made possible only by way of its relationship to the face of another” (Batnitzsky 
2007 ,40). de Boer, on the other hand, understands Levinas’ philosophy to be a philosophy of 
dialogue: “Dialogue is the transcendental framework for the intentional relation to the world 
or, in Buber’s terms, the I-Thou relationship is the transcendental condition for the I-It 
relationship” (de Boer 1997, 1–2). Even though I consider both of these arguments to be 
proper transcendental arguments present in Levinas’ work, I will here limit myself to those 
arguments concerned with the notion of subjectivity. This means that arguments concerning 
infinity and ethics to a large degree will be excluded, unless they contribute to the question of 
subjectivity. The motivation for such a limitation is that subjectivity always seems to 
constitute the point of departure for the other arguments. It is the first-person perspective 
which constitutes the framework of Totality and Infinity, and most of the arguments of the 
book rest on a proper understanding of Levinas’ notion of subjectivity. 
19 
 
3 Psychism, or the inner life 
In this section I want to examine the first trait of subjectivity Levinas introduces, and that is 
the inner life of the subject, or psychism, which is to be understood as the self-relation of the 
subject. In the next chapter I will examine another two traits of subjectivity, those of 
enjoyment and dwelling, which concern the subject’s world-relations. I want to analyse the 
way these relations develops a sense of personal identity for the self, which constitutes the 
singularity of the self. What is characteristic for all of these relations is their concreteness, 
which is clearly expressed by Levinas’ vitalistic or existentialistic way of describing the 
matter. As such, they constitute a manifest contrast to the formalism of transcendental 
subjectivity, the manner in which, as Levinas claims, the subject is understood by Kant and 
Husserl. While explicating this notion of identity through concrete relations, we will on 
several occasions return to the discussion between formalism and non-formalism. But it is 
important to note that Levinas is working from the basic existentialistic premise that every 
account of the subject is an account of a worldly subject, and that it must hence take into 
consideration the manner of our existence. While Levinas’ thoughts on psychism to a large 
degree share certain fundamental premises with the philosophy of Heidegger, the notion of 
enjoyment and dwelling are rather intended to either modify or replace certain Heideggerian 
notions related to our being in the world. One of the core arguments that run through the 
treatment of psychism, enjoyment and dwelling is the way in which they manifest the 
separation of the subject. The correlation between separation and identity is one of Levinas’ 
main claims in the book, and place him in the tradition of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, all of 
whom argue for an absolute, separable self. But the comparison between these philosophers is 
only valid with major modifications. First of all, as the analysis of psychism shows, Levinas 
claims that the self-relation of this separable self is not a relation of knowledge, but is rather 
to be understood as lived. Second of all, as the subsequent analysis of enjoyment will show, 
this separation is not to be understood as self-sufficiency, as the subject is rather to be 
understood as “living off” the world. Lastly, this separation and the correlated identity is not a 
static trait which characterises the subject, but is conditioned by concrete events, be it the 
activity of the subject in psychism, or the passivity and receptivity in enjoyment. What is at 
stake for Levinas with the notion of separation is his understanding of metaphysics, which 
presupposes an absolute separation between the two terms of the metaphysical relation – the 
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Same and the Other. In the following I want to examine how this separation is positively 
produced, and how this separation also constitutes the identity of the subject.  
3.1 The notion of psychism 
Levinas endorses multiple separable notions of personal identity in Totality and Infinity, all of 
which have the common trait that the identity in question cannot be reduced to a set of formal 
qualities. Rather, the notions of identity are to be understood as the result of concrete 
relations. This is where Levinas’ vitalistic or existentialistic approach to the subject becomes 
apparent, for the identity is constituted by the content of the subject’s experiences, rather than 
by a formal quality which can be attributed to the experiences: “To be I [moi] is, over and 
beyond any individuation that can be derived from a system of references, to have identity as 
one’s content. The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose 
existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to 
it. It is primal identity, the primordial work of identification” (TI, 36/25). Psychism is the 
inner life of a subject with its plurality of thoughts and subjective experiences, unified by the 
subject’s fundamental temporality and its sense of personal time. By this inner life, we 
encounter Levinas’ first principle of personal identity. This identification is not a way the 
subject represents itself to itself, nor is it an act of cognition; it is rather to be understood as a 
lived experience. On the one hand it is the way the subject knits together past, present and 
future to a story – or a life – it claims to be its own, and on the other hand it is the experience 
that I cannot but live my life. As I want to show in the examinations to follow, these two 
descriptions of the identity by inner life complement each other, and are both founded on 
what Levinas, following Heidegger’s philosophy, claims is the fundamental temporality of the 
subject. The former description is examined by Levinas as the temporality of the subject,
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while the latter is exposed through a number of existential analyses Levinas’ offers 
throughout his works.
6
 
                                                 
5
 The temporality of the subject is a theme that Levinas discusses with multiple philosophers, and not only 
Heidegger. Both Husserl’s and Bergson’s thought on time constitute essential contributions to Levinas’ 
philosophy. Bergson and Heidegger will be discussed further in the essay, while Husserl’s thoughts on time-
consciousness have to be omitted due to the limited scope of this essay. 
6
 Of the most famous of these analyses is to be found in Levinas’ early work, On Escape, first published in 1935.  
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In describing the notion of psychism, Levinas uses a series of different terms, such as 
‘thought’, ‘soul’, ‘the I’, ‘inner life’, and even ‘interiority’. The relation between these terms 
is not obvious, as Levinas often uses them in multiple senses. Some further explication thus 
seems to be appropriate. The main issue rises in relation to the ambiguous sense of the term 
‘interiority’, which was discussed in the introduction. On the one hand the interiority was 
discussed negatively, as that which falls within a system, and on the other hand it was 
discussed more positively, as the life-world or the world-relations of a human being who is 
located within the world. In the chapters on psychism, Levinas first and foremost uses it in 
limited sense of the second interpretation, to denote the subject as it lives and thinks, prior to 
all relations to the world; psychism is the interiority of the subject. Later, this self-relation 
will be shown to be “prior to all relations to the world” only in so far as it is forgetful of these 
relations. This forgetfulness, which Levinas’ identifies with the “youth” of the subject, has 
important consequences, and will be examined in a separate subchapter. But the ambiguity in 
the term ‘interiority’ points to a tension in Levinas’ work, between the “I” that has an 
interiority that cannot be included in any other external system, and the “I” that is at the centre 
of the Same and systemises the world around it. This tension is expressed by seemingly 
contradictory statements. 
The positive understanding of psychism as interiority plays a major role in Levinas’ 
philosophy as it is the point of departure for metaphysics: “‘Thought’ and ‘interiority’ are the 
very break-up [brisure] of being and the production (not the reflection) of transcendence. We 
know this relation only in the measure that we effect it; this is what is distinctive about it. 
Alterity is possible only starting from me” (TI, 40/29). In this dense quote, Levinas specifies 
both how the subject is something which stands out – something which constitutes a break 
with totality – and how it plays an essential role in the possibility of transcendence. This 
notion of transcendence, is not the transcendence of a subject towards the world, but more 
radically – in Levinas’ thought – towards the Other. While Levinas claims that the former 
sense of the word transcendence is not a proper transcendence, as it is only a movement 
within the same, the second sense of the term points toward a sense of the term where the 
subject stands in a relation with something towards which it cannot adequately be said to be 
moving. What seems to be at stake is the relation between the Same and the Other, which may 
be said to constitute one of the core ideas of Levinas’ philosophy. From this crucial remark 
we can derive three main claims concerning the subject: Firstly that the relation of 
transcendence is only possible given that it takes its departure from the I; Secondly, that this 
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transcendence is not reflected by the I, as that towards which we transcend is not an object 
that can be represented, but rather something that is produced; And, thirdly, that “thought” 
and “interiority”, which are here to be identified with psychism, constitute a break with 
totality. The remaining subchapters on psychism will discuss the sense of this rupture, and the 
way in which the subject derives a sense of separation and identity from this. 
But the image of psychism as interiority described above stands in sharp contrast with other 
passages where Levinas describes the subject as that which is to be identified with totality. 
Just a few lines after the passage cited above, Levinas claims the following: “The same is 
essentially identification within the diverse, or history, or system. It is not I who resists the 
system, as Kierkegaard thought; it is the other” (TI, 40/30). The tension between the two 
descriptions, the one where the subject breaks with the system that tries to reduce it and the 
other where the subject cannot break with the system, sometimes simply because it is the 
subject itself that makes the systems, is not relieved in Totality and Infinity. It may be 
suggested that Levinas’ thoughts on how the subject is founded on a relation to Infinity might 
ease the tension. These thoughts, which will not be discussed in this essay, are one of the 
ways in which Levinas argues against the idea of the fundamentally autonomous subject. By 
showing how the subject always already stands in a relation with something it cannot have 
produced itself, and of which it cannot adequately form an idea, any description of the subject 
which leans towards either one of the descriptions – the subject as simply totalising or as a 
point of rupture – will be insufficient. Thus the tension introduced above does not disappear, 
but is rather a recurring theme elaborated throughout the book both by the interplay between 
his thoughts on responsibility and freedom, and between dependence and separation. Levinas’ 
pseudo-genealogical account of the subject presented in the introduction, is important as it 
underlines the way these different levels of analysis are always present in the actual subject. 
Apart from the question of how to understand the term ‘interiority’, there are problems 
connected to the other terms as well. The term ‘soul’ occurs on several occasions throughout 
the book as a synonym to psychism. But as any discussion which distinguishes the soul from 
the world often seem to imply a metaphysical substance dualism – a proper discussion of 
which is nowhere to be found in Totality and Infinity – we must ask ourselves whether 
Levinas is engaging in an argument in defence of substance dualism. Levinas does in fact 
argue for a separable subject, but as this is defended in terms of temporality and not 
substances, I will claim that the metaphysical importance of Levinas’ argument is one of 
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separation and transcendence, and not one of substance dualism. Levinas’ argument of 
psychism, as it will be presented in the below, solely refers to the first-person perspective of 
the subject. In order to clarify the discussion I will thus refrain from using the terms 
‘interiority’ and ‘soul’, but use ‘psychism’ and ‘inner life’ synonymously. The term ‘I’ will 
refer to subject in its broader sense, and not only the subject of psychism, as will the term 
‘self’ and ‘subject’. 
This examination of psychism will be guided by the way psychism offers a principle of 
identity for the self. By existential analysis of death and memory, Levinas wants to show that 
psychism is fundamentally temporal. This temporality will be shown to be an inner time – or 
personal time, as Levinas calls it – an idea by Henri Bergson’s Essai sur les données 
immédiates de la conscience, or Time and Free Will, as it is translated into in English. 
Levinas adopts the idea that time is essential to the possibility of human freedom – which 
Levinas, in relation to psychism, calls youth – but does not place this in the context of physics 
and the conservation of energy, as does Bergson. Psychism is discussed in purely vitalistic 
terms, only referring to the first-person perspective of the subject in question: “Interiority is 
essentially bound to the first person of the I. The separation is radical only if each being has 
its own time, that is, its interiority, if each time is not absorbed into the universal time” (TI, 
57/50). The importance of the first-person perspective is also underlined when Levinas tries to 
show how the separation of the I from the Other is manifested in a concrete moral experience: 
“what I permit myself to demand of myself is not comparable with that I have the right to 
demand of the Other. This moral experience, so commonplace, indicates a metaphysical 
asymmetry: the radical impossibility of seeing oneself from the outside and speaking in the 
same sense of oneself and of others” (TI, 53/45). The tension between the first- and the third-
person perspective, or, as it will also be called, between singularity and generality, pervades 
Levinas’ authorship. 
3.2 Epistemological and metaphysical criticism of 
the notion of inner life 
The notion of psychism, or the inner life, is our first introduction to the Levinasian idea of 
personal identity. Even though Levinas soon partly integrates psychism into a broader 
vitalistic context, including enjoyment, it constitutes a separable principle of identity, along 
with its own issues. One of the main concerns is introduced by Levinas’ claim in the preface 
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of Totality and Infinity that one of the major marks of a totalising philosophy is that it cannot 
account for psychism; in fact, that it cannot account for personal identity in general. In the 
preface this is described in dramatic terms as the individuals are uprooted from the original 
identity which they derive from themselves, and are instead given an identity relative to a 
system. The major part of Totality and Infinity is intended to correct such an understanding of 
subjectivity. Even though Levinas never explicitly deals with it, two generalised objections 
may be offered to the idea of psychism, which themselves exemplify the totalising tendency. 
An epistemological claim may be that psychism is too vague an idea to be the subject of 
philosophy, and when it is in fact formalised it often seems to presuppose a notion of 
infallible self-knowledge or self-awareness, which themselves are highly controversial 
attributes. Even more radical is the metaphysical claim that psychism is a potential illusion, 
reducible to e.g. neurobiological correlates. Such a metaphysical critique usually ignores – 
and sometimes even dissolves – the inner life, for example by explaining it away or reducing 
it to something that can be shown to be the ground for our illusion of inner life. The prime 
example of such a metaphysical debate is the mind-body-problem as it evolved in the 
Cartesian aftermath up to the contemporary metaphysics.  
Multiple reasons may be offered for why Levinas does not engage explicitly with these 
criticisms, but two responses to the criticism above may be emphasised. Against the 
epistemological claim, it is clear that Levinas wants to overturn what he understands to be the 
dominance of epistemology: Preconceptions regarding knowledge should not lead us to 
neglect aspects of the human life, so readily present to each and every one of us. This 
approach is visible as he tries to show how deeply rooted these notions of inner life are to 
human life, but is radicalised as he wants to show how they again constitute the preconditions 
for the concept of truth. Levinas’ conception of truth is too vast a topic to be treated in this 
essay, but might be summarised as following: One the one hand it is distinguished from any 
notion of truth which gives prevalence to justification, and on the other hand it is 
distinguished from the Heideggerian notion of truth which rests on disclosure, which he 
claims presupposes the notion of participation: “Enrootedness, a primordial preconnection, 
would maintain participation as one of the sovereign categories of being, whereas the notion 
of truth marks the end of this reign. … The inner life, the I, separation are [sic] uprootedness 
itself, non-participation, and consequently the ambivalent possibility of error and of truth. The 
knowing subject is not a part of a whole…” (TI, 60–61/54–55). The Levinasian understanding 
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of truth rests on the presupposition of a separable self, and on the idea that the condition of 
truth is sociality. 
Against the metaphysical criticism, Levinas goes on to show the plausibility of his own 
approach. This is both done by offering existential analyses, but also by examining the 
preconditions of metaphysics. He takes the subject as his point of departure, as he is working 
within the tradition of subject-oriented metaphysics, importantly accentuated and modified by 
Heidegger: “Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – 
all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being 
for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the 
question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own 
Being” (BT, 26–27). Even though Heidegger’s philosophical project, as it is presented in his 
seminal work, Being and Time, is different than Levinas’ project, they both commence with 
an examination of the entity who is posing the philosophical questions. In Levinas’ case, this 
entity is described as a separable self, and as he repeatedly claims, this self is the precondition 
of metaphysics itself. Only insofar as we have two terms which are absolutely separable – but 
which yet retain a relation – can we have metaphysics, in Levinas’ understanding of 
metaphysics as transcendence, rather than immanence. The separation of the inquiring subject 
is partly produced by psychism, which thus is shown to be one of the preconditions for 
metaphysics.  
3.3 Regulative ideas: The Levinasian comme si 
As was mentioned in the introduction, Levinas seldom refers to the philosophers he engages 
with, neither when he is influenced by others’ ideas nor when he criticises them. The 
arguments outlined above are first and foremost directed towards general philosophical 
positions. The same is the case with another strategy Levinas uses in order to counter critical 
arguments which remain sceptical about psychism. Without invoking the whole of Kant’s 
systematic philosophy, Levinas employs something comparable to the Kantian regulative 
ideas. For Kant these ideas are ideas of reason intended to give rules and directions to the 
understanding. Only with these ideas may the understanding be assumed to be systematic and 
unified. The example at hand, offered by Kant, concerns the idea of the form of a whole of 
cognition: “If we survey the cognitions of our understanding in their entire range, then we 
find that what reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about concerning it is the 
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systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity of reason 
always presuppose an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of cognition, which precedes 
the determinate cognition of the parts and contains the conditions for determining a priori the 
place of each part and its relation to the others. … One cannot properly say that this idea is the 
concept of an object, but only that of the thoroughgoing unity of these concepts, insofar as the 
idea serves the understanding as a rule” (Kant 2000, A645/B673). This of course opens up the 
possibility that the regulative idea might be an illusion, as it lies “outside the field of possible 
empirical cognition” (Ibid., A644/B672). But Kant goes on to say that if the regulative idea is 
an illusion, it is a still a necessary illusion. In Kant’s critical project the regulative ideas are 
ideas which are necessary for the possibility of our experience, and the example given by 
Kant above shows a necessary condition for the possibility of talking about objects outside of 
our immediate scope. As such it is a precondition for scientific theories about empirical 
knowledge, and as this idea of unified and systematic guides our approach to the empirical 
world in general, it is also necessary for our common-sense empirical knowledge, since we 
tend to consider our cognition to be faulty as long as it does not comply with this idea. The 
Kantian regulative idea is often expressed by an “as if”, for example when he rejects the 
possibility of a cosmological proof of the existence of God: “The ideal of the highest being is, 
according to these considerations, nothing other than a regulative principle of reason, to 
regard all combination in the world as if it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, so as 
to ground on that cause the rule of a unity that is systematic and necessary according to 
universal laws; but it is not an assertion of an existence that is necessary in itself” (Ibid., 
A619/B 647).  
Throughout Totality and Infinity, Levinas uses the phrase “comme si” in order to convey 
something that is quite similar to the Kantian regulative idea.
7
 Similar to Kant, Levinas uses it 
to be able to talk about something that lies beyond the scope of immediate experience (in the 
Kantian sense), but which is presupposed both by common sense and scientific knowledge. 
The crucial difference between Kant and Levinas on this matter is that while Kant uses 
regulative ideas to describe the rules given by the reason to the understanding, Levinas’ 
“comme si” postulates the reality of psychism, in order to justify phenomenological 
descriptions of it. The postulate of reality is motivated by Levinas’ understanding of psychism 
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 It should be noted that Levinas does not use this phrase in a systematic way. Most often it is simply used in 
order to avoid an essentialistic vocabulary.  
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as the phenomenon, where, as we shall see shortly, the potentially illusory character of the 
content of psychism does not negate psychism, but proves it. Levinas claims that this “comme 
si” is not only justified by the fact that we all seemingly experience (in the broader, non-
technical sense of the term) our inner life – of which he offers existential analyses – but also 
by the fact that psychism is, as we saw earlier, presupposed by the possibility of the separable 
subject, metaphysics and truth. These are quite strong claims, but such is the nature of 
Levinas’ philosophy: he wants to show that the metaphysical relation between the subject and 
the radical Other, grounds not only all positive ethical theories, but also all other branches of 
philosophy: “Morality is not a branch of philosophy, but first philosophy” (TI, 304/340)8. 
Psychism is the point of departure for this argument, and the way Levinas examines it in 
Totality and Infinity is through analyses of the temporality of the subject. 
3.4 Time and memory 
The main characteristic of psychism is that it indicates the temporality of the subject. In 
Totality and Infinity Levinas discusses this in connection to all the different relations the 
subject engage in. As this chapter concerns psychism the discussion will here be limited to the 
temporality of the self-relation. The two major ways in which the temporality of the subject is 
unfolded are through memory and projection. Levinas often uses dichotomies in order to 
show the difference between totalising thought and the philosophy that expresses a respect for 
the individual. In relation to psychism, one of these dichotomies is that of chronological time 
and universal time, or as it is also described, of personal time and historical time. The 
universal or historical time is for Levinas an expression of totality: ”The time of universal 
history remains as the ontological ground in which particular existences are lost, are 
computed, and in which at least their essences are recapitulated.” (TI, 55/48) In history each 
individual is understood in the light of a common time, where important existential conditions 
of the individual – like birth and death – are simply understood as punctual moments, deriving 
their ”meaning” from the time and the place of the event in the universal time. The idea of 
time which the chronological or personal time is to counter is never ascribed to one single 
understanding of time. Rather it seems to be directed against several distinguishable 
conceptions. First of all it might be ascribed to the mechanical or scientific understanding of 
time criticised by Henri Bergson in Time and Free Will. While his book is generally directed 
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against the mechanical notion of time qua quantitative, it is specifically directed against Kant 
who, as Bergson claims, subordinates time to space by understanding time as quantifiable. 
But the notion of personal time is also directed against another two conceptions of time, both 
of them teleological. On the one hand Levinas continuously refers to an immanent 
teleological notion of time commonly associated with Geisteswissenchaft, and particularly 
Hegel, where time is understood to be the unfolding of a logos or rationality, only to 
constitute a whole in which every moment might find its place and meaning. On the other 
hand Levinas refers to, and clearly distances himself from, a more transcendent teleological 
notion of time often associated with certain religious ideas of eschatology. This latter notion 
of time, even though it entails an idea of a rupture, ultimately postulates a temporal whole 
bestowing meaning upon every temporal moment. The notion of personal time is intended to 
oppose all of these three different conceptions of time. The crucial point of the personal time 
is that it entails an irreducible first-person perspective. 
This alternative conception of time known as personal time might be called a Bergsonian 
notion of time, as it is heavily influenced by Bergson’s idea of duration. One of Bergson’s 
main theses in Time and Free Will, after claiming that feelings or intensities cannot be 
quantified, and after distinguishing between two sorts of consciousness – immediate 
consciousness and reflective consciousness – is that the traditional notion of time has been 
dependent on the notion of space. By a series of examples, Bergson advocates a notion of 
time which only appears in immediate consciousness through the purely qualitative 
experience of our inner states. He calls this notion pure duration: “Pure duration is the form 
which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it 
refrains from separating its present state from its former states” (Bergson 1960, 100/74–75). 
The main impact of Bergson’s notion of duration on Levinas is the way it opens up the 
dimension of psychism (Levinas 2009, 27–28). At this point one might wonder why Levinas’ 
notion of personal time is here associated with Bergson rather than Heidegger, and there are 
two main reasons for this, apart from the fact that Levinas himself emphasises the importance 
of Bergson. First of all the temporality of the subject or Dasein is examined in relation to two 
different questions. While Bergson tries to intercept the attempt to apply the same notion of 
time on both the mechanical world and the world of spontaneity, Heidegger examines the 
temporality of Dasein in order to appropriately pose the question of Being. This leads to both 
a difference in vocabulary in discussing the issues, and in the set of concerns. The relationship 
between Bergson and Heidegger is complicated, but for Levinas, the crucial distinction is that 
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Bergson examines life rather than Being. The second main reason for stressing the influence 
of Bergson rests with the idea that duration is explicitly to be understood as making possible 
the spontaneity of the subject. While Heidegger argues that Dasein is always ahead of itself, 
and that it thus cannot be described as a fully present, static existence, he goes on to claim that 
Dasein might be examined as a whole as Being-towards-Death. In Bergson’s thought there is 
a similar idea of rupture, but here it is rather to be understood as discontinuity. Duration 
describes a discontinuous time, where no pre-formation or projection of the future is given in 
the present. Duration always implies something radically new, as there is no given relation 
between one moment and the next. Time as duration is not to be understood as a structural 
trait of the subject, but as immediate experience (Bergson 1960, 104–106/78–79, 239/179–
180)
9
. As Levinas tries to avoid understanding the task of philosophy as understanding Being, 
Bergson represents an important alternative for him. But Levinas is heavily influenced by 
Heidegger’s notion of temporality as well, mainly in relation to the idea of projection, which 
will be examined in the next subchapter. 
What is lost in the universal accounts of time is the richness of the inner life and the first-
person perspective. Levinas exemplifies this by showing how the subject itself understands 
the moments of birth and death in her life. This analysis is mainly to show that the subject is, 
by virtue of psychism, a self-interpreting being, a term borrowed from Charles Taylor. The 
moment of birth is a necessary condition for the individual life, but for the one whose birth is 
in question it is only later that this moment of birth is appropriated into the narrative of one’s 
life. More generally Levinas is claiming that even though there is a certain chronology to the 
human life which might be observable from the outside, the subject itself will not relate to the 
moments of its life in the same manner. Rather than understanding its life as a series of causes 
and effects, as a third-person observer might do in light of historical time, the personal time of 
the inner dimension leaves open the possibility of the subject being unaware of the causes and 
circumstances which has lead to the present situation. By virtue of temporality as it is 
manifested in psychism, the subject does not relate to its life simply as an effect of prior 
causes. Rather these circumstances are always discovered at a later moment, and then they 
will always be interpreted in light of that moment. Thus in contrast to the relation between 
cause and effect as it is understood in the universal perspective of historical time, the subject 
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duration as intimately related to consciousness. In his later works, such as Creative Evolution he tries to expand 
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30 
 
only adopts certain circumstances as causes by projecting herself towards them. This 
inversion where “the cause of being is thought or known by its effect as though [comme si] it 
were posterior to its effect” (TI, 54/47) – an inversion which Levinas admittedly calls 
logically absurd – is not a matter of fact that is reflected in thought. Rather it is an inversion 
that is produced by thought. This leads Levinas to claim that psychism is a particular way of 
being: “The original role of the psychism does not, in fact, consist in only reflecting being; it 
is already a way of being [une manière d’être], resistance to the totality.” (TI, 54/46). 
Psychism understood as temporality delineates a way of being that – by virtue of temporality 
itself – stresses the importance of singularity in opposition to universality.  
3.5 Projection and death 
As with memory and the way the human subject relates to its own past, the subject’s relation 
to its own future and the possibilities it entails, also represents a way the personal identity is 
articulated. Levinas’ analyses of the future of the self are done in terms of death and 
fecundity, and rather than discussing them in terms of causality, he does so in terms of 
possibility. But there is an important difference between what the two arguments are intended 
to show. Even though both of the arguments, indicates a manner in which personal identity is 
constituted, along with a manifestation of a breach with totality, the latter is done in a 
different manner. With memory Levinas claims that the inner life retains the possibility of 
interpretation and adoption. The same activity that produced the principle of identity – along 
with the moments and circumstances knitted together through memory – also produces a 
breach with totalising thought as it indicates a singularity that is singular by virtue of this 
activity. This activity we know as psychism does not necessarily entail a conscious activity 
resulting from reflection. There are countless acts we commit that are not preceded by a 
conscious reflection, but that still contribute to the production of the same identity. 
Singularity in this discussion is just another possible term for personal identity. In the next 
chapter we will examine further principles of identity, which are not the result of activity, 
such as enjoyment. With the relation to the future there is, along with the breach of the 
singular subject, another term involved which also represents a breach, namely the future 
towards which the subject projects itself, which is something that cannot constitute the 
identity of the self.  
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3.5.1 Heidegger’s Being-towards-death and the notion of 
authenticity 
The analysis of death in particular is to a large degree indebted to Heidegger, but with several 
important qualifications. In Being and Time Heidegger claims to strive towards offering a 
complete existential analytic of Dasein. Such an effort is challenged by seemingly inevitable 
event of death, which marks the end of Dasein’s existence. As death is inevitable, Heidegger 
claims that Dasein is always directed towards it, but once death is reached, Dasein is no 
longer there. “Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death 
reveals itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is 
not to be outstripped. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Its existential 
possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed, 
indeed, as ahead-of-itself” (BT, 294). Thus, Heidegger goes on to claim, there cannot be an 
existential analysis of death, and a complete existential analytic of Dasein seems impossible. 
At this moment Heidegger proposes that this is only a problem if we treat death as an 
existential state, and that it should rather be understood as an ontological structure. Dasein is a 
being that is always ahead of itself, always projecting itself into the future. And the one 
possibility Dasein cannot but project itself towards is the always impending death. This 
existential structure of Dasein, which Heidegger calls Being-towards-death, plays an 
important role in Heidegger’s philosophy, and we will later return to some of its other 
implications, but for now it is important to underline the way Being-towards-death offers a 
principle of individuality for Dasein.
10
 Heidegger introduces three important characteristics of 
this existential structure in the quote above. First of all, he claims that it is the possibility 
which concerns Dasein the most, as what is at stake is nothing but Dasein’s Being-in-the-
world itself. Secondly, he claims it is a relation which does not refer to any other Dasein than 
the one whose death is in question, and that it is a relation in which Dasein cannot be 
replaced: “When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have 
been undone” (BT, 294). Finally, he claims that it is a relation to a potentiality Dasein cannot 
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 This is a recurring theme in Heidegger’s philosophy, but see also towards the end of the lecture series 
published as History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, where this is put is in unequivocal terms: ”This 
certainty, that ’I myself am in that I will die’, is the basic certainty of Dasein itself It is a genuine statement of 
Dasein, while cogito sum is only the semblance of such a statement. … insofar as I am, I am moribundus. The 
MORIBUNDUS first gives the SUM its sense” (Heidegger 1992, 316–317). 
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avoid. All of these characteristics indicate the individuality that Being-towards-death 
manifests amidst all of Dasein’s relations. 
Heidegger famously connects this existential structure to his thoughts on the authenticity of 
the self. As Taylor Carman points out, the technical term of authenticity [eigentlighkeit] plays 
at least two roles in Being and Time. On the one hand authenticity refers to the quality of 
something being properly belonging to Dasein, and by authentic modes of existence 
Heidegger thus means “those [modes] in which Dasein stands in a directly first-person 
relation to itself, in contrast to the second- and third-person relations in which it stands to 
others, and which it can adopt with respect to itself, at least up to a point” (Carman 2007, 
285). But on the other hand authenticity is also an evaluative concept describing something 
that is desirable or choice-worthy. This twofold sense of authenticity has commonly been 
understood – an understanding shared by Levinas and many of his commentators – as leading 
Heidegger into the view that our life with others – Mitsein – is necessarily inauthentic as we 
lose ourselves into the undifferentiated cluster of first-, second- and third-person perspectives. 
It is only by the call of consciousness that Dasein may return from its absorption in the 
distractions of the world of the general They – of Das Mann. At this point Heidegger claims 
that the source of this call is no one but Dasein itself: “In conscience Dasein calls itself. ... 
When Dasein is appealed to, is it not ‘there’ in a different way from that in which it does the 
calling? Shall we say that its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self functions as the caller? 
... [T]he call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The 
call comes from me and yet from beyond me” (BT, 320). Heidegger thus postulates a two-
tiered understanding of Dasein: One the one hand Dasein is the being that has fallen by losing 
itself in the world, but on the other hand Dasein is the being that is characterised by being 
thrown into a world which is not of its own making and in which it is not at home. These 
notions will be discussed further in the chapter on enjoyment which concerns the subject’s 
world-relations, but for now it is important to note that for Heidegger, Dasein moves between 
these two tiers in a peculiar way. In realising the naked and thrown character of its being, 
Dasein flees into the distractions of the world of the They. It is the mood [Stimmung] of 
anxiety that – by virtue of the ontological characteristic, or existentiale, of Dasein usually 
translated as state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] – drives Dasein away from fundamental character 
of its Being-in-the-world. This mood of anxiety also plays the role of disclosing this Being-in-
the-world to the fallen Dasein, on the ground of which the conscience may call on Dasein.  
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The notion of authenticity is to describe the possible self-relation of Dasein in which it comes 
to term with its own individuality by disclosing its Being-towards-death, and the concomitant 
ontological characteristics of its existence, such as its thrownness [Geworfenheit] or that it is 
always ahead of itself. This authentic existence is described by Heidegger as Dasein’s 
anticipatory resoluteness [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. As such an authentic existence is an 
existence in which Dasein lives in light of the fact that it is accountable for what it is and is 
not: “By ‘resoluteness’ we mean ‘letting oneself be called forth to one’s ownmost Being-
guilty’. Being-guilty belong to the Being of Dasein itself, and we have determined that this is 
primarily a potentiality-for-Being. To say that Dasein ‘is’ constantly guilty can only mean that 
in every case Dasein maintains itself in this Being and does so as either authentic or 
inauthentic existing” (BT, 353). Dasein’s Being-towards-death comes into play here as it 
marks Dasein’s primordial possibility: The self-understanding manifested by resoluteness 
“maintains itself authentically in it if the resoluteness is primordially that which it tends to be. 
But we have revealed that Dasein’s primordial Being towards its potentiality-for-Being is 
Being-towards-death ... Anticipation discloses this possibility as possibility. Thus only as 
anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being” (BT, 354). The Dasein that leads an authentic existence has come to 
terms with the thrownness that characterises it, along with its potentiality-for-Being which is 
ultimately Being-towards-death, which gives it the responsibility that follows from the fact 
that Dasein’s projects are Dasein’s ownmost, unfolding within the horizon of the certainty of 
the always impending death. 
3.5.2 Readdressing death 
Heidegger’s analyses of Dasein’s Being-towards-death were to show the fundamental 
temporal character of Dasein, and the fact of its finitude. Levinas’ initially agrees with the 
notion of temporality that is involved, in so far as it is indicates the limits of Husserl’s 
understanding of the future in terms of protention, where the future is understood as limited to 
the intuitively expected and to possible perception: “<In such anticipation> the intuitively 
expected, that to which one intends in foresight as ‘coming in the future,’ has at the same 
time, owing to possible reflection ‘in’ anticipation, the signification of something which will 
be perceived” (Husserl 1983, 175). Death in Heidegger’s philosophy indicates another kind of 
future which is inevitable, but which is not a possible perception; it represents what was 
earlier described as the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”. In Levinas’ 
34 
 
philosophy, as in Heidegger’s, death is, like birth, available to analysis from two different 
perspectives. On the one hand, it is the end point of the subject and Levinas claims that as 
such death is just another punctual moment in historical time, only available to the surviving 
subjects, never to the subject whose death is in question. On the other hand, death may be 
understood in light of psychism, where it is something which the subject relates to by virtue 
of its inner life. The crucial difference between Levinas and Heidegger on this issue is both 
the role death plays in the subject’s existence and the characteristics of the temporality it 
entails. 
Levinas’ first objection to Heidegger’s account might at first seem a bit implausible, as what 
he wants to challenge is the idea of the certainty of death. “For a being to whom everything 
happens in conformity with projects, death is an absolute event” (TI, 56/49). As Heidegger 
claims that death is the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein, one could easily reverse the 
terms and say that death is an impossible possibility, since it can never be experienced, as 
Dasein is no longer there [Da]. By connecting Being-towards-death and authenticity 
Heidegger seems to lay himself bear to the objection concerning how Dasein is to appropriate 
the certainty of death without relying on third-person accounts. Put in Levinas’ terms, we 
might say that even though Heidegger gives death an existential meaning for Dasein, he still 
understands it through the eyes of the survivors. Death as an absolute event is not something 
that can be derived from the first-person perspective, and the conception of it as an absolute, 
punctual event where Dasein no longer is present, rests on the perspective of the survivors, or 
the third party. This seems to lead Heidegger into a conflicting account of Dasein who is to 
lead an authentic life by realising its accountability of its projects and its irreducible first-
person perspective in light of the fundamental structure of its existence as characterised by 
finality, when the certainty of death itself rests on a third-person account. Heidegger’s 
solution to the problem is to distinguish between the ontic and the ontological level: While 
Dasein’s own death cannot be represented at the ontic level of experience, it can be so at the 
ontological level of fundamental structure, revealed as a transcendental condition. But 
Levinas’ objection to considering death as an absolute event is not that it leads Dasein into 
inauthenticity, but that it entails an inadequate understanding of temporality.  
Levinas’ attempt to reassess temporality will be addressed one step at a time. First it is 
important to note that Levinas does not do away with the individualising capacity of death – 
no one can die your death for you. But what he claims is the error of Heidegger’s account is 
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that he fails to appreciate the radical otherness of death. The significance of death as 
understood in psychism is both the way it shows how psychism offers a principle of 
identification and the way it opens up a future that is radically unknown as it cannot be 
anticipated. But instead of accepting death as an absolute event indicating the finitude of the 
subject, Levinas wants to show that there is another dimension to death: “for there to be a 
separate being, for the totalisation of history to not be the ultimate schema of being, it is 
necessary that death which for the survivor is an end be not only this end; it is necessary that 
there be in dying another direction than that which leads to the end as to a point of impact in 
the duration of survivors” (TI, 55/48). But what is this other direction? This is Levinas’ 
second move, as he shifts the attention from death to dying, where the former was agreed 
upon as beyond the possible experience, the latter may be experienced by the subject in 
question. With the phenomenon of dying, Levinas is able to give a richer principle of 
identification. Even though Levinas would agree with Heidegger’s claim that death 
understood as Dasein’s ownmost offered a principle of individuation, the personal identity 
which follows from this individuation retains a formal structure as it rests on an impossible 
experience. By rather addressing dying, Levinas’ develops a principle of identity that rests on 
possible experience. This is dramatically expressed in his analysis of death agony which he 
understands as the refusal of death as an absolute event: ”The death agony is precisely in this 
impossibility of ceasing, in the ambiguity of a time that has run out and of a mysterious time 
that yet remains; death is consequently not reducible to the end of a being. What ‘still 
remains’ is totally different from the future that one welcomes, that one project forth and in a 
certain measure draws from oneself… Dying is agony because in dying a being does not 
come to an end while coming to an end; he has no more time, that is, can no longer wend his 
way anywhere, but thus he goes where one cannot go, suffocates – how much longer…. The 
non-reference to the common time of history means that mortal existence unfolds in a 
dimension that does not run parallel to the time of history” (TI, 56/49). In this quote we can 
see to what degree Levinas stresses the unknown nature of death and how he reintroduces the 
ambiguous nature of time: time discussed as universal time where death represents an end 
point, and time discussed as personal time where this end point is repeatedly postponed. This 
latter view of time is only accessible through the first-person perspective. And it is this 
experience of suffering and postponement that attests individuality, rather than the formal 
quality of having to die one’s own death. 
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Both memory and dying confirms the notion of personal time, and consequently the notions 
of separation and identity. We have not discussed the subject’s relation to its future apart from 
death, which is only briefly discussed in Totality and Infinity as the possibility of the I’s “self-
possession in the future” (TI, 54/47). Levinas acknowledges both the Husserlian idea of the 
future as protention and the Heideggerian idea of projection as two important ways in which 
we relate to out future. But his important contribution is that these do not offer a complete 
account of this relation, as the subject also relates to things which are radically different from 
it, and which cannot contribute to its identity. The future referred to as “what still remains” 
was described as something we cannot welcome nor project ourselves towards. Thus death 
introduces the notion of radical alterity that plays a crucial role in Levinas’ philosophy, and 
indicates the limits of psychism discussed so far. In dying we are shown to be in a relation to 
death as otherness. Already in the first parts of the book Levinas connects these two terms 
while discussing the separation of the metaphysically desired: “This remoteness is radical 
only if desire is not the possibility of anticipating the desirable, if it does not think it 
beforehand, if it goes towards it aimlessly, that is, as towards an absolute, unanticipatable 
alterity, as one goes forth unto death” (TI, 34/22). The analysis of dying offers a positive 
confirmation of the separation by maintaining the irreducibility of personal time to universal 
time, but it also shows how the subject is related to something towards which it cannot project 
itself, as it is a radically unknown future. At this point it is crucial to clarify that by refusing 
death as an absolute event, Levinas is not claiming that the subject in some way lives on after 
its death, nor is he postulating the eternity of the soul. Rather, he wants to underline the ways 
in which psychism refuses to be totalised. This, he claims, is what the idea of the eternity of 
the soul was supposed to express (TI, 57/50). By comparing psychism with the idea of the 
eternal soul, Levinas is making a metaphysical claim about separation, not about the 
substantial basis of the soul. Even though Levinas several times use the word psychism as 
synonymous with the soul, this is only one of the synonyms he uses. Furthermore, a 
discussion on the substantial basis of the soul is nowhere to be found in his book
11
; the issue 
of psychism is, as we have seen, rather discussed in terms of thought and time.  
                                                 
11
 The only time Levinas actually mentions a body-soul dualism is in order to reject that he is engaging in that 
discussion. I quote the passage at length: ”The body does not happen as an accident to the soul. Shall we say that 
it is the insertion of a soul in extension? This metaphor solves nothing; there would remain the problem of 
understanding the insertion of the soul in the extension of the body. Appearing to representation as a thing among 
things, the body is in fact a mode in which a being, neither spatial nor foreign to geometrical or physical 
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By highlighting the radical unknown character of death, Levinas is not trying to challenge the 
mortality of the human subject. As we shall shortly see, it is first and foremost an attempt to 
alter the notion of temporality, but it is implicitly also a criticism of the pathos of Heidegger’s 
existentialism. By connecting death and authenticity, Heidegger turned the issue of death into 
a question of the self-mastery of coming to terms with the conditions of our life. The relation 
to death is a self-relation. In Levinas’ philosophy this is not the case; as the subject’s relation 
to death is a relation to otherness. Death is not something we live towards, but which comes 
to us, unforeseeable and unknown: “The imminence of death does not come from a precise 
point in the future... The unforeseeable character of the ultimate instant is not due to an 
empirical ignorance, to the limited horizon of our understanding, which a greater 
understanding would have been able to overcome. The unforeseeable character of death is due 
to the fact that it does not lie within any horizon. In death I am exposed to absolute violence, 
to murder in the night” (TI, 233/259). Rather than discussing death in terms of mastery and 
self-relation, Levinas thus underlines our vulnerability in relation to an always impending 
threat. This criticism of the heroic rhetoric of the traditional existentialism will reappear later 
in this essay. 
But finally, in what sense does Levinas’ alter the notion of temporality? Underlying Levinas 
criticism of Being-towards-death and authenticity is the negative assessment of sociality. Both 
Levinas and Heidegger agree on the importance of being able to assume second and third-
person perspectives on ourselves, without which a social life would seem impossible. The 
problem arises when temporality is disclosed in the self-relation of its Being-towards-death. 
This gives rise to a particular misconception Levinas claims Heidegger falls for: “Traditional 
philosophy, and Bergson and Heidegger too, remained with the conception of a time either 
taken to be purely exterior to the subject, a time-object, or taken to be entirely contained in 
the subject. But the subject in question is always a solitary subject. The ego all alone, the 
monad, already had time. ... [I]t believed in the silent dialogue of the soul with itself” 
(Levinas 2004, 96–97/160–161). One might object by saying that Heidegger does not make 
this assumption, supported by passages such as this: “The being, in which Dasein can be its 
wholeness authentically as being-ahead-of-itself, is time. Not ‘time is’ but ‘Dasein qua time 
temporalizes its being.’ Time is not something which is found outside somewhere as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
extension, exists separately” (TI, 168/182). Even though Levinas’ claims about the body remain ambiguous, it is 
clear that he is not talking about two interacting substances. 
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framework for world events. Time is even less something which whirs away inside in 
consciousness. It is rather that which makes possible the being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-
being-involved-in, that is, which makes possible the being of care” (Heidegger 1992, 319–
320). What Heidegger seems to claim is that time is neither something purely interior or 
purely exterior, but that it is a structural trait of Being that Dasein produces simply by its way 
of being. But Levinas’ criticism remains intact if it is slightly reformulated. What he objects 
to in Heidegger’s account of temporality is not that it is purely interior or purely exterior, but 
that it is essentially bound to the Dasein in question. Levinas’ account of the subject’s 
temporality is on the contrary intended to highlight the way sociality constitutes one of the 
fundamental conditions for temporality. First he claims that it “is not finite freedom that 
makes the notion of time intelligible; it is time that gives a meaning to the notion of finite 
freedom” (TI, 224/247). Time is not bound either to the purely exterior world or to the purely 
interior psychism; rather it is connected to the plurality of social existence. The relation to 
death breaks up the assumed solitude of the subject by introducing plurality; we are related to 
something that is radically different from us. Death often, if not always point to a sociality: 
“Death approaches in the fear of someone, and hopes in someone. ... In the being for death of 
fear I am not faced with nothingness, but faced with what is against me, as though murder, 
rather than being one of the occasions of dying, were inseparable from the essence of death, 
as though the approach of death remained one of the modalities of the relation with the Other 
[Autrui]” (TI, 234/260). By explicitly criticising the Heideggerian account of death as Dasein 
being faced with nothingness, Levinas wants to show that death rather is characterised with 
being located within a social context, either by the subject being threatened by someone or 
aided by someone. He quickly clears out the religious interpretation of the passage quoted 
above by claiming that he is not referring to a religious system, but rather an irreducible 
interpersonal order. Levinas’ metaphysical underpinning of this temporality and sense of 
future is offered in fecundity. As this essay is limited to the way the subject relates to itself 
and the world, fecundity will not be examined here.  
Analyses of Levinas’ understanding of time tend to stress the way in which it breaches with 
personal time and opens up to sociality, an argument that is often directed against Heidegger. 
In this subchapter I have tried to show how Levinas objects to certain of Heidegger’s claims 
and assumptions, but I have also tried to show how he retains an ambiguous notion of time. It 
should be clear that Levinas claims that time is not revealed by finite freedom as bound to the 
subject in question, but that it is rather what makes finite freedom possible. Finite freedom is 
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repeatedly described as having still more time, as the analysis of dying showed. Yet at the 
same time, Levinas defends the existential relevance of time in attesting the personal identity. 
In fact, even though Levinas directed a criticism against Bergson’s and Heidegger’s 
distinction between purely exterior and purely interior time, he also defends a notion of 
personal time, but with one modification: even though the personal time defines the 
possibilities of the subject in questions and opens up for the freedom we discussed in terms of 
memory, this time is not purely interior, but only arises in relation to alterity.  
3.6 Youth and freedom  
Psychism opens up a dimension of subjectivity that can neither be reduced to the way the 
subject is observed through the third-person perspective, nor to the world-relations the subject 
is engaged in. Even though the analysis of enjoyment will show that the subject’s relation to 
the world is one of both independence and of dependence, Levinas will insist on the relative 
self-sufficiency of psychism. This means that even though psychism would be unimaginable 
without the worldly existence of the subject, the world-relations do not adequately explain the 
self-relation involved in psychism. At the core of this self-relation is the Levinasian notion of 
youth, which I earlier called spontaneity. The notion of youth was introduced when Levinas 
discussed the way the subject identified itself by adopting circumstances and moments 
through memory. What Levinas tried to show was the manner in which the subject refrained 
from considering itself as determined by the complex of relations that supported its existence, 
be it the relation to a particular site in the world or the relation between causes and effects. 
Even though the subject is always located within these relations of conditions, psychism 
opens up for the possibility that the subject may consider itself not to be determined by these 
relations: “by virtue of the psychism the being that is in a site remains free with regard to that 
site; posited in a site in which it maintains itself, it is that which comes thereto from 
elsewhere. The present of the cogito, despite the support it discovers for itself after the fact in 
the absolute that transcends it, maintains itself all by itself – be it only for an instant, the space 
of a cogito” (TI, 54/47). The inner life is what makes this suspension of conditions possible, 
but it should be noted that the suspension in question is a suspension within the first-person 
perspective. What Levinas is discussing is the subject’s ability to distribute existential 
importance to different aspects of its life. In certain situations it seems obvious that the 
suspension is only possible because of a certain unawareness of the conditions, and that given 
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that the subject recognises these conditions, it will reassess them appropriately. But this does 
not eliminate the fact that the subject may relate to these conditions in different ways. The 
youth of psychism is to capture the activity of the subject which can only be described 
through the first-person perspective. But Levinas goes on to claim that this instant of youth is 
not merely a psychological trait of the human consciousness. Rather, it indicates a 
metaphysical separation: “That there could be this instant of sheer youth, heedless of its 
slipping into the past and of its recovered self-possession in the future... that there be the very 
order or distance of time – all this articulated the ontological separation between the 
metaphysician and the metaphysical” (TI, 55/47). 
By claiming that youth indicates a metaphysical separation, Levinas builds on multiple 
premises we have discusses so far in the essay. First it should be clear that the principle of 
separation and of identity is the same in Levinas’ philosophy, and thus that the activity that 
produces identity also produces separation. This coincidence follows from the fact that 
Levinas understands both identity and separation to be grounded on singularity, a term which 
is contrasted with generality and universality. Thus, speaking of the principle of identity at 
hand – psychism – we might say that the subject draws a sense of identity by the activity 
involved in memory and projection, and the moment involved therein. In addition to this, it 
also draws identity from more passive experiences and the moments involved, as we saw in 
the example of dying. This identity manifests singularity as it involves something which 
cannot be included in a more generalised or formal account, since what is involved is only 
accessible from the first-person perspective. This irreducible singularity is what Levinas 
means by the notion of separation.  
Levinas airs one objection which he ascribes to the determinist, namely that psychism may 
ultimately be an illusion. One response to this objection might be related to the discussion of 
regulative ideas, namely that if psychism is an illusion, it would be a necessary illusion. This 
necessity stems from his understanding of metaphysics as presupposing a radical separation 
between the metaphysician and the metaphysical, on which rests his account of the subject, 
the world, the Other, truth and ethics. But Levinas also offers another argument in defence of 
psychism: “The conscious being may very well involve something unconscious and implicit, 
and one may denounce as much as one likes its freedom as already enchained to an ignored 
determinism; ignorance here is a detachment, incomparable to the self-ignorance in which 
things lie. It is founded in the interiority of a psychism; it is positive in the enjoyment of 
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itself” (TI, 55/47). Even though we can always claim that the inversion of the logical order 
(which alters the relation between cause and effect in such a way that the subject seemingly 
lives in a moment of ungroundedness) is an illusion, there is a crucial difference between 
being ignorant of oneself as situated in a determining chain of causes and being self-ignorant 
in the way one is without psychism. The illusions in question are not perceptual illusions, but 
rather, what might be called existential illusions. That such illusions are possible necessitates 
a “way of being” in which they could be possible, and that is psychism. Psychism is the 
temporal inner life of thought and subjective experiences, by virtue of which “life between 
birth and death is neither folly nor absurdity nor flight nor cowardice. It flows on in a 
dimension of its own where it has meaning” (TI, 56/49–50). 
The argument in defence of psychism by the possibility of illusion might look similar to the 
cogito-argument of Descartes’ meditations. There are certain similarities, such as that the 
argument takes its departure from a solipsistic subject and that it deals with the subject’s inner 
life, but the differences are crucial. Levinas’ argument is not a defence of substance dualism 
and it does not claim that the subject is capable of infallible self-knowledge. Levinas both 
admits that a self-relation implied by psychism may be limited and even misleading because 
of unconscious or implicit elements of the subject, and that this psychism itself may be an 
outright illusion, but as he goes on to claim, the possibility of illusion itself attests the inner 
life of the subject. Furthermore, Levinas’ argument does not restrict itself to analysing a 
thinking thing; the identity of psychism is not limited to an identity through thinking – or 
representing – oneself, but is more importantly found in the way we experience our inner life 
as temporally unified. The treatment of the inner life is thus not limited to our rationality, and 
opens up for the distinction between being ignorant of something and being in complete self-
ignorance. While the former implies the first-person perspective of someone who potentially 
relates truthfully or not to his or her existential condition, such a first-person perspective 
cannot be ascribed to the latter. 
But is this a valid argument in defence of psychism? Levinas seems to be presupposing what 
he is trying to prove. The difference between our ignorance of the potentially illusory 
character of our inner life and the self-ignorance of things is only a difference if we 
presuppose an inner life; it is a difference between a first-person perspective that is not 
destroyed by its illusory character and something that cannot be ascribed such a first-person 
perspective in the first place. Given that we do not presuppose an inner life and thus not the 
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first-person perspective, the argument from the possibility of illusion loses its power. This 
might mark the limits of Levinas’ argument, but at this point it is important to specify that the 
argument is neither motivated by a radical doubt and a following search for infallible 
foundation, nor does it try to convince an imagined sceptic. It might seem that Levinas is 
instead trying to turn the tables by asking the question: Is the fact that we may have false 
beliefs of our inner life a sufficient reason to leave the first-person perspective all together? 
Given that we all live as if we have an inner life, is that not a sufficient reason for us treating 
this inner life philosophically as if it is real? What is at stake is the possibility of 
understanding the life lived between birth and death as meaningful to the subject whose 
existence is in question. We might wonder whether further arguments might be given in 
defence of psychism. If threatened by a radical scepticism, the reality of the inner life seems 
best supported by practical-transcendental arguments as the one offered above. 
3.7 The subject’s self-relation 
3.7.1 Self-interpreting animals 
Earlier in this chapter, I introduced Levinas’ example of birth in order to show how the 
subject adopts different moments of its life as preconditions or causes for the moment from 
which this adoption is performed. Even though Levinas himself uses the term ‘cause’ when 
talking about these issues, it is clear that it is used in a dual sense. As the backdrop to 
Levinas’ argument is the attempt to understand human action and consciousness in terms of 
freedom, rather than causality, it might be suggested that he should avoid talking about causes 
at all. For when Levinas’ talks about how the subject adopts certain conditions as causes, he is 
discussing personal identity and self-understanding, not actual causality. While it is clear that 
there are cases where the ignorance or forgetfulness of certain moments in a subject’s life will 
have an impact on the sense of identity, Levinas will not claim that such ignorance will have 
an impact on causality. Levinas is not endorsing the claim that a causal relation is contingent 
upon our knowledge and appropriation of it. Rather, he is challenging a way of explaining 
behaviour.  
A similar argument may be found in the writings of various philosophers, among them 
Charles Taylor in his essay Self-interpreting animals. There he makes it clear that the 
distinction between self-interpretation and explanation – or the difference between the first- 
43 
 
and the third-person account – is not something that should be taken for granted, as the notion 
of self-interpretation “runs against one of the fundamental prejudices or, to sound less 
negative, leading ideas of modern thought and culture. It violates a paradigm of clarity and 
objectivity” (Taylor 2005, 45). But his claim is that the human subject is essentially a self-
interpreting being. In this essay, Taylor chooses to discuss a set of emotions among our 
experiences, which he calls subject-referring feelings, and he goes on to claim that such 
subject-referring feelings are not only the basis of our understanding of what it is to be 
human, but that they are constituted by the articulations of these feelings we come to know 
them by and accept. Even though Taylor discusses emotions in particular, the argument might 
be extended to include the circumstances and conditions of our life in general as the subject 
relates to them in psychism, which is what Levinas in fact does. Taylor describes these 
feelings – his examples are shame and remorse – as characterised by referring to and 
including several other terms which we must understand and appropriate, and without which 
we would probably not have the feeling in question: “Hence we can see that our feelings 
incorporate a certain articulation of our situation, that is, they presuppose that we characterize 
our situation in certain terms. But at the same time they admit of – and very often we feel that 
they call for – further articulation, primarily as the elaboration of finer terms permitting more 
penetrating characterization. This further articulation may in turn transform the feelings” 
(Ibid., 63–64). 
Whereas Taylor aims to show how certain feelings are conditioned by our understanding and 
interpretation of the situation and the different terms involved, which he ultimately wants to 
claim presuppose language, Levinas simply wants to show how this self-interpretation offers 
a principle of personal identity. Levinas notion of psychism, a self-relation which does not 
refer to the world or to other persons, does not intend to describe an identity is ever produced 
absolutely independent from the world and other persons. The kind of identity Levinas posits 
as peculiar to the self-relation identity does not necessarily refer to the world and the other 
persons. To the degree the situation and the other persons bestow an identity upon the subject 
it still retains the possibility of interpreting it otherwise. The terms in which Levinas discusses 
the possibility of self-interpretation is that of memory. Psychism as temporality produces the 
identity and separation of the self, both by manifesting a time that cannot be subsumed under 
universal time and by opening up a dimension where the subject is not simply a part of a 
causal chain, but where there is room for spontaneity or, as Levinas simply calls it, 
possibility. This is done by the possibility of memory to invert the chronological order where 
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the birth comes before the present of the subject: ”By memory I ground myself after the 
event, retroactively: I assume today what in the absolute past of the origin [birth] had no 
subject to receive it and had therefore the weight of a fatality. … Memory as an inversion of 
historical time is the essence of interiority.” (TI, 56/49) The possibility of retroactively 
grounding ourselves manifested by memory is fundamental to the human being characterised 
by psychism, and thus, through the workings of psychism, “separation is not reflected in 
thought, but produced by it” (TI, 54/47). Levinas’ notion of psychism is thus, among other 
things, a defence of the understanding of the human subject as essentially self-interpreting. 
3.7.2 Authenticity and social mimetism 
Charles Taylor’s notion of subject-referring emotions and Levinas’ notion of psychism both 
refer to an interpretative inner life, but there is an important distinction between the two 
arguments: Whereas Levinas simply talks about the adoption of conditions and circumstances, 
Taylor also discusses the articulations of the circumstances – in his example, emotions – we 
adopt and claims that they are ultimately conditioned by language. This opens up for another 
possible objection that we know from the classical existentialism of Sartre and Heidegger as 
the question of authenticity. In what sense can we say that our inner life is spontaneously 
interpretative, if it is conditioned by the cultural context in which we are located? Levinas 
remains dismissive of the existentialist’s response to this question by the notion of 
authenticity, both because he claims that it is given prevalence over other ethical concerns, 
but also because he claims that it does not play the role in the subject’s life as the 
existentialists try to ascribe to it. In his book The Practices of the Self, Charles Larmore tries 
to reformulate and defend a notion of authenticity which he claims plays a crucial role in our 
way of thinking of ourselves and the world. After clearing out some conceptions of the term, 
which concern “becoming what one is” or “coinciding with our true self”, he defines 
authenticity as “our ability to give ourselves over to a certain possibility without looking at 
ourselves from another’s point of view” (Larmore 2010, xiii). Larmore then goes on to show 
how this redefined notion of authenticity allows us to accommodate the mimetic character of 
much of our inner life. When we interpret our feelings, mental states or conditions, we often 
describe them from the first-person perspective as being drawn from us, we often discover, 
when considering ourselves from a disengaged third-person perspective, that they were in fact 
informed by the culture and traditions we partake in. But this, claims Larmore, does not mean 
that we are determined by the circumstances which we are always already located within: 
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“There is a world of difference between an action in which we guide ourselves by the 
example of others and an action that, marked though it is by the conventions of our culture, 
takes place without our appealing to them. In the first case, reflection plays an essential role, 
since the character of an action is defined by its intention ... But in the second case, reflection 
is absent, or at least it does not take the same form” (Larmore, 2010, 54). As the notion of 
authenticity in both Heidegger’s and Larmore’s treatment of it is essentially related to 
individuality, it becomes clear that: “The individuality of a life does not consist in the traits an 
individual shares with no one else... [I]ndividuality means ... that it is each individual himself, 
no one else in his place, who lives his own life ... What matters is the way we experience our 
love [which is Larmore’s example in discussing authenticity] and not the originality of our 
feelings” (Larmore 2010, 55–57). 
Larmore’s notion of authenticity is intended to capture the self-relation of the subject. His 
analysis of social mimetism and following reformulation of authenticity, allow us to avoid an 
objection Levinas seemingly was exposed to, namely that the spontaneity of psychism might 
be reduced to the conventions of the culture and traditions the subject is located within. Even 
though Levinas does not address these questions explicitly, it is clear that he would follow a 
similar line of argumentation, as the identity produced by psychism does not rest on the 
originality of the content of psychism, but on the possibility to “invert the chronological 
order” and the conscious experience of it. As we shall see later, the identity is also produced 
by the quality of mineness that characterises all experiences. There is another important 
similarity between the arguments offered by Larmore and Levinas, which concerns the self-
relation of the subject, but as this also concerns the notion of enjoyment, it will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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4 Enjoyment and dwelling 
Psychism offered a principle of individuation independent from any world-relations, and thus 
marked the separation of the “I” from all other relations it might engage in apart from a self-
relation. By the notions of enjoyment and dwelling, Levinas wants to show another two 
principles of identification, this time by analysing how the subject identifies itself in relation 
to the world. That these two principles are to be separated from psychism is established by the 
notion of youth examined above, but enjoyment and dwelling are to be considered as 
deepening an identity already established in Totality and Infinity by virtue of psychism. Due 
to Levinas’ pseudo-genealogical approach to subjectivity, psychism, enjoyment and dwelling 
represent intimately connected, yet separable moments, which are present simultaneously, 
even though the notion of enjoyment and dwelling is shown to more fundamental. It is 
interesting to note that Levinas begins by explicating psychism, thus establishing the 
importance of the existential dimension of self-relation that entails from the inner life. And 
while this existential dimension and the adjacent spontaneity of youth retain their importance 
in enjoyment, their independence is shown to be correlated with a dependence necessitated by 
corporal existence in the world. Thus, even though Levinas begins his exposition by analysing 
the separation of psychism, and later goes on to claim that it is in enjoyment that the dawn of 
subjectivity takes place, both levels of analysis are necessary, along with the third level of 
ethical subjectivity – that is, relation with the Other – for the complete understanding of the 
Levinasian subject. So, while the levels might be separated in analysis, they are always 
already concurrent in the actual subject. But by separating them we are able to discern the 
different traits they entail: they constitute different relations, they relate to different relata, and 
with regards to the question of activity and passivity, the different layers of subjectivity might 
be attributed different levels of fundamentality. The tension between dependency and 
independency which was first introduced by Levinas with his thoughts on the personal time of 
memory and projection, now resurfaces in the relation between the enjoying subject and the 
world. As the individuation of psychism produced the separation of the subject from the 
world through the positive movement of psychism itself, so will enjoyment and dwelling 
show how the subject is separated both from the world in its relation to the world and from 
the metaphysical other by two different positive traits by the relations in question: the 
happiness of enjoyment and the extraterritoriality of the dwelling. The separation in question 
is not intended as a claim that the subject is able to shut itself from the world, or become 
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independent of it, but rather that the subject retains a sense of identity even though it remains 
dependent on the world. Or to put it otherwise, it is not sufficient to account for the world-
relations of the subject in order to understand the subject, as a sense of identity is produced 
through these relations, which makes them personal. This idea will be examined throughout 
this chapter. 
The analysis of enjoyment exposes the human subject’s most fundamental way of being in the 
world. As human subjects we are located in a world which surrounds us, and whose content 
we relate to in multiple ways: as nourishment so that we can sustain our existence, as things 
we may utilise as tools or as things we may perceive as objects for representation in 
knowledge. Heidegger’s analysis of our being-in-the-world was intended as a critique of the 
traditional prioritising of the theoretical relation to the world first by showing that we have a 
more primordial practical relation to the world as a structural whole of practical relations; a 
structure of finalities Dasein is engaged with prior to any reflection and thematisation, but 
which only becomes a theme in so far as the structure breaks down. But even more 
essentially, Heidegger’s critique was to show that our diverse relations to the world are to be 
understood in light of our fundamental way of being, that of care [Sorge]. Care – the way 
Dasein’s own Being is an issue for it - and the related concepts of concern [Besorge] – in 
relation to the Dasein’s activities – and solicitude [Fürsorge] – in relation to Dasein’s being 
with others – is intended to be prior to any distinction between theoretical and practical. 
Rather, it is only in so far as Dasein’s Being is defined as care, that the practical and the 
theoretical constitute two possibilities of Being [Seinsmöglichkeiten] for it (BT, 235–238). As 
with care, enjoyment is intended to show a fundamental level of our relation to the world, a 
relation that pervades both the theoretical and the practical relation. It is directed as a critique 
of the fundamental character of care, and does not replace any of the other relations between 
the subject and the world, even if it offers a modification of them.  
4.1 Enjoyment as “vivre de…” 
Enjoyment is the way human beings both live off and live from the world [vivre de...]
12
, 
where the things and objects we are surrounded by and the activities we engage with them in 
                                                 
12
 The French phrase ”vivre de…” has a dual sense which in English is expressed as ”living off and from…”. 
The usual translation of this phrase is “living from...”, and I will use this translation, but always with the duality 
in mind. 
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constitute the content of life: “One does not only exist one’s pain or one’s joy; one exists from 
pains and joys. Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity. 
To live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on it nor to act 
by means of it. ... But if I eat my bread in order to labor and to live, I live from my labor and 
from my bread. ... [E]njoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my 
life – it embraces them” (TI, 111/114). This way of relating to the world is beyond the 
distinction between theoretical and practical: “What I do and what I am is at the same time 
that from which I live. We relate ourselves to it with a relation that is neither theoretical nor 
practical. Behind theory and practice there is enjoyment of theory and of practice: the egoism 
of life” (TI, 113/115–116). What Levinas is trying to convey is that even though we treat 
things in the world both as objects of representation and as tools or implements for our 
activities, there is a sense in which these thoughts and actions, as well as the objects and 
things engaged by them, constitute the content of our life and, as Levinas also puts it, the 
value [prix] of our life.  
Levinas’ notion of enjoyment is intended to show that the human subject cannot be reduced to 
any formal trait, or to bare existence, since it is always endowed with content. Such an 
understanding of existence, or life, as Levinas prefers to call it when discussing it in this rich 
sense, is the basis of Levinas’ refutation of care as the fundamental structure of the ways of 
being in the world: “Life is not the naked will to be, an ontological Sorge for this life. Life’s 
relation with the very conditions of its life becomes the nourishment and content of that life. 
Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear than my being: 
thinking, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun” (TI, 112/115). It is 
interesting to note that while Levinas first introduces enjoyment as a critique of a formalistic 
account of subjectivity, he here also criticises a certain form of existentialism. In the first 
sentence of the quote above, he seems to conflate two distinct views, namely a view on life as 
a “naked will to be” on the one hand, and Sorge – or care – on the other. While the latter is 
intended to be a reference to Heidegger, the former view stands without any specified 
direction.
13
 That these two characteristics are to be separated is apparent as Heidegger clearly 
                                                 
13
 Even though this reference stands without specified direction, it is intended to criticise any philosophy that 
reduces life to bare existence. Nietzsche stands as a plausible advocate for such a view. In the following quote he 
understands life as reducible to a will or an urge, as well as denying any further value to life: ”There is nothing to 
life that has value, except the degree of power – assuming that life itself is the will to power” (Nietzsche 1968, 
37). 
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states that care is not reducible to any will or drive: “The phenomenon of care in its totality is 
essentially something that cannot be torn asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special 
acts or drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction, or to construct it out of these, 
will be unsuccessful. ... Care is ontologically ‘earlier’ than the phenomena we have just 
mentioned” (BT, 238). In what way then is enjoyment opposed to care, if it not to be 
conflated with a formalistic account of subjectivity, or a reductive account of existence as 
‘bare’? The critique of care represents a third critical angle of enjoyment, which is directed 
against Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s fundamental structure as care: “Dasein is an 
entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue” (BT, 236). To be an issue, is to be 
understood as “self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (BT, 236). 
This structure of care, combined with the idea of Jemeinigkeit – the idea that this Being that is 
at issue, is in each case mine – founds the basis for Heidegger’s thought about authenticity 
and inauthenticity discussed earlier in relation to psychism (BT, 67–68). It is this 
understanding of a subject occupied by its own being and striving for authentic living, that 
Levinas wants to counter with his notion of enjoyment: “The love of life does not resemble 
the care for Being, reducible to the comprehension of Being, or ontology. The love of life 
does not love Being, but loves the happiness of being” (TI, 145/154). Human existence is 
characterised with a sense of meaning since it is always already engaged in activities and 
situations which contribute to the identity of the subject in question. Care cannot be the 
fundamental characteristic of the subject as the subject does not fundamentally concern itself 
with its Being. Rather, it is concern with its always already meaningful and content-endowed 
life – and ultimately the life of the Other. This is the sense of Levinas’ claim that the subject 
“can sacrifice its pure and simple being to happiness. It exists in an eminent sense; it exists 
above being” (TI, 63/57). The opposition between enjoyment and care thus lies at the level of 
axiology and ontology, as Levinas puts it (TI, 119/123–124), where axiology assumes 
primacy over ontology. 
Even though Levinas’ notion of enjoyment is primarily directed against care because the latter 
notion is understood as related to the idea of authenticity and related to the question of the 
meaning of the overarching concept of Being, enjoyment is also directed against a particular 
existentialistic rhetoric. This latter criticism was discussed in relation to psychism and 
authenticity, and will resurface later in the subchapter on dwelling. But the rhetoric of 
Levinas’ text itself should not be allowed to pass without comment. As was mentioned in the 
introduction, Levinas often chooses a polemical tone in his writing, and this is often expressed 
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by the way he coins his ideas. In his discussions about death he chose examples of violence 
and murder in order to express that death was not to be understood as something we lived 
towards, but something which took us by force and by surprise. The same polemical phrasing 
is the case with the notion of enjoyment. While the examples and phrases concerning death 
stood in stark contrast with the idea they opposed, they still clearly and relatively 
unambiguously expressed the Levinas’ point. Levinas’ way of discussing enjoyment is more 
problematic as the term is, to some extent, misleading. By choosing words and phrases like 
‘enjoyment’, ‘happiness’ and ‘love of life’ in describing our fundamental way of relating to 
the world, Levinas’ is trying to counter what he consider the seriousness of the traditional 
existentialistic account of our worldly existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses our 
Being-in-the-world in terms of thrownness, falling, alienation and potential solitude. A similar 
tone is to be found in Sartre’s writing, which often underline the sense of alienation from the 
world, famously expressed in his novel Nausea, where the protagonist, Roquentin, is 
contemplating the root of a chestnut tree when he is suddenly revolted by and alienated from 
the world through an illuminating experience of its quality of existence (Sartre 2012, 180–
192). But are Levinas’ terms – which are univocally positive – fit to describe our fundamental 
relation to the world? If Levinas had claimed that, all we would need in order to falsify 
Levinas’ descriptions would be a situation which could only with great difficulty be described 
in positive terms. And in fact, Levinas offers at least one such description himself, which is 
the aforementioned agony of dying. Thus, ‘enjoyment’, ‘happiness’ and ‘love of life’ should 
be taken as technical terms referring to the manner in which the subject both lives off the 
world and yet retains an independence from it by the way all our activities and the contents of 
these activities contribute to our identity. These terms thus do not assume the positive 
characteristics of the situations in question, even though the terms themselves seem to suggest 
otherwise. 
4.2 Enjoyment as affectivity and the notion of 
materiality 
Levinas’ account of enjoyment is constituted by two main aspects: one has already been 
discussed as the “living from...”, while the other is the subject’s relation to elements, a 
relation in which the affectivity or passivity of the subject is most distinctly shown. The 
affectivity of the self in relation to the elements is one of sensibility. In order to understand 
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Levinas’ theory of the elements it is important to distinguish between the things we encounter 
and the background from which they emerge. The things are distinguished by their form: 
“The form which separates the object, which delineates sides for it, seems to constitute it” (TI, 
160/172). This form is not given to us in enjoyment, but presupposes labour, be it practical or 
theoretical. Of these two forms of labour Levinas claims that the practical is primary: it is the 
practical engagement with things that first delineates the form they have as things. The world 
of things is thus conditioned by the bodily engagement with things inside the world. So far 
Levinas agrees with Heidegger’s critique of the primacy of the theoretical, but by introducing 
the relation of enjoyment to the elements, Levinas wants to show a primordial relation to the 
world in which the subject remains passive. This relation is Levinas’ first realistic case 
against the plausibility of idealism, the second case being the metaphysical relation to the 
Other. The importance of the elements in Levinas’ philosophy is twofold: On the one hand 
they are the material basis to any construction offered through labour, and on the other hand 
they show the subject to be primarily passive qua affective. 
4.2.1 Things, objects and elements 
Even though Levinas is not always consistent, he intends to offer a philosophical distinction 
between the terms object and thing. While the ‘object’ usually designates the object of 
intentionality or representation, the ‘thing’ refers to an entity we engage with practically 
through labour. He goes on to claim that we have a relation to the world prior to the level of 
differentiation into objects or things, which he describes as the elemental level. The elements 
are the undifferentiated background from which labour makes the things emerge. Levinas also 
refers to them as medium [milieu] and pure quality. While things are available to possession, 
as labour gave them a form that made them available and graspable, the elements are “a 
common fund, or terrain, essentially non-possessable, ‘nobody’s’: earth, sea, light, city” (TI, 
131/138). The examples given are supposed to highlight some of the main characteristics of 
the elements: they are formless and as formless they are ungraspable. Furthermore, as 
formless they do not have any side towards which we can approach them; rather: “The 
relation adequate to its essence discovers it precisely as a medium: one is steeped in it; I am 
always within the element” (TI, 131/138). The elemental world constitutes the materiality of 
the world of things, which is the result of labour. This materiality is available to us, but as the 
elemental is without any objects or things, our relation to it is not bound to any distinct 
content. In fact, Levinas claims that there is not any substantial supporting ground on what 
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might only inadequately be called the objective side of the subject’s experience of the 
elements. Rather they are given as pure qualities; qualities which refer to nothing: “The pure 
quality of the world does not cling to a substance that would support it. ... It is not a question 
of a something, an existent manifesting itself as refractory to qualitative determination. 
Quality manifests itself in the element as determining nothing” (TI, 132/139). But only a few 
paragraphs later, Levinas offers what might seem like a contradictory statement: “Enjoyment 
– an ultimate relation with the substantial plentitude of being, with its materiality – embraces 
all relations with things” (TI, 133/140). This allows us to specify what Levinas is claiming 
with the theory of the elemental.  
By the terms ‘substance’ and ‘substantial’ Levinas seldom seems to designate a substance in 
the sense of the greek ousia, as the fundamental or foundational entities of reality. Rather, his 
use seems to be closer to that an “intuitive” or “naïve” notion of a thing, where it is contrasted 
to events or properties. Initially, this understanding of substance as an “intuitive” notion of 
things must be separated from Levinas’ understanding of things, as the latter only arise as the 
result of labour. But in the quote at hand, Levinas uses the term ‘substantial’ in relation to 
materiality, which makes it more difficult to uphold this interpretation of the former term. But 
what does Levinas mean by materiality, given that enjoyment is primarily defined as a 
relation to the elements? First of all, the elements have been defined as an undifferentiated 
background that meets us as pure qualities, or as he also puts it, as “adjectives without 
substantive” (TI, 132/139). With Levinas’ phenomenological commitments in mind it should 
be clear that he is describing the ground for our experience of the world, and not defending a 
metaphysical thesis about substance monism or dualism. The elements as pure qualities 
constitute the basis for our experience of the world, prior to any distinction between things 
and objects. This relation to the elements is the most basic relation we have to the world, and 
pervades all our other relations. The use of the term substantial in the quotation above was 
thus misleading, as it was used in a non-technical term with the derived meaning of being 
fundamental. But usually Levinas’ intension is for it to designate the formal qualities of the 
things resulting from labour, and thus not a form of fundamental entity: “The hand delineates 
a world by drawing what it grasps from the element, delineating definite beings having forms, 
that is, solids; the informing of the formless is solidification, emergence of the graspable, the 
existent, support of qualities. Substantiality thus does not reside in the sensible nature of 
things” (TI, 161/173).  
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Characterised as a thing that is clearly delineated, with a distinct form – as a solid, the 
substances, or things, are available for representations. This is another important distinction 
between elements on the one hand and things and object on the other, the latter of which is 
essentially to be understood as representation. The elements are not available for 
representations, but yet we relate to them by virtue of the sensibility of enjoyment. The 
fundamental character of the materiality of the elements lies in that they are the basis of all 
constitution of things – as all things arise from labour with the elemental – and of many of the 
objects, in so far as these representational objects which in turn refer to things. The idealist 
understanding of representation, which do not refer to any further things, might seem to avoid 
this critique by the claims of sufficiency that lies latent in the Husserlian notion of universal 
epoché which excludes any claim of existence or reality, not only on behalf of the object of 
experience, but the totality of the external world. The claim of sufficiency lies in that no 
extra-mental content is admitted into the analysis, which makes the epoché stand in a conflict 
with the possibility of object-dependent intentional content. The Levinasian notion of 
elements opposes such a limitation on the content of analysis, as the elements, which Levinas 
describes as coming towards us from nowhere, cannot be reduced to being purely interior, but 
rather arises from our worldly existence in which we are always already located in the midst 
of the elements. And since Levinas claims that the relation to the elements are the most 
primordial relation to the world and that it is characterised by the passive affectivity of the 
subject, the notion of elements is also a criticism of the idealist theory of representation.
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Where does this leave us with the status of the element as the materiality of the world of 
things and representations? Even though materiality is not one of the key terms of Levinas’ 
philosophy, Simon Critchley has on several occasions described Levinas’ philosophy as “a 
material phenomenology of subjective life, where the conscious I of representation is reduced 
to the sentient I of enjoyment” (Critchley 2009, 63). This is a term more often associated with 
another French phenomenologist, namely Michel Henry, but might well be ascribed to 
Levinas as well, given that we keep his special notion of materiality in mind. 
4.2.2 Different modes of consciousness: empirical vs. 
transcendental readings 
                                                 
14
 The arguments Levinas offers in defence of this notion of the elemental lies in his existential analysis of 
nausea in On escape and of insomnia in Existence and Existents. The strength of the arguments rests on the 
accuracy of Levinas’ analysis, but due to the limited scope of this essay, these analyses will not be discussed.  
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Even though this essay is concerned with the personal identity and the singularity of the 
subject, it is important to give a coherent reading of the relations the subject engages in, as it 
is by virtue of these that the identity is produced. This also necessitates an examination of the 
status and relata of these relations. Levinas’ discussion of the notions of things, objects and 
elements is to a large degree indebted to the tradition of phenomenology, which Levinas 
constantly refers to, either by appraisal or by criticism. In this section I want to discuss two of 
the more central phenomenological notions Levinas’ criticises, namely the notion of 
intentionality and of representation, and see how this criticism plays out in Levinas’ 
conception of the different relations the subject engages in. The discussion might be 
formulated into two questions. Firstly, what is the status of the relation involved in 
enjoyment? Is it to be understood as a form of consciousness or rather as an existential 
structure directing all forms of consciousness? And secondly, to what extent are the different 
relations the Levinasian subject engages in connected to the phenomenological notion of 
intentionality, and what status does the relata of these relations have? These questions concern 
both the relation of enjoyment and the metaphysical relation, but as this essay is concerned 
with the notion of subjectivity in psychism, enjoyment and dwelling, it is mainly the former 
that will be treated.  
Georg W. Bertram has recently written an article where he addresses these questions and 
defends the claim that the relation to alterity is a structural trait of all consciousness, and not 
itself a special type of consciousness with a special kind of object. His argument is important 
as it sides with the transcendental reading of Levinas’ philosophy on the question of whether 
the Other should be understood as a ground for experience or as empirically accessible. Even 
though Bertram’s argument is limited to moral consciousness understood as the relation with 
radical alterity, it is still relevant to discuss this as analogous to sensibility and the elements, 
in that the question we pose on both occasions is whether there are multiple types of 
consciousness and objects. In his revisionary reading, where he understands the fundamental 
idea of Levinas’ philosophy to be that of normativity in a sense which is broader than simply 
ethical, he claims that moral consciousness is neither to be understood as a special type of 
consciousness nor as having a special kind of object. In fact, he claims, as moral 
consciousness is to be understood in contrast to correlation-consciousness – which is what 
Bertram calls Husserl’s notion of intentionality – and as only correlation-consciousness is 
understood as having an object, moral consciousness does not have an object at all. Bertram 
goes on to claim that it is only by rejecting the two theses about the special type of 
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consciousness and the special kind of object, that we may understand moral consciousness as 
fundamental. He concludes his argument by developing the sense in which moral 
consciousness is fundamental: “The fundamental role of moral consciousness must be 
understood in such a way that it enters into all other forms of consciousness. A particular 
directedness lies in all consciousness as such. .. [T]he consciousness on which Levinas 
focuses is not to be conceived of as a special mode of consciousness, but as a structure that is 
irreducibly at play in all consciousness” (Bertram 2012, 117). Moral consciousness is thus to 
be understood as a structural directedness towards alterity, which, as he later qualifies, is “an 
irreducible dimension of all – objective – consciousness” (Ibid., 119). Correlation-
consciousness and moral consciousness are to be understood as two inseparable dimensions 
where the moral consciousness constitutes a fundamental structural directedness for all 
correlation-consciousness. This directionality is not simply the aboutness that usually is 
ascribed to intentionality, but rather a non-objectivising directedness. By the notion of non-
objectivising directedness, Levinas expresses the idea that every consciousness of an object is 
marked by sociality, or to put it otherwise, by our directedness towards others: “In each thing 
that comes to consciousness there resides a relation to others. Levinas’s explications can be 
varied in this sense, to gain consciousness of something means to offer the world to another 
through (one’s own) consciousness” (Ibid., 117). This revisionary reading of Levinas is 
intended to broaden the scope of Levinas’ argument by showing that the fundamental idea of 
his thought is that of a normativity which pervades all domains of practical and theoretical 
philosophy. This argument leads him to claim that since alterity and the relation to objects are 
irreducibly connected, we cannot engage in a relation with objects without also being engaged 
in a relation of alterity, and visa versa. Even though Bertram does not explicitly claim that all 
consciousness is bound by being about an object, he claims that there is no relation to alterity 
without a relation to objects: “One can speak of two dimensions that shape all of 
consciousness: objectivity and alterity. The two dimensions cohere irreducibly” (Ibid., 118). 
The prime example he offers from Levinas is that of the linguistic articulation of the world 
which shows that a meaningful world requires a world which is offered by the subject to the 
other through speech: “This objectivity is correlative not to some trait in an isolated subject, 
but of his relation with the Other. Objectification is produced in the very work of language” 
(TI, 209/230). Thus, directedness towards alterity is a structural trait of consciousness, and 
not a special type of consciousness with a special kind of object. 
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As should be clear from my reading of the relation to the elements through enjoyment, I want 
to argue that Bertram’s understanding of Levinas’ notion of consciousness, while being 
accurate on the consciousness of the world of things, excludes major parts of Levinas’ 
argument. Even though the relation to the elements is not a relation to alterity, it is a special 
kind of consciousness, with a special kind of relata, namely the elements. The elements are 
not something we can relate to through the objectivity accomplished by the linguistic 
articulations of the world. If we admit that we are related to a particular relata in our relation 
with the elements, it is clear that it cannot be described as an object – as objects in the 
phenomenological sense depends on being at least partly constituted through activity – and 
that it thus cannot be described without recourse to a type of consciousness that is not 
objectivising. Sensibility, our fundamental relation to the world, is not simply an 
undifferentiated registration of sensory data – as we through the passivity of sensibility also 
relate to the world as meaningful, something which will be further examined in the subchapter 
on happiness. But sensibility is not the willing and activity of the objectivising and positing 
consciousness as intentionality either. Refusing to counter the problem of schematism posed 
by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason – rather choosing to sidestep it – Levinas does not ask 
how the subject applies pure concepts in order to systematise its empirical sense perceptions, 
but rather how the subject may accommodate differentiations already manifested by 
something exterior. As such sensibility is characterised as a consciousness being “about” 
something in a non-objectivating, non-positing and ultimately non-active way. 
Bertram’s reading of Levinas is instructive in that it tries to expand the impact of Levinas’ 
philosophy by showing that his core ideas have an impact on all the major dimensions of 
philosophy and not exclusively on ethical or practical philosophy. Even though I agree with 
Bertram on this claim, the understanding of the relation to the Other as a structural 
directedness seems to be an unwarranted conflation. In a crucial passage that will be quoted at 
length, Levinas specifies his understanding of sensibility: “[Sensibility] is not to be confused 
with still vacillating forms of ‘consciousness of.’ It is not separated from thought by a simple 
difference of degree, nor even by a difference in the nobility or the extent of expansion of 
their object. Sensibility does not aim at an object, however rudimentary. It concerns even the 
elaborated forms of consciousness, but its proper work
15
 consists in enjoyment, through which 
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 The French word here is ‘œuvre’ in its masculine sense which, where the feminine form designates labour and 
activity, rather is to be understood as the product, quite similar to the way  ‘œuvre’ is used in the English 
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every object is dissolved into the element in which enjoyment is steeped. For in fact the 
sensible objects we enjoy have already undergone labor. The sensible quality already clings to 
a substance” (TI, 137/145). This dense passage touches upon many of the crucial moments of 
the current discussion. First Levinas draws a distinction between sensibility and intentionality. 
As thought at this point is to be understood in relation to representation, and thus is to be 
identified as a theoretical form of activity, it is also to be related to intentionality. Sensibility, 
in contrast to intentionality, does not involve any object, taken in its technical sense. When 
Levinas goes on to discuss sensible objects, this might seems to constitute a contradiction 
with how he has just started describing sensibility, but this tension is resolved by the duality 
in the notion of sensibility, which is also present in the notion of enjoyment. Enjoyment is to 
be taken in a strict and a wide sense. The strict sense limits enjoyment to the enjoyment of the 
elements, something which is related to solely through enjoyment. The wide sense of 
enjoyment, the sense in which we must understand the “living from...” relates to object, 
things, activities and relations; it relates to everything which constitutes the content of life. As 
sensibility is the mode of enjoyment, this duality is reflected in sensibility. Thus sensibility 
relates both to the pure qualities of the elements and to the qualities as already grounded in a 
substance. This duality shows that even though we might sense objects as well, the proper 
understanding of sensibility – that is, sensibility in its strict sense, where it is prior to any 
activity on part of the subject – relates to something that cannot properly be called an object. 
Thus Levinas’ claim in the passage quoted above is not that sensibility is not “about” 
anything, but that it should not be understood in terms of intentionality. It is not an empty or 
limited form of intentionality directed towards vague objects, but this does not entail that it is 
not directed towards anything at all. Sensibility is to be understood as an independent faculty 
directed towards the materiality of the world prior to any activity from the subject. 
Even though Levinas does not always use the term consistently, his leading understanding of 
the object rests on the Kantian and Husserlian tradition. Kant delineated a critical notion of 
the object, contrasted to what he claimed was the realist assumption latent in most of the pre-
Copernican philosophies, by which he claimed that the object of the senses could not be 
fundamental, in the sense that it could constitute the intuition of the object, as this would 
make any a priori understanding of it impossible. Rather, the object has to be understood as 
                                                                                                                                                        
language today.  Even though this sense of the word still retains connection to activity, it is not to be conflated 
with the word Levinas uses to express labour in the sense we have discussed here, for which he uses the term 
‘travail’.  
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the object of understanding, in which the objects conforms to the concepts a priori. The 
Kantian notion of the object is the object of activity, and not of the passivity of sensibility, 
something which becomes apparent as Kant goes on to say that only the object which we can 
cognise as it conforms to the concept a priori, is a possible object of experience, the limit of 
which is given by activity: “we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have 
put into them” (Kant 2000, BXVII–BXVIII). Such an understanding of the object is likewise 
to be found in Husserl’s phenomenological idealism. When Husserl introduces the 
phenomenological epoché, he also offers the following distinction between natural being – the 
world and its content as it is given to continuous experience with the supposition of existence 
– and transcendental being – the pure being as a priori possibility as it is given when the 
existence-supposition is suspended by the epoché as a realm of pure, a priori possibility. This 
again leads to the distinction between the ‘actual’ object as it is given to natural 
consciousness, and the ‘immanental’ object as it is given when pure consciousness observes 
its own conscious act and its content. Even though Husserl will retain the interest in what it is 
that leads the subject to assume the actuality of objects, or “existential holding-good” as he 
calls it, important parts of Husserl’s thought treat the object as immanent to consciousness, 
and discuss it in terms of how it is constituted by consciousness. These two main components 
– the activity of the subject and the immanence to consciousness – as they are developed by 
Kant and Husserl determine the main sense of the term ‘object’ in Levinas’ philosophy. 
Understood in this way, it should come as no surprise that Levinas refrains from describing 
the elements as objects. 
This excursion leads us back to Betram’s important question concerning whether there are 
multiple types of consciousness that takes different kinds of objects. In the sense of the term 
‘object’ that has just been explicated, it seems clear that Levinas does not think that neither 
enjoyment nor moral consciousness takes any special object, but this does not rule out that 
they still constitute different types of consciousness. Such a claim would only be valid if all 
states of consciousness were intentional and objectional, but not even Husserl claims this. 
Husserl’s most well-known example of non-intentional consciousness is pain. Even within 
intentional consciousness Husserl differentiates between positional and non-positional 
consciousness, where the former posits the existence of the intentional object, while the latter 
does not form any such judgment, but where such a judgment might be formed if the attention 
is redirected. Examples of objects that Husserl discusses in terms of non-positional 
intentionality are imagined objects and most importantly the unattended surroundings of the 
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posited object (Husserl 1983, 99). Even if Husserl grants the non-positional intentionality of 
the unattended surroundings, there is an important difference between this example and 
Levinas’ thought, as the unattended surroundings are available for objectification if the 
subject’s attention is redirected, whereas this is not possible with the elements or the Other. 
Thus Levinas’ understanding of our relation to the elements and the radical Other is best 
described as non-positional, non-objectivating and non-active. He clearly claims that the 
metaphysical relation is not to be understood as intentionality, as “this Husserlian term evokes 
the relation with the object, the posited, the thematic, whereas the metaphysical relation does 
not link up a subject with an object” (TI, 109/111). Levinas admits that there is a similarity in 
the relation of enjoyment to that of intentionality “taken very broadly”, simply by the fact that 
every moment of life is in relation with something other than that moment itself. This 
generalisation, as it concerns every moment of life, also reaches out to the metaphysical 
relation. But Levinas quickly clarifies that this similarity with the Husserlian notion of 
intentionality is only apparent, as the directedness that is similar to enjoyment, metaphysical 
consciousness and intentionality, is not the core of intentionality. This latter notion is rather to 
be understood as essentially consciousness of an object, and this notion of an object is, 
according to Levinas, essentially to be understood as representation: “already from the first 
exposition of intentionality as a philosophical thesis there appeared the privilege of 
representation. The thesis that every intentionality is either a representation or founded on a 
representation dominated the Logische Untersuchungen and returns as an obsession in all of 
Husserl’s subsequent work” (TI, 122/127). The limitations of the intentional relation are 
distinctly set forth when Levinas discusses intentionality in relation to the clear and distinct 
ideas of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy and Husserl’s Cartesian Meditation. 
While both Descartes and Husserl claims that there is a separation between – in Husserl’s and 
Levinas’ terms – the intentional act and the intentional object, the object of representation 
involved in the clear and distinct idea given to consciousness still remains interior to thought. 
As the objects are to be understood as intelligible, and this intelligibility is understood by 
virtue of Sinngebung, or sense-bestowal we are able to examine the way Husserl claims the 
subject contributes to the sense of the object. Sense-bestowal is a notion Husserl introduces 
after having performed the epoché in which the positing of actual existence is suspended, 
allowing us to see how the noematic act constitutes the sense of the intentional object through 
considering, for example, the perceived object as perceived or the judged object as judged 
(Husserl 1983, 213–216). This correlation between the act (noema) and the data (noesis) leads 
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Levinas to claim that the Husserlian phenomenology prioritises representation and 
construction: “Intelligibility, characterized by clarity, is a total adequation of the thinker with 
what is thought ... The intelligible is precisely what is entirely reducible to noemata ... In the 
intelligibility of representation the distinction between me and the object, between interior 
and exterior, is effaced” (TI, 123–124/129). In Descartes’ case, his understanding of the 
intelligibility of the object in terms of clarity, does not necessarily lead him to idealism, as 
Husserl argues for in his work. Descartes is often rather considered to be a proponent of a sort 
of naïve realism. But Levinas criticises Descartes for giving sensibility too small a role in the 
account of the subject. But in comparison to Husserl, Levinas grants that Descartes does not 
define consciousness in terms of idealistic representations. It should be noted though that 
Heidegger offers an alternative reading of the role of representation in Descartes’ 
understanding of consciousness. He claims that the formula of representation pervades the 
whole spectre of consciousness, not only knowing and thinking, but also willing, asserting, 
feeling, sensing and imagining (Heidegger 1991, 106–109).  But both Descartes and Husserl, 
Levinas claims, fails to appreciate the fundamental role of sensibility, which leads them both 
to understand exterior in terms of interiority.
16
 
If consciousness qua intentional is defined by relating to its objects as representation by virtue 
of the epoché, and thus concerns the consciousness as objectivating and active, what are the 
alternatives? That Levinas clearly speaks about different relations are beyond doubts; but the 
question remains on what kind of status these relations have. Whereas Bertram’s reading 
argues that these relations are structural, and do not involve a special kind of relata, I have 
wanted to show that such a transcendental reading cannot give an account of what Levinas 
says about the elements and the metaphysical other. Even though a transcendental, non-
empirical relation is conceivable, a structural account of these two peculiar relations seems to 
invalidate the value of the existential analysis Levinas offers in order to support his claims. 
Whereas I agree with Bertram both on the fundamental character of the relation with alterity 
and the way it enters into all the major philosophical domains, and not just that of ethics, such 
a claim does not seem to necessitate an understanding of this relation as merely structural. I 
have argued that these relations are a type of consciousness. But if the relata of these relations 
are not objects, what are they then? Even though the consciousness of the elements and the 
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 Descartes’ idea of infinity from his third meditation represents an exception for Levinas, and constitutes the 
main influence on his own idea of infinity. 
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relation to the Other has been treated together in this subchapter as they both are non-
positional, non-objectivating and non-active, this is where the differences arises. As a relata, 
the elements are not something merely surrounding the thing we direct our attention towards, 
something that can be discerned when we redirect our attention, nor are they simply vague 
and indiscernible objects. As Levinas’ existential analyses are supposed to show, these 
elements are definitely something even though they are not intentional objects, vague objects 
or background objects: they are pure qualities, unsupported by any object or substance, and 
hence formless. Our consciousness of the elements shows us that before any activity, we are 
surrounded by something that neither owes its existence to our positing, nor its sense to our 
sense-bestowal. This consciousness is described by Levinas as “the consciousness of 
consciousness” (TI, 112/114), but that this consciousness is defined, neither by reflection nor 
by representation. Again, following Levinas’ phenomenological commitments, the crucial 
question is not what these things are in themselves, but how we relate to them. And by 
examining how we relate to the elements and the Other, we discover that in these cases we 
relate to something which cannot be adequately understood through epoché, as they cannot be 
reduced to immanent intentional content. The difference between the elements and the Other 
is that the ground for this irreducibility concerning the elements is their incessant movement 
towards the subject prior to any activity on its behalf, while it concerning the Other is the way 
the Other expresses itself. The latter issue will be discussed further in the chapter on the 
notion of the human Other. 
4.2.3 A sense of identity in affectivity 
In enjoyment the subject is shown to be primarily affective through sensibility. As enjoyment 
is prior to any sort of theoretical or practical activity with regard to the object or activity in 
question, the elemental world constitutes an incessant presence over which the subject has no 
power of constitution or transformation. It might seem difficult to reconcile this idea of 
enjoyment as affectivity with what we have already said about enjoyment, namely that it is a 
way of identity. Any account of identity through enjoyment must address the question of how 
an identity is possible within the constant presence of the flux of content the elements 
constitute. It should be clear by now that Levinas, on the whole, argues for a subject that is 
unified in the sense that it has its principle of unity within itself. This leads to the question of 
whether the identity of the subject is to be understood as being over and above the content 
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itself in order for it to be the content of one subject or if it nothing but the collection of 
contents.  
The discussion Levinas enters here might be recognised as leading back to Kant’s response to 
Hume’s criticism of the notion of subjectivity. Applying his method of empirical skepticism 
to the major philosophical notions Hume claimed that he could not find any idea of the self 
within him. Based on his thought on ideas and impressions, where every idea – understood as 
a mental image – had to be derived from a corresponding impression – understood as 
sensations, passions or emotions – he went on to claim that the problem was inherent to the 
notion of self: “It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or 
person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are 
suppos’d to have a reference” (Hume 1985, 299). But since he could not find the principle for 
this self or person within him, he went on to express what is known as the bundle theory of 
subjectivity. Discussing the different impressions supposedly unified in a self he says: “they 
are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with 
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. … [There is no] single 
power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. … There is 
properly no simplicity in it at one time, not identity in different” (Ibid., 300–301).  
Kant’s response to this problem was offered in his theory of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. By first arguing how all our representations, given that they are to be 
understood as one representation, presuppose the synthesis of apprehension which unifies the 
manifold offered within an intuition, Kant goes on to claim that this synthesis of apprehension 
also have to take place a priori, in order for us to have representations of time and space. By 
taking his Copernican revolution into account – in which Kant turns his attention from the 
notion of the object as fully real and constituted by itself, to the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of the object qua object for us – Kant claims that “the unity that the object makes 
necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the 
manifold of representations” (Kant 2000, A105). But given this necessity, what is the status of 
the consciousness in question? This is where the transcendental apperception enters the scene: 
“Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. A transcendental ground must 
therefore be found for the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all 
our intuitions … Now this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the 
transcendental apperception. That which should necessarily be represented as numerically 
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identical cannot be thought of as such through empirical data. There must be a condition that 
precedes all experience and makes the latter itself possible” (Ibid., A106–107). Kant thus 
grants that Hume was right in that the unifying self is not accessible through experiences, but 
having argued that this self is a necessary condition for experience itself, it has to be found a 
priori as a transcendental condition. This transcendental unity of apperception is finally 
described as the possibility of ascribing an “I think” to every representation: “The I think 
must be able to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be 
represented in my that could not be thought at all. … [O]nly because I can comprehend their 
manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations; for otherwise I 
would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious” 
(Ibid., B132–134). 
Kant’s response to the criticism of Hume is in Levinas’ mind deficient, mainly for two 
reasons: On the one hand Levinas claims that this transcendental unity imposes a formalism 
which he opposes as it only offers a formal principle of identity and thus breaking with 
Levinas’ phenomenological commitments, and on the other hand the Levinasian identity of 
the subject must be prior to any activity, as the fundamental level of the subject is a priori to 
activity. Because of this latter reason, the notion of psychism as it was discussed earlier is 
now inadequate. Psychism was described as involving both activity and passivity; the latter 
because not all of our inner life is characterised by activity as enjoyment shows. In so far as it 
involves activity, is not limited to – even if it includes – the subject’s representations of itself, 
but is rather to be understood as including a wider notion of self-relation where the crucial 
point is that the content of psychism is lived, whether they are represented or not. This 
characteristic concerns the understanding of psychism both in its active and passive form. But 
as psychism was described as the realm of spontaneity, in so far as the subject may overturn 
or revert the order of chronology through of memory and projection by having the freedom of 
relating to the moments of one’s identity, psychism fundamentally entails an activity of the 
self. This activity was described as the subject’s ability to revert the conditions of its situation, 
as if it was unrestrained from the world. But this freedom of psychism does not presuppose 
the actual worldlessness of psychism, and as we have seen, one of the fundamental 
presuppositions of Levinas’ thought is that the subject is always already embodied and 
located within the world. It is therefore obvious that another principle of identity is needed, 
and that this is to be found within enjoyment. Had we stayed with psychism, without 
analysing the world-relations of the subject, we could easily have fallen prey for what Levinas 
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describes as the “temptation of idealism”. But through enjoyment we are to learn that the 
activity of psychism rests on a prior passivity, wherein lies Levinas’ answer to the problem 
posed by Hume and Kant. 
Levinas’ solution to the problem as it is posed by Hume and Kant will be discussed further in 
the following subchapter. As for now, a few more words about the relation between the 
identity in enjoyment and in psychism are in order. Levinas repeatedly claims that enjoyment 
concretises psychism. This concretisation is though not to be understood as a limitation of the 
spontaneity of youth, but rather of a grounding of it in concrete bodily existence in the world. 
This self-relation in the world-relation is fundamental for the understanding of subjectivity, as 
the subject finds itself in a world that is not of its own construction: “This relation of myself 
with myself is accomplished when I stand [me tiens] in the world which precedes me as an 
absolute of an unrepresentable antiquity. To be sure, I cannot think the horizon in which I find 
myself to be an absolute, but I stand in it as in an absolute. Standing there is precisely 
different from ‘thinking’. The bit of earth that supports me is not only my object; it supports 
my experience of objects” (TI, 138–139/146). In enjoyment Levinas postulates an identity 
given prior to the activity of the self. This passive
17
 principle of identity is not to be 
understood as static, but rather as dynamic. Levinas claims that a sense of identity is thought 
to be intrinsic to enjoyment itself and he describes it as a “contraction of the ego”. Enjoyment 
is thought to involve a movement by virtue of which, we might talk about an identity: 
“Enjoyment is a withdrawal into oneself, an involution. What is termed an affective state does 
not have the dull monotony of a state, but is a vibrant exaltation in which dawns the self. For 
the I is not the support of enjoyment. ...; the I is the very contraction of sentiment, the pole of 
a spiral whose coiling and involution is drawn by enjoyment” (TI, 118/123). This 
metaphorical description of subjectivity as a “coiling” or “involution” shows an identity 
which is neither the result of a substantial basis, nor the result of an activity of the subject in 
question. It is now time to try to combine the different aspects of psychism and enjoyment 
and see how Levinas claims that this principle of identity is to be understood as happiness, 
and how this principle is related to the idea of dwelling. 
                                                 
17
 Levinas uses the term ’passive’ in a dual sense. Sometimes it is to be understood negatively, as an undermining 
of the self. Other times it is to be understood as the absence of activity. It is in the latter sense I use the word. It 
could easily have been systematically replaced by the terms ‘affectivity’ and ‘receptivity’, which Levinas often 
treats as synonymous, but the term ‘passivity’ reveals more distinctly the non-active characteristics of the 
subject. 
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4.3 Dependency and independency 
Enjoyment has been shown to consist of two main aspects: the affective relation to the 
elements and the “living from…”, the latter of which is the principle of identity in the 
subject’s relation to the world. The relation to the elements and the “living from…” are united 
by the notion of sensibility. As the elements are to be understood as pure qualities, there is a 
sense in which we relate to the elements even when we are relating to the world of things, and 
that is the “living from...”, namely the experiential dimension of all the things that we do and 
surround us with, be they contingent activities and contents or existential conditions for our 
lives. As was discussed in subchapter 4.2.2, these are contents and activities are not to be 
understood as objects of representations, but immediate contents of a lived life. The 
difference between enjoyment as it is examined in “living from...” and in relation with the 
elements, is that whereas the elements by virtue of their nature could not be represented, the 
enjoyment of the living life, concerns many objects that can be represented, and, in fact, 
concerns even the act of representation itself: “enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all 
the contents that fill my life – it embraces them” (TI, 111/114). But enjoyment itself is not an 
act of representation. The principle of identity in enjoyment resides in the separation it 
involves, and this is manifested by two separable moments: the happiness of enjoyment and 
the dwelling. 
4.3.1 Happiness 
The happiness of enjoyment is the love of life, which lays bare the duality in all the activities 
we engage in and the contents we engage with. This duality rests on the fact that while these 
contents and activities remain distinct from us they constitute the content of our life. This 
constitution is again to be taken in two senses: on the one hand the constitution entails that 
without these contents the particular life in question would not have been realised (or, to put it 
otherwise, something else would be constituting this particular life), and on the other hand 
that they are constituting in the sense that they make up the existential conditions for life 
itself. This latter sense is emphasised by the fact that Levinas often calls the contents 
nourishment. The subject relates to both of these two ways in which the content of its life is 
necessary – as actual content and as nourishment – in terms of happiness: “life’s relation with 
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its own dependence on the things is enjoyment – which, as happiness, is independence” (TI, 
112/114). The relation of enjoyment thus includes our relations of representations and to 
things along with our relations with the elements and with the metaphysical other.  
In the beginning of Totality and Infinity, Levinas analysed the contrast between need and 
desire. Enjoyment understood in terms of nourishment is a need that can be fulfilled. As 
Levinas would put it, we can quench our thirst, we can assuage our hunger, but this does not 
mark the independence or happiness of enjoyment. This independency does not reside in the 
suspension and possible absence of needs. Alongside with this model of need, Levinas 
understands the enjoyment on the model desire, which he claims cannot be fulfilled. 
Understood on this model the importance of enjoyment is not that it can sometimes be 
fulfilled, but rather that we thrive on the contents of enjoyment, and in fact also on our needs. 
We enjoy them. The notion of happiness entails a separation and independency because it is 
intimately connected with the personal identity of the I: “because life is happiness it is 
personal. The personality of the person, the ipseity of the I, which is more than the 
particularity of the atom and of the individual, is the particularity of the happiness of 
enjoyment” (TI, 115/119). The sense of personality that Levinas associates with enjoyment is 
not to be understood as the mere empirical claim that we as individuals have different 
preferences in our enjoyment. It is rather to be understood in connection to the metaphorical 
description of identity described earlier in this essay, as the involution or contraction of the I 
in enjoyment.  
There is a sense in which enjoyment inherently entails an “I”, as the enjoyment is always 
some “I”’s enjoyment; but this “I” is never solely a formal trait. It is always deepened by the 
content of its enjoyment. The inherent “I” of enjoyment can thus not be understood to be a 
mere formal trait as it is always concretised in relation to its content. This identity is 
furthermore not a static identity
18
, as the metaphorical description of the identity in enjoyment 
as a contraction or involution indicates. Rather, these metaphors imply a dynamic identity that 
continuously deepens. And even though this identity might be reflected upon and represented, 
the identity is not itself the result of any reflection or representation: “It is an existence for 
itself – but not, initially, in view of its own existence. Nor is it a representation of self by self” 
                                                 
18
 When discussing the independence of happiness, Levinas contrasts this with the independence of the 
substance: “Substances are only what they are” (TI, 113/116). In this context independence may be understood 
as identity. 
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(TI, 118/122). The metaphorical descriptions Levinas offers of this kind of identity as a 
“contraction”, an “involution”, an “eddy” and a “coiling” spiral, are intended to escape the 
question of how we might draw an identity out of the flux of the manifold sensational 
experiences and is Levinas’ response to the problem he sees in Hume’s bundle theory of 
subjectivity and Kant’s theory of transcendental subjectivity. 
We might wonder how these metaphors for subjectivity capture the way the personal identity 
of the self is constituted, and Levinas does not offer any further qualifications as to their 
explanatory role. But it is clear that they are not to be taken as mere postulates, but rather as 
attempts to offer better descriptions of the nature of our sensibility and affectivity as human 
subjects. Whereas the dependency and the independency of the “living from...” seems 
plausible as it is offered as a description of the existential dimension of our way of being in 
the world, the sense of identity inherent in enjoyment – the sense of involution and 
contraction – is more complicated. How is it that the involution of the “I” is not just an 
experiential description of how it feels to be a human being in the world, but also a principle 
of identity? How does a deepening of identity – another metaphor – follow from involution or 
contraction of the self, and how does this deepening avoid Hume’s question of how the 
different moments of sensation constitute the sensation of one particular subject? The core 
idea that answers these questions is the way in which the fact that something is lived, 
constitutes identity. As all kinds of representation are ruled out, we might follow two routes in 
answering these questions.  
The first alternative is to claim that even though Levinas insists that the identity by 
“involution” is prior to any activity – both practical and theoretical – he does not manage to 
neither solve nor escape the problematic unity of the subject. Rather than showing that the 
subject is passive prior to all activity, the “involution” itself is a kind of activity, granting that 
it may be a sub-conscious movement. This movement, even though it is dependent on the 
content given in sensation, is not itself the movement of the sensation, as the subject as 
sensing retains a distance from what it senses. Thus a certain kind of formalism remains in 
that a transcendental activity is still necessary to make sense of the identity in enjoyment.  
The second alternative is not as critical and goes like this: Rather than understanding the 
subject as that which unifies the stream of experiences by actively unifying the sensations into 
experience, there is a certain intrinsic unity to this stream as all sensations entail a certain 
mineness. All sensations belong to someone, and this someone is never anonymous; it is 
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always one particular person whose sensations these are. Such an interpretation turns the 
tables on the problem, for instead of asking how sensations and experiences are unified, 
which leads to the question of the unity of the unifier – the subject – the sensations are 
assumed to be intrinsically unified by a common property, namely that of a particular 
mineness. Thus, no prior activity is necessary in order to show how the subject unifies the 
sensations, and the subject is shown to be primarily passive. As every sensation has a 
mineness along with an experiential influence on the sensing subject, the identity that is 
entailed by sensation is passive and non-formalistic; it is lived. Even though this identity in its 
turn is evolved by the activity of psychism through memory and projection, its fundamental 
sense does not rest on any activity.  
As Levinas himself never engages explicitly with these questions in depth, the way in which 
he is to be interpreted remains unclear. These two alternatives have been outlined even if they 
are opposed, as the former gives prevalence to the notion of activity associated with 
psychism, even if this activity turns out to be transcendental, while the latter gives prevalence 
to passivity. I will consider the latter alternative – in so far as the property of mineness is not 
understood as a mere formal trait, but rather bound to a particular intimacy between the 
subject and the experiences –to be the most promising as it seems to avoid the problem of 
transcendental activity. But this approach quickly meets its own challenges. One of these 
problems arises if we claim that the subject is unified by having a set of experiences that all 
are unified by belonging to one subject, we seem to be running in circles. To avoid this circle 
we will have to claim one of two things. Either we can claim that the unity of the contents of 
consciousness is more independent in that the mineness does not refer to the subject, which is 
to understand this mineness as a formal trait. In that case, the subject is nothing over and 
above the unified contents. Or, rather we will have to claim that the unity of the subject is 
somewhat more independent, and thus something over and above these contents. These two 
alternatives each have their own merits. The latter agrees with Levinas’ clear-cut statements 
where he claims that the sensations and contents of our life are separate from this life itself: 
“What we live from and enjoy is not the same as that life itself. ... Though I live my life, the 
life I live and the fact of living it nonetheless remain distinct, even though it is true that the 
this life itself continually and essentially becomes its own content” (TI, 122/127). There is 
something more to subjectivity as consciousness than the mere sum of the contents: “Distinct 
from my substance but constituting it, these contents make up the worth [prix] of my life” (TI, 
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112/115). Yet, the former alternative captures a possibility that remains open within the 
notion of “involution” as long as its sense is not specified clearly. 
So far, two interpretations of the identity in enjoyment were proposed. The first gave 
prevalence to activity, while the second gave prevalence to passivity. Within this second 
interpretation, another two interpretations of the sense of mineness was offered. It is now time 
to try to extract what is useful from each of these interpretations and combine them to a 
coherent conception of Levinas’ notion of identity in enjoyment. A key to the possible 
solution is found in a paragraph where Levinas discusses the relationship between freedom 
and separation: “Freedom as the possibility of commencement, referring to happiness, to the 
marvel of the good time standing out from the continuity of the hours, is the production of the 
I ... Separation and atheism, these negative notions, are produced by positive events” (TI, 
148/158). As psychism was produced by a positive event – by virtue of the youth of memory 
and projection – so is the happiness of enjoyment to be understood not as a static trait, but 
rather as an event producing the separation and identity in question. The separation is not a 
fact prior to the event itself, but this event should not be understood as an activity of the 
subject whose identity is in question. That any such event is necessary seems to be in line 
with most of what Levinas says throughout the book, as he tries to avoid making ontological 
claims about essences. What though, is the status of these events that produces separation and 
identity in enjoyment? As these events are not to be assimilated with activity, as they are not 
produced by the subject themselves, it becomes apparent that they are rather brought by the 
mere fact of our conscious bodily existence. Identity in this sense is not something we 
ourselves consciously produce, nor anything that is merely bestowed upon us, but rather 
something that is produced by virtue of our life is characterised by being a conscious bodily 
existence within a world. Thus, while it is true that the mere mineness of sensations is not a 
sufficient condition for personal identity, neither is the understanding of this identity as 
produced by the activity of the self accurate. It is rather the events brought about by sensation 
that constitute this identity. This is in accordance with an understanding of the subject in 
enjoyment as passively affective. In the happiness (or unhappiness) of enjoyment – both in 
the way the sensed constitute necessary conditions for our sensations and our life and the way 
in which we feel that these contents and activities constitutes the experiential dimension of 
our life – a mineness is implied, which by virtue of the events brought about by the 
sensations, develops a sense of identity. This is sense of Levinas’ claims when he describes 
the dawn of the self in enjoyment: “The upsurge of the self beginning in enjoyment, where the 
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substantiality of the I is apperceived not as the subject of the verb to be, but as implicated in 
happiness ... One becomes a subject of being not by assuming being but in enjoying 
happiness, by the interiorization of enjoyment which is also an exaltation, an ‘above being’” 
(TI, 119/123–124). Likewise, this is the sense of Levinas’ claims when he shortly after 
expresses the non-formalism of this identity: “Individuation through happiness individuates a 
‘concept’ whose comprehension and extension coincides; the individuation of the concept by 
self-identification constitutes the content of this concept” (TI, 120/124–125). This way of 
putting into words the subject as an individuation of a concept, is to be understood only 
metaphorically, as Levinas only a few pages earlier claims that the identity of the human 
subject has the particular trait of not being the individuation of a concept: “The ipseity of the I 
consist in remaining outside the distinction between the individual and the general” (TI, 
118/122). Levinas’ notion of identity in enjoyment thus seems to rest on a quality of mineness 
in our experiences, produced by, and bound to, the positive event of our conscious bodily 
existence. 
In enjoyment, we hold on to the exteriority in the sense that the relata of enjoyment is not to 
be understood in terms of construction and representation. In holding on to exteriority, 
Levinas claims that we are affirming of the world. But such an affirmation is not to be 
understood as ascribing the consciousness a positing role, as is the case with the Husserlian 
notion of sense-bestowal. We are not bestowing existence, but rather affirming existence in 
passivity. Through this affirmation, we also affirm the body. As Levinas’ idea of nourishment 
entailed, our bodily existence reveals our being to be vulnerable and conditioned, but this is 
then countered by the way in which we draw an identity from this existence: “The body naked 
and indigent is the very reverting, irreducible to the thought, of representation into life, of the 
subjectivity that represents into life which is sustained by these representations and lives of 
them” (TI, 127/134). This bodily existence, which then is shown to be the ground of our 
practical engagement with the world as labour, eminently exposes the duality of dependency 
and independency. The practical engagement with the world made possible by bodily 
existence, of which Levinas exemplifies with labour, destruction and murder, differs from the 
theoretical engagement he identifies as intentionality, by assuming an exteriority, which 
Husserl suspends by his epoché: “To assume exteriority is to enter into a relation with it such 
that the same determines the other while being determined by it. ... The way in which the 
same is determined by the other, and which delineates the plane in which the negating acts 
themselves are situated, is precisely the way designated above as ‘living from...’” (TI, 
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128/134). Exteriority in this context is not to be understood as the exteriority of the Other, but 
simply the consciousness-independent reality of the world, and the things located therein. And 
these activities which Levinas understands as negating acts, is not the way we relate to the 
radical Other, but are the characteristically manner in which we relate to the world through 
labour. 
It is finally important to note that the separation and identity analysed in enjoyment is only 
accessible through the first-person perspective, as was the case with psychism. Subjectivity is 
discussed, not in terms of a substance, but in terms of the life and experiences of a particular 
subject. The choice of perspective does not in itself rule out the account of the subject as 
substance, as Descartes’ meditations show, but it is here designating a preoccupation with the 
individual, following the example of, among many others, Heidegger and the existentialist 
tradition. Despite all the differences between existentialism as it got to be known through the 
works of Sartre and Heidegger, there is a common premise that the richness of human 
existence should be included in the account of subjectivity; and this is, as we have already 
discussed, the basis of both Heidegger’s and Levinas’ critique of the formalism of Kant, a 
formalism which is also to be found in the works of Husserl. That the account of the identity 
of the self in happiness is to be understood in the same manner is emphatically expressed in 
the following paragraph: “Happiness is a principle of individuation, but individuation in itself 
is conceivable only from within, through interiority. In the happiness of enjoyment is enacted 
the individuation, the auto-personification, the substantialization, and the independence if the 
self” (TI, 147/157). 
4.3.2 Dwelling 
The tension between the dependency of enjoyment through the need of nourishment and the 
corresponding independency through the happiness we derive from our needs allowed 
Levinas to argue for the subject’s separation from the world by virtue of its identity. A similar 
separation is observable in the tension related to Levinas’ notion of the dwelling. While the 
former separation is achieved by examining the subject’s primordial passivity in relation to 
the world, the latter separation of dwelling expounds on this passivity by examining further 
the conditions of our corporal existence in the world. This corporal existence was exposed in 
the vulnerability of the needing body of enjoyment, but, along with dwelling, the body will 
now be shown to be the condition of labour and our further acquisitions in the world, which is 
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the way Levinas understands our practical engagement with the world of things. The notion of 
dwelling, showing that we are always existing within a world that precedes us, limits the 
plausibility of idealism and concretises the dependency of the subject. Our existence is 
corporal and dependent on both the world of culture and of nourishment: “the consciousness 
of a world is already consciousness through that world. Something of that world seen is an 
organ or an essential means of vision: the head, the eye, the eyeglasses, the light, the lamps, 
the books, the school” (TI, 153/163). There is no strict separation between the moments of 
analysed in enjoyment and dwelling, but in general, we might say that whereas the ‘living 
from...’ designates the how we relate to the world that surrounds us at a passive level, the 
notion of dwelling designates the manner in which we find ourselves located in the world in 
the first place. 
The elemental world has already been shown to be that which surrounds us at all time, and the 
subject has been shown to relate passively to this world. But nevertheless, Levinas claims that 
we retain some independence from these elements, apart from the independence of happiness: 
“Man has overcome the elements only by surmounting this interiority without issue by the 
domicile, which confers upon him an extraterritoriality” (TI, 131/138). This domicile, which 
Levinas calls the primary appropriation, makes the existence in the world, a presence “within 
what he [the subject] already possesses, such that we shall be able to say that the domicile, 
condition for all property, renders the inner life possible” (TI, 132/139). The idea of dwelling 
is primarily directed against certain existentialist’s thought of our being in the world in terms 
of “thrownness” and the broader idea of alienation from the world. Speaking about the 
subject, Levinas says: “he does not find himself brutally cast forth and forsaken in the world. 
Simultaneously without and within, he goes forth outside from an inwardness” (TI, 152/162). 
That this paragraph should be understood as a reference primarily directed towards 
Heidegger, is specified by another passage where Levinas explicitly introduces the 
Heideggerian term Geworfenheit, or thrownness (TI, 142/151). Levinas does not offer further 
specifications as to how he understands the thrown character of human life, but by describing 
it in terms of brutality and forsakenness – and considering that these references are a part of 
Levinas’ attempt to show how the human life is always endowed with richness of content – it 
seems warranted to understand these references in connection to the aforementioned critique 
of care. Common to Levinas’ understanding of both of these terms is the sense in which they 
imply an existence in the world in which the subject’s existence itself is threatened. Whereas 
this in care was interpreted by Levinas as “the naked will to be” – a conflation that has 
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already been criticised – this threat, as understood in terms of Geworfenheit, implies an 
opposition between the subject and the world, an opposition which alienates the subject and 
leads it to get “caught up in the other [autre] that limits it and negates it, suffers from this 
alterity
19” (TI, 164/176). It was in order to refute this opposition that Levinas claimed that our 
basic relation to the world is characterised by enjoyment.  
Upon comparing the notions of dwelling and Geworfenheit, we might wonder whether the 
difference between them really rests on Levinas’ claim that the world of the Geworfenheit is 
threatening. There are some important similarities between the terms. First of all, Levinas 
seems to agree on the first characteristic of the thrownness of Dasein’s – or the subject’s – 
existence, namely that it is “a naked ‘that it is and has to be’” (BT, 173). This fact of 
existence, where we always find ourselves in a world, is not of our choosing, something 
which has existential importance as Heidegger claims that this fact is not to be mistaken for 
any factuality associated with the present-at-hand, but rather is to be understood as a 
characteristic of Dasein’s existence. This latter point indicates the second similarity as 
Levinas agrees with the claim that the thrown character of human existence is always taken up 
in this existence itself, that is to say, that it has existential importance. In Levinas’ thought 
this is reflected in the way we relate to the world prior to any activity by the enjoyment of 
elements which are incessantly moving towards us. This understanding of our openness 
towards the world is to a certain degree corresponded by the Heideggerian idea of the moods 
of Befindlichkeit, usually translated as state of mind. Both enjoyment and Befindlichkeit 
reveals the subject’s openness towards the world, prior to any theoretical or practical activity. 
Thirdly, even though Levinas introduces the notion of enjoyment in order to counter the 
rhetoric of Heidegger’s and Sartre’s philosophy, he himself also describes our being in the 
world as threatened by the insecurity of the elements.
20
 As Levinas’ subject relates to the 
world in different ways highlighting its changing role (from nourishment to threat), the same 
can be said about Heidegger’s Dasein since the sense in which the existence of Dasein is 
                                                 
19
 Both the term ’other’ and ’alterity’ are here to be taken in their non-specific sense; they are not to be 
understood as implying that the world is a metaphysical other or represent a radical alterity. 
20
 Such a relation to the fact of our existence, was dramatically described in On Escape, where Levinas describes 
the existence we are thrown into in similar terms as he describes Geworfenheit: ”The elementary truth that there 
is being – a being that has value and weight – is revealed at a depth that measures its brutality and seriousness. 
… It is not that the suffering with which life threatens us renders it displeasing; rather it is because the ground of 
suffering consists of the impossibility of interrupting it” (Levinas 1998, 94–95/52). 
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understood as threatened by the world is, in Heidegger’s treatment, only one mode of 
Befindlichkeit (BT, 179–180). 
With these similarities in mind, we can approach the differences that appear. The main 
difference does not seem to lie, as Levinas indicates in the passages referred to above, in that 
Geworfenheit indicates an existence that is brutally thrown into a world that threatens it, as 
this is also apparent in the subject’s relation with the elements. Nor does the difference lie in a 
relation between the world and the subject characterised by negation, as this is present also in 
the Levinasian notion of labour, with which he claims we counter the insecurity of the 
elements. Rather, the difference lies in that in Levinas’ philosophy, this character of 
thrownness that marks our existence is supplemented by the independence and privacy 
introduced by the dwelling. Another important difference lies in the manner in which the 
subject takes the fact of thrownness up into its existence. Heidegger claims that it is by the 
moods of Befindlichkeit that Dasein is revealed to itself as thrown into the world. These 
moods are not strictly to be neither interior nor exterior: “States-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] are 
so far from being reflected upon, that precisely what they do is to assail Dasein in its 
unreflecting devotion to the ‘world’ with which it is concerned and on which it expends itself. 
A mood assails us. It comes neither from ‘outside’ nor from ‘inside’, but arises out of Being-
in-the-world, as a way of such Being” (BT, 175–176). Levinas shares the claim that our 
primary relation to the world is unreflected, but he does not endorse the claim that the moods 
seem to imply, namely that Dasein and the world, at a fundamental level, cannot be separated. 
By refuting the Heideggerian relation between Dasein and the world, Levinas also contests 
Heidegger’s efforts in showing how Befindlichkeit constitutes the condition for sensibility and 
affectivity: “only because the ‘senses’ [die ‘Sinne’] belong ontologically to an entity whose 
kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind, can they be ‘touched’ by anything 
or ‘have a sense for’ something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an 
affect. ... Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of 
which we can encounter something that matters to us” (BT, 176–177). As we have already 
seen, Levinas claims that sensibility and affection, and the correlative passivity of the subject, 
are the characteristics of our primary relation to the world. He agrees that they designate an 
openness towards the world, but not that this openness also relies on a mood, even though the 
term ‘enjoyment’ could indicate otherwise. A third difference has already been discussed in 
an earlier subchapter in relation to care. As care, and the related notions of concern and 
solicitude, unifies the important ontological characteristics of Heidegger’s Dasein, among 
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them that it is thrown into the world,
21
 Dasein is understood as a being whose Being is an 
issue for it. For Heidegger, this leads to Dasein’s possibility to lead either an authentic or an 
inauthentic life. Since Levinas discards the fundamental role of care, he also rejects the notion 
of authenticity and the way in which they constitute a structural whole which might offer a 
complete analytic of Dasein.  
The notion of dwelling is intended to show how we – after relating to the world through 
enjoyment, and after discovering that our existence is threatened by the insecurity of the 
elements – relate to the world through labour. Dwelling is the condition for labour and 
consists of two main ideas: that of recollection and of first possession. The latter notion, 
which Levinas argues is a transcendental condition for labour and further acquisition is the 
way we always move towards the world from somewhere. Unlike the elements – which 
seemingly come from nowhere as pure qualities – the subject enters the world from a ground 
already acquired. Levinas expresses this idea in terms of habitation, describing this 
“somewhere” as home, in order to counter the existentialist idea of alienation from the world. 
The notion of first possession expresses two core ideas: first that we always find ourselves 
located in a certain situation and in certain circumstances which is the foundation for our 
further relation to the world, and secondly that this location is not characterised by being a 
foreign place, but rather by familiarity. I will not discuss this idea of first possession any 
further, but certain of its aspects are also present in the idea of recollection.  
4.3.3 Recollection 
The notion of recollection also answers the same question of how an identity is possible 
within the flux of experiences, but on a different level, building upon what was discussed as 
the happiness of enjoyment. Recollection is, in contrast to the involution in enjoyment, 
characterised by activity as it “designates a suspension of the immediate reactions the world 
solicits in view of a larger attention to oneself, one’s possibilities, and the situation. It is 
already a movement of attention freed from immediate enjoyment, for no longer deriving its 
freedom from the agreeableness of the elements” (TI, 154/164–165). It is our ability to gather 
ourselves even though we are always in the midst of a situation, in order to assess our 
                                                 
21
 The three main characteristics as they are discussed in Being and Time is existentilality (the being-ahead-of-
itself), thrownness or facticity (the being-already-in-a-world) and falling (the being-alongside). The issue of how 
these are related and unified by care is an important issue, but lies beyond the scope of this essay. 
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circumstances and evaluate our possibilities. As such it is comparable to psychism, and may 
be described as psychism concretises in view of its world-relations. The recollection is a 
response to the insecurity of the elements that is experienced as threatening, and marks a 
separation that, in contrast to happiness, is characterised by acts of reflection and 
representation. From the exposition above it should be clear that Levinas’ main argument is 
that any activity of the subject is grounded on a prior passivity and affectivity which opens the 
subject up to the realities of the world and itself offers a sense of identity. Thus recollection is 
secondary to the identity in enjoyment and is to be understood as deepening the sense of 
identity already established by the happiness of enjoyment. 
Recollection, already implying representation and reflection founds the basis of Levinas’ 
analyses of our extended engagement with the world, which he understands in terms of labour 
and possession. The world as first analysed in terms of the elements was characterised by, 
amongst others, two important traits: that the elements were not supported by any substance 
and that they came towards the subject incessantly. That they apparently come from nowhere 
is the reason why Levinas calls the elements mythical. But this “mythical” format of the 
element, exposed by enjoyment leads us to the foundation and necessity of labour: “This 
coming from nowhere, from ‘something’ that is not, appearing without there being anything 
that appears – and consequently coming always, without my being able to possess the source 
– delineates the future of sensibility and enjoyment” (TI, 141/150). As the elements are 
inherently insecure, the dependence-relation the subject stands in with them is 
correspondingly shown to be threatened: “the I needs the world, which exalts it. The freedom 
of enjoyment thus is experienced as limited. Limitation is not due to the fact that the I has not 
chosen its birth and thus is already and henceforth in situation, but to the fact that the 
plenitude of its instant of enjoyment is not ensured against the unknown that lurks in the very 
element it enjoys, the fact that joy remains a chance and a stroke of luck” (TI, 144/153). This 
is where labour and possession enters into the account of the subject’s relation to the world. 
The subject is shown to be delivered over to the world of elements and thus exposed in its 
vulnerability. These two characteristics of the subject play a central role in Levinas ethical 
ideas. 
The importance of recollection, apart from being the ground of labour, lies in Levinas’ answer 
to the question on how the distance produced by recollection is achieved. Rather than 
returning to the notion of enjoyment and showing that recollection rests on the separation 
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already produced by the happiness of enjoyment, Levinas introduces the notion of intimacy. 
In a passage that will be quoted at length, he confronts the general position that understands 
our relation with the world as characterised by estrangement and opposition: “familiarity and 
intimacy are produced as a gentleness that spreads over the face of things. This gentleness is 
not only a conformity of nature with the needs of the separated being, which from the first 
enjoys them and constitutes itself as separate, as I, in that enjoyment, but is a gentleness 
coming from an affection for that I. The intimacy which familiarity already presupposes is an 
intimacy with someone. The interiority of recollection is a solitude in a world already human” 
(TI, 155/165). The familiarity of the world is not the result of its subordination to our will and 
labour, but is rather grounded on the fact that the world we inhabit is always already shared. 
Not only do the world of the elements present itself as a world we enjoy, but when this world 
turns out to be insecure and our life in it to be threatened, the world of things which is the 
result of labour, shows itself to be already partially prepared by others. As our relation to the 
future as death, along with offering a principle of identification also showed that we stood in 
relation with something radically different from us, so do the idea of intimacy: ”The 
nothingness of the future [which the insecurity of the elements exposed], we shall see, turns 
into an interval of time in which possession and labor is inserted. The passage from 
instantaneous enjoyment to thee fabrication of things refers to habitation, to economy, which 
presupposes the welcoming of the Other [autrui]” (TI, 146/156). 
4.3.4 Intimacy, or the familiarity of the world 
At this point Levinas introduces his highly debated notion of the discrete Other, which he 
designated as “the Woman”. Due to the limited scope of this essay, I will not engage in the 
extensive debate that these passages have provoked, but I would like to offer some remarks 
concerning the interpretation of these passages in so far as they are relevant for the exposition 
of our being in the world as characterised by both dependence and independence and the 
related debate of alienation from the world. First of all, it should be noted that whereas I 
cannot understand why Levinas feels it necessary to introduce gender categories in order to 
designate different metaphysical notions, the distinction between the discrete other and the 
Other in its proper sense is important, since the discrete other introduces familiarity and 
intimacy in our relation to the world, whereas the proper Other introduces responsibility. 
Richard Cohen tries to understand this function of the discrete other in his essay The 
Metaphysics of Gender, and claims that these categories are simple metaphors, unproblematic 
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because they are used as a “purely conventional gesture” (Cohen 1994, 198). While 
explaining Levinas’ use of the terms, and clarifying that Levinas is not designating men and 
women to different metaphysical categories, this does not justify his use of gendered 
metaphors, and only partly address the criticism of these terms. While I do agree with the 
interpretation that Levinas’ use of the terms “feminine” and “Woman” are metaphorical, as do 
the majority of Levinas’ interpreters22, it is still a contested issue at what level these 
metaphors are intended to be understood.  
A common interpretation, here represented by Diane Perpich and Cathrine Chalier, who both 
agree with the metaphorical interpretation, claims that the feminine is intended to serve the 
ontological function of turning the ego from the egoism that characterises enjoyment to the 
responsibility that characterises ethical subjectivity. This interpretation claims that it is by 
virtue of the feminine that “natural life turns into ethical life” (Chalier 1991, 119) and that the 
alienating activity of the “virile spirit” is put into question. While Perpich to a large degree 
accepts Chalier’s account, she raises a question she claims remains unthematised, namely the 
question of how the feminine is able to fulfil the described function: “who converts her? Is 
she ‘naturally’ more ethical than he is? Is she inherently possessed of a conscience? ... Like 
the role of the pineal gland in Descartes’ ‘resolution’ of the mind-body relation, the feminine 
face is a mechanism meant to serve as the interface between incommensurable orders” 
(Perpich 2008, 104).  
These problems hinge on the important question of how we should understand Levinas’ 
pseudo-genealogical account of subjectivity. On the one hand we can understand Levinas’ 
analyses of the different levels of subjectivity at face value and treat the subject as something 
that first is egoistic, and which will remain egoistic, until its conduct is interrupted, initially 
by the intimacy of the discrete other, and later by the radical Other. Such an account is 
warranted by the letter of Levinas’ narrative, where he throughout the book discusses the 
subject in terms of critical events which turns it from one phase to another. On the other hand 
                                                 
22
 This interpretation is warranted by Levinas’ use of metaphorical descriptions throughout his work, and in this 
case by a specific clarification he offers: “Need one add that there is no question here of defying ridicule by 
maintaining the empirical truth or countertruth that every home in fact presupposes a woman? The feminine has 
been encountered in this analysis as one of the cardinal points of the horizon in which the inner life takes place – 
and the empirical absence of the human being of ‘feminine sex’ in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension of 
femininity which remains open there” (TI, 157–158/169). 
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we might try to understand these analyses in light of the few methodological comments 
Levinas makes at the beginning of the book, where he specifies that he will follow a 
transcendental and phenomenological approach. This allows us to understand that, while 
Levinas will insist on the necessity of events such as the encounter with both the discrete 
other and the radical Other – something he does in order to avoid an essentialistic account of 
the subject – he also claims that these encounters have always already occurred. This view of 
Levinas’ account of subjectivity does not claim that there are distinguishable levels of 
subjectivity in actual existence, but that these differentiations are analytical tools. By this 
account, there is no purely egoistic subject, in Levinas specialised understanding of the term, 
deprived of an encounter with the Other. The ideas of intimacy and the discrete other is to 
express the way we are always located within a social context which is essential both to the 
way in which we relate to the world, but also to our ability to attune ourselves to the 
responsibility that arises from the relation to the radical Other. The discrete other thus 
designates an aspect of our social condition, even though this condition is constituted by 
particular persons. It should thus not be understood as identified by a particular gender or a 
particular person, the latter since the person is not to be identified as fully coinciding with the 
role attributed to the discrete other. It is rather because the particular person contributes to the 
social context that it plays this role, along with multiple others. Perpich’s question thus seems 
to disappear as soon as we assume that the terms are metaphorical and as long as we keep 
Levinas’ pseudo-genealogical method in mind. From what I have said so far in this essay, it 
should be clear that I endorse this second of the two view of Levinas’ method offered in the 
previous paragraph. I will discuss this through two considerations. 
A first consideration is that the literal understanding of Levinas’ genealogical style seems to 
be based on an inadequate understanding of the relationship between the empirical and the 
transcendental in Levinas’ thought. This is most apparent in the conflation between the 
analysis of subjectivity and actual subjectivity. The differentiations Levinas make in Totality 
and Infinity – differentiations we have discussed in terms of the subject of psychism, the 
subject of enjoyment and the ethical subject – are to highlight the different traits of 
subjectivity, but is never claimed to be actualisable in separation. Thus, the question of how 
the feminine must be constituted in order to be able to overturn an egoistic subject, may be 
avoided if we understand Levinas’ discussion of the dwelling and the discrete other in its 
transcendental sense. This sense of the term ‘transcendental’ denotes something which has 
always already happened. By this I do not wish to designate these events to a sphere separable 
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from the empirical. They are not formal transcendental events, as this would contradict what 
we discussed in the subchapter on happiness. These events are surely to be understood as 
taking place in our life and they are repeatable. This sense of the term ‘transcendental’ stems 
from the fact that the empirical and the transcendental does not stand in a stark opposition in 
Levinas’ philosophy, as it does in Kant’s philosophy. The transcendental is not to be taken as 
a priori, but merely as necessary conditions for a certain possibility. The transcendental does 
not designate a sphere of its own, separated from the empirical, as it does in Kant’s 
philosophy. Throughout our discussion on subjectivity, we have encountered several events 
that are to be understood as transcendental conditions to the notion of subjectivity: among 
others the youth of psychism, the involution and happiness of enjoyment and the meeting with 
the discrete other. By describing these events as always already realised I claim that we 
cannot consider human actuality, our life in the world, without or before such events. The 
notion of subjectivity presupposes these events. That being said, these events are concretely 
realised in the world. It might sound strange to claim that these events have always already 
been concretely realised when we keep in mind that human life unfolds temporally. Is there 
no moment before this realisation? This confusion might be eliminated when we consider the 
source of these events. They are produced by our existence itself; in so far as we live, the 
events are actualised. There is no subjectivity prior to the movements of psychism, prior to 
the involution of psychism, or prior to the intimacy of the human existence as coexistence. In 
analysis there is of course no metaphysical impossibility in imagining a life prior to these 
events, say for example prior to the meeting with the discrete other or the radical Other, but as 
Levinas presupposes, along with most existentialist and ethical thinkers, human existence is 
not considered and analysed deprived of these events. In the example at hand concerning the 
intimacy of the world, Levinas thus claims that our being in the world is never to be 
understood as solipsistic.  
Thus, what Levinas is trying to describe is not an already virile subject, now being challenged 
by a feminine spirit, but rather how our relation to the world is always marked by its 
familiarity, both because it is the world as already partially prepared by others as it is shared, 
and because our worldly existence is always co-existence. The latter point of coexistence is 
also to be found in the philosophy of Heidegger, with whom Levinas stands in a constant 
dialogue with. Even though the idea of solitude is a recurrent theme in Heidegger’s 
philosophy he claims that the self cannot be thought without being-with other Daseins 
[Mitsein] and being-alongside things [Sein-bei]; along with being-one’s-self [Selbstsein] they 
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are constituents of the being-in-the-world. But Levinas criticises Heidegger’s notion of being-
with because this coexistence is not sufficient for the ethical as Levinas understands it, since it 
cannot accommodate for a relation with the radical Other. Furthermore, in Totality and 
Infinity the notion of coexistence also indicates that our primordial relation to the world is not 
one of alienation, but of familiarity. And it is this latter point that indicates the main 
importance of the notion of dwelling and the related notion of intimacy. While happiness 
showed how our existence in the world was characterised by familiarity rather than alienation 
without reference to other people, dwelling includes such a reference, and opens up for the 
ethical relations Levinas later wants to examine. 
The second consideration is closely related to the first as it also arises in relation to these 
thought on the transcendental and the empirical in Levinas’ philosophy, and is a worry put 
into words by Perpich: “If the ego were preordained to an ethical life, either by the possession 
of inherent social instinct or by a naturally occurring moral sensibility, its goodness would 
also be predetermined. Like the acorn that can become an oak or nothing at all, an ego 
preordained to ethical responsibility would flower or wither without its essence ever being put 
into question; the only question would be whether environmental conditions were in favor of 
it or against it. If ethics is conceived, as it most assuredly is in Levinas, as that which breaks 
with nature and is the advent of the human …, it cannot come about in the natural course of 
the ego’s life in enjoyment” (Perpich 2008, 10). The problem raised by Perpich rests on two 
important assumptions: Firstly, that the subject needs to be turned towards the ethical in the 
genealogical sense discussed above, and secondly, that the alternative to such a genealogical 
reading is essentialistic. I have tried to criticise such a genealogical reading by offering a 
metaphorical reading of these passages, and thus termed Levinas’ narrative style “pseudo-
genealogical”. I have also tried to rebut the second assumption, since there is a meaningful 
distinction between empirical events that are discussable in terms of before and after, and 
empirical events where any considerations of “before” in actuality seems invalid. Levinas’ 
account of subjectivity is an account of what it is to be human, and the discussions of the 
advent of the human is intended to distinguish between different levels of analytical 
complexity. To be a human subject is to always already be in these relations, the self-relation, 
the different world-relations and the relation to both the discrete other and the radical Other. 
That does not lead to static essentialism, as these relations are produced by events, but we 
cannot consider the subject before these events. With that said, the fact that we always are in 
these relations does not mean that we are ethical in the normative sense that Perpich intends 
82 
 
above. The transcendental level of Levinas philosophy – a level we have called the proto-
ethical – is to show the conditions of ethics, and to show that we are already engaged in these 
conditions. We can of course ignore certain of the implication of our worldly existence, we 
can ignore all calls for aid and justice – and we often do – but we cannot break with our 
worldly existence and our engagement with others as humans. Does this designate the ethical 
dimension of human nature? To a certain degree it does, in the sense that to be human is to 
have these relations. But not in the essentialistic sense of nature, as these relations still need to 
be produced. Thus, the events described above – most importantly the meeting with the 
discrete other and the radical Other – are not to be understood as indicating that we naturally 
behave ethical in the sense that we assume responsibility, as these events have always already 
been actualised. Our ethical conduct is not the result of mere conditioning, as Levinas thought 
of psychism is intended to show. The events have always already happened and are repeated 
throughout our lives, but to act according to them still presupposes existential commitments, 
in the sense of how we choose to lead our lives. This latter point will be discussed further in 
the final chapter on the relation with the human Other. 
4.3.5 Extraterritoriality 
Levinas’ description of the location of dwelling as in the extraterritorial is intended to counter 
certain of the interpretations that might follow from understanding the human existence as 
necessarily located in a world. The duality of dependency and independency expressed in our 
existence described as worldly and as extraterritorial, is parallel to the duality analysed in our 
relation to both the world of elements and the world of things. While our relation to the world 
of the elements was characterised by our passivity towards the surrounding elements which 
constituted the nourishment and content of our lives, we simultaneously lifted ourselves 
above this dependency by virtue of happiness, which allowed us to derive a rich sense of 
identity from the relation. The same is the case with the world of things, which is the result of 
human labour in reaction to the insecurity of the elements, we derive a sense of identity both 
from the enjoyment of this activity and its content, and by our ability to recollect in the midst 
of the world, and thus raise above the conditions of our situations. We are thus not merely 
conditioned by the elemental world nor do we merely melt into a structure of practical 
finalities in the world of things. We are not merely thrown into a world which primarily 
stands in opposition to us, but we live in a world that also nourishes us so that we may sustain 
our existence and a world in which we are already at home, since it is a world that is shared. 
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The notion of extraterritoriality is to capture the sense in which the situation and 
circumstances we find ourselves in, and from which we move towards the world from within 
the world, is a place of familiarity: “Recollection and representation are produced concretely 
as habitation in a dwelling or a Home. But the interiority of the home is made of 
extraterritoriality in the midst of the elements of enjoyment with which life is nourished. This 
extraterritoriality has a positive side. It is produced in the gentleness or the warmth of 
intimacy” (TI, 150/161). The term ‘extraterritoriality’ thus both express the separation from 
the world entailed by dwelling, and the fact that whereas the world may be described in the 
third-person perspective, the dwelling and intimacy can only be accessed through the first-
person perspective. 
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5 The merits and limits of the vitalistic 
account 
In this essay I have examined Levinas’ notion of subjectivity in terms of personal identity. I 
have limited myself to the pre-ethical level of subjectivity for two main reasons. On the one 
hand this limitation allows us to appreciate the fact that Levinas defends a notion of 
subjectivity as singularity along with his idea of the radical Other as singular. On the other 
hand it shows that the idea of a passive subject is not only reflected in the ethical relation with 
the radical Other, but also in our fundamental relation to the world. Even though the ethical 
thought of Levinas has not been discussed in this essay so far, I want to introduce the notion 
of the singularity of the Other in this chapter, in order for us to see the impact the notion of 
the singularity of the self may have on Levinas’ thought. The singularity of the Other will be 
introduced by way of the subject’s relation to it, namely through the expressions and appeals 
of the Other. Through an analysis of Levinas’ claims about this singularity and the notion of 
expression, I want to show that Levinas is exposed to the criticism that his thought cannot 
account for the notion of normativity. That being said, it is important to emphasize that this 
analysis is done against the spirit of Levinas’ thought. Levinas would easily claim that this 
analysis itself was a demonstration of totalising thought. But before we can discuss these 
issues further, some groundwork is in order. 
The singularity of the self was shown to be produced by virtue of a set of principles of 
identity. The principle of identity offered in psychism defended a notion of identity produced 
by the subject’s ability to relate to its own circumstances by adopting them. This active 
principle of identity was then shown to be grounded on a passive principle of identity 
produced by our relation to the world in which we are always already located. None of these 
principles entail a notion of self-representation, a term which is secondary and dependent on 
the two basic principles. Rather, the identity which is produced is to be understood as 
resulting from the subject’s living. But as we saw, this idea of lived identity was difficult to 
capture without metaphors, and Levinas used images such as “involution” and “contraction”. 
Levinas is of course not the only one to claim that the inner life resists representation; 
Bergson is one of his important associates. Similarly to Levinas, Bergson describes this lived 
identity in vitalistic terms, which is to say that he uses descriptions grounded in the actual life 
of the subject as it is experienced from the first-person perspective. There is though also 
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another tradition which defends a notion of the identity of the self in a way which might be 
described as giving prevalence to the practical and the lived over the theoretical. This is the 
tradition of those who understand subjectivity in terms of a practical self-relation, a tradition 
which both Heidegger and Sartre have represented in this essay.  
Of more recent philosophers such an approach has been utilised by Charles Larmore. In this 
chapter I want to briefly note the similarities and the differences between the normative 
account of the self as it is presented by Charles Larmore and Levinas’ vitalistic account. 
Subsequently I want to show what is lacking in Levinas’ account of subjectivity, a lack which 
becomes apparent when he tries to move from the pre-ethical level of psychism and 
enjoyment to the ethical level of the relation to the Other. The problem is twofold: On the one 
hand, we observe that Levinas’ defence of the singularity of the self opens up the question of 
whether the singularity of the Other is presented through “revelation” or through analogy 
from the singularity of the self. To put it in other words: Is this singularity, as expressed by 
the Other, presented to the subject without the subject’s contribution or does it rest on an 
analogy from the subject itself? On the other hand, the tension between the Other as presented 
through revelation or through analogy leaves Levinas open to the criticism of whether he has 
offered an adequate account of normativity. It might seem that his critique of the notion of 
authenticity could have eliminated a possible solution to the tension is Levinas’ account.  
5.1 Larmore’s normative conception of the self 
In his book The Practices of the Self, Charles Larmore re-evaluates several of the premises 
that have been the core of multiple accounts of subjectivity throughout the history of 
philosophy. While discussing with a wide range of philosophers from both the “analytical” 
and the “continental” tradition, he draws significantly on the ideas of both Heidegger and 
Sartre.
23
 Similarly to these two, and Levinas, Larmore wants to criticise the theories of the 
self which gives prevalence to perception and representation, both those which use these 
notions in order to argue for a special kind of self-knowledge ascribed to the subject and those 
which tries to eliminate the notion of the subject as an impossible object of perception. 
                                                 
23
 He does in fact also refer to Levinas once, in a footnote, claiming that “there is more than one point of 
convergence between Levinas’s conception of the subject’s responsibility as a kind of ‘passivity’ … and the ideas 
I lay out in the following pages. This is not the place, however, to explain in what ways I feel close and also far 
from Levinas’s thought” (Larmore 2010, 106). 
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Larmore’s main thesis in this book is to defend the claim that there is a special relation that 
the subject maintains to itself, and that this relation is to be understood in terms of 
commitments and avowals rather that in terms of knowledge: “The intimate relationship we 
have to ourselves, which cannot be reproduced in our relationship with others, is of a 
completely different order [the relations of knowledge]. It is an essentially practical self-
relation – or, more precisely, a normative one, insofar as committing ourselves signifies 
obligating ourselves to respect what the commitment gives us reason to do. ... [M]y goal is to 
bring out the fundamentally practical structure of the self and the different ways in which it 
comes to expression” (Larmore 2010, xiv).  
As Larmore tries to explicate the essential self-relation that characterises the subject, he draws 
an important distinction between practical and cognitive reflection. Our faculty of cognitive 
reflection allows us to “discover what our existing knowledge implies, rather than taking 
another look at experience” (Ibid., 24). Such a reflection, pertaining to knowledge, concerns 
not only our knowledge of the world, but also our attempts to understand our own beliefs and 
desires and to compare different courses of action with each other given a certain goal. The 
aim of cognitive reflection, as Larmore thus understands it, is knowledge. Practical reflection, 
on the other hand, does not concern knowledge. Rather, it is our ability to “turn back upon 
ourselves ... in order to take an explicit stand, to devote ourselves to beliefs, feelings, or 
actions that may already be unreflectively ours or that we are now making our own for the 
first time” (Ibid., 24). It is important to notice that this distinction is parallel to Levinas’ 
distinction between the theoretical and the practical in that the former entails objectification, 
while the latter does not. By Larmore’s notion of practical self-reflection, the subject is not 
drawing a distinction between itself as reflecting and itself as the object of reflection. Such a 
distinction is problematic if we claim that it manifests the essential self-relation of the subject, 
and has been thoroughly discussed in the history of philosophy. Larmore’s important 
contribution to this discussion is the claim that every attempt to describe the subject’s 
essential self-relation in terms of self-knowledge, either leads to such a division or to an idea 
of intuitive self-knowledge.
24
 Even though our self-relation through practical reflection comes 
                                                 
24
 Larmore do not explicitly puts forth this claim, but having first discussed the problematic consequences of the 
divided self throughout his discussion on authenticity and on cognitive reflection (Larmore 2010, 88–90) , he 
goes on to reject that self-knowledge may take any other form. It is important to notice that Larmore does not 
criticise cognitive reflection as such, or the value of cognitive self-reflection; he only claims that it cannot be the 
subject’s essential self-relation. Both this latter point and the criticism of alternative forms of self-knowledge 
87 
 
closer to the essential self-relation of the subject than cognitive reflection does, the “practical-
normative” self-relation Larmore is after is not itself a relation of reflection, as it is not only in 
the moments of reflection that we retain this self-relation. Practical self-reflection is an 
expression of a self-relation which too is practical in nature, but which is prior to reflection. 
Larmore claims that this essential self-relation is the way the human beings always “take a 
stand and commit ourselves to respecting their [the beliefs and desires we hold] implications” 
(Ibid., 136). Larmore’s aim in showing the limits of the cognitive reflection in general is 
intended to demonstrate how we fail to understand the way the subject is always already 
engaged in the world that it inhabits, if we do not adequately understand the notions of 
practical reflection and of practical pre-reflective self-relation. This engagement manifests 
itself in terms of commitments and avowals. 
Having highlighted the aspects of Larmore’s theory that concern the topic of this essay, it is 
easy to spot the significant similarities with Levinas’ thought. The notion of practical self-
reflection resembles both Levinas’ notion of psychism and Taylor’s notion of self-
interpretation, as it was discussed earlier in this essay. The common trait is that they all seem 
to make the lived life, as it is accessible from the first-person perspective, available for 
philosophical discussion. Even though Levinas discusses it in terms of causes and conditions 
which the subject remains free to invert or adopt, Larmore in terms of commitments only the 
subject itself can engage in, and Taylor in terms of the essential role of self-interpretation for 
human subjects, they all defend the importance of the first-person perspective in 
understanding the structure of subjectivity. But one important difference quickly makes itself 
apparent, and that is the choice of vocabulary. Where Levinas uses what I have called a 
vitalistic and existentialistic vocabulary, Larmore chooses to discuss the topic in normative 
terms. While discussing Bergson and Sartre, Larmore explicitly criticises the vitalistic 
vocabulary, claiming that defending the importance of the first-person perspective does not 
entail a commitment to the vocabulary of lived life: “Bergson chose a vitalist vocabulary in 
laying out the fundamental nature of our relation to ourselves. It seems to me more 
                                                                                                                                                        
should be apparent from the following passage: ”cognitive reflection on oneself is not condemned to miss its 
object, even if the self always appears then in terms of universal intelligibility and not the self that we alone have 
to be. But the fact is that observation and inference constitute the very motor of such an enterprise, as we 
attribute to ourselves beliefs and desires in order to make sense of what we have observed about ourselves. The 
illusion is to think that there can exist a kind of self-knowledge that takes place in a completely different 
fashion” (Larmore 2010, 123). 
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perspicuous to use to this end a ‘normativist’ vocabulary... It is not the concept of ‘life’ (or its 
siblings, like ‘experience’) that holds the key to our being, but rather such concepts as ‘norm’ 
and ‘commitment’. We are wholly normative beings” (Ibid., 95). There is no doubt that 
Levinas is to be included in this criticism, and the question of whether Levinas’ vocabulary 
stands in the way of his efforts to fully understand the subject is not unwarranted. But it 
should be noted that the part of Levinas’ project which is presented in this essay, is the 
attempt to accentuate the singularity of the subject. And since his main thesis is that this 
singularity is produced by the subject’s living, a vitalistic vocabulary does indeed seem to be 
in order. This vitalistic vocabulary is not without its merits. Levinas’ vocabulary follows from 
his methodological commitment to commence with the analysis of experience. This 
commitment to experience was originally intended by Husserl to promote a philosophy free 
from presuppositions. But given the existentialistic premise that the human subject always 
already finds itself in the midst of the world it inhabits, Levinas is not aiming for a 
presuppositionless philosophy. Rather he is trying to present a philosophy that, even though it 
tries to account for the structure of our relation with ourselves, the world and the radical 
Other, never loses touch with the experiences that first motivated the investigation. Such an 
approach gives an important weight to the claims Levinas makes, as they, even though they 
are not analytical propositions, are not mere postulates either. Rather they rest on analyses of 
concrete experiences which others may repeat or evaluate the accuracy of. Larmore’s critique 
of the vitalistic vocabulary thus seems to be a bit harsh, both because the vocabulary in 
question grounds the propositions of the theory in actual life – which is, in fact, the topic in 
question – and because it allows us to evaluate a broad range of experiences which might alter 
certain premises and strengthen others. Such is the role of Levinas’ analyses of, for example, 
death agony and insomnia, which both highlight aspects of the subject’s being, such as its 
vulnerability. 
But as we shall see shortly, there is indeed something that seems to be lacking in Levinas’ 
account, and that concerns normativity. It should be clear that the question of normativity and 
commitment never enters into the analysis of enjoyment, given that commitment is to be 
understood as an activity. The notion of enjoyment underlines both our general openness and 
vulnerability to the world and the way in which this relationship contributes to our identity. 
The fundamental passivity in our experience of the world examined through enjoyment does 
not rule out that the subject may relate to these experiences in different ways as it becomes 
aware of them, and that it through these ways of relating to experiences commits itself. There 
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is thus a sense of commitment in psychism. But what about the relation with the Other? How 
does Levinas’ account for the normative content of this relation?  
5.2 Analogy or revelation: The notion of the human 
Other 
Throughout this essay I have tried to offer a coherent reading of how Levinas understands the 
subject as a singularity, a singularity which is produced as the personal identity of the self. 
But the importance ascribed to the subject seems to stand in tension with the common 
understanding of the structure of Levinas thought, exemplified by Michael Morgan, where 
“everything starts with the other person” (Morgan 2008, 259). This basic idea forms the core 
of the ethical reading of Levinas’ philosophy, a reading which goes like this: It is the 
revelation of the singularity of the face of the Other that disturbs the subject and forces it to 
accept the reality of something which – or someone whose – meaning it cannot draw from 
itself; it stands in a relation with radical alterity. When we examined the relation to the 
element, it was clear that the subject stood in relation with something other than itself, to 
which it was delivered, but there is an important difference between the otherness of the 
elements and the alterity of the Other: the idea of responsibility (other than for oneself) does 
not enter into the relation with the elements. It is the revelation of the face of the Other that is 
seen as the source of our obligation and it is accessible to us through sensibility. The key 
thesis of this argument is that the human subject is not thrown into the world alone. As we 
saw in Heidegger’s treatment of authenticity, even though he admitted that human existence 
was characterised by being-with, there was only a certain solitude that allowed the notion of 
authenticity and its adjacent sense of responsibility for oneself to take place on the centre 
stage. In Levinas’ philosophy, the fact that the subject’s being in the world is always already a 
social existence is fully acknowledged, allowing for a reorientation from the responsibility for 
oneself, to the responsibility for the Other. But what is the structure of this responsibility? 
How is normativity introduced to this relation? Morgan draws several conclusions on this 
structure by comparing Levinas with Christine Korsgaard, the following conclusions being 
the most important. First, our obligation is not grounded on any conceptualisations or on 
reflection which allows us to recognise the common human nature in us as obligating. 
Second, it is not only by the concrete pain or suffering expressed by the Other that this 
obligation arises; it is simply the Other’s very existence that calls out to us. From these two 
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conclusions we recognise that it is not the generality of the Other – that we share a common 
rationality, for example – that is the source of our responsibility, but its singularity and 
vulnerability. The third conclusion is that this openness towards the Other through singularity 
is a feature of all social existence. And last, since it is prior to any conceptualisation, the 
Other need not be a human being; any creature can have a face. All that is required is that the 
creature can be in need and call out to us (Morgan 2008, 258). On the ground of these 
conclusions, I want to ask the following question: Is the account of the subject’s relation to 
the face of the Other through revelation adequate? 
The asymmetrical relation between the subject and the Other is one of the basic ideas of 
Levinas’ philosophy. It is intended as a criticism of the theories of our social existence which 
make the assumption that any obligations between subjects are established on the common 
ground between them, be it relative (as the relative common human nature in Hume) or 
absolute (as in Kant’s attempt to ground morality on reason). Levinas’ claim is that it is 
asymmetry that constitutes the core of our relation with the human Other; an asymmetry that 
is retained in all relation where the radical alterity of the Other is accommodated for, by 
relating to the Other as an Other and not as a thing. One might wonder whether the relation is 
not actually symmetrical since it is a relation between singularities, but as Levinas is 
committed to the first-person perspective, there is still a structural asymmetry between the 
two singularities. But there is a tension in the way Levinas describes this relation. On the one 
hand it is described through terms of epiphany or revelation. The singularity of the Other is 
revealed to us; it is not the result of our reflection, but is given to us through the expression of 
the Other. The Other’s identity is not bestowed upon him or her through our sense-bestowal, 
but is rather constituted through the Other’s own activity and relative self-sufficiency. But this 
way of describing the alterity of the Other already leads us over to the other way the relation 
between the subject and the Other is to be understood. It seems apparent that the singularity of 
the Other and of the subject is produced in the same way, by virtue of the principles of 
identity. Thus, even though we relate to the expressions of the Other, these expressions are to 
be understood as expressions of singularity, much in the same way as the subject is according 
to it being an incorporation of an irreducible first-person perspective and through its ability to 
interpret and justify itself and its actions. Thus, we may ask ourselves: How do we recognise 
the Other’s expressions as expressions? How do we recognise the singularity these 
expressions are expressions of? 
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The question which is to be settled is whether the singularity of the Other is fully revealed to 
us through the expressions of the Other, or if we still need some analogy from the singularity 
of the subject. The idea that the singularity of the Other is revealed to us is described multiple 
times throughout Totality and Infinity: “Manifestation καθ΄αύτό [in respect of itself] consists 
in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its 
regard, expressing itself. … The absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation: a 
coinciding of the expressed with him who expresses, which is the privileged manifestation of 
the Other [Autrui], the manifestation of a face over and beyond form” (TI, 65–66/60–61). 
This manifestation as revelation is grounded on the radical exteriority of the Other, as it 
becomes apparent when Levinas discusses the Other’s will: “The Other’s designs do not 
present themselves to me as do the laws of things. … The will that refuses the foreign will is 
obliged to recognise this foreign will as absolutely exterior, as untranslatable into thoughts 
that would be immanent in itself. Whatever be the extension of my thoughts, limited by 
nothing, the Other cannot be contained by me: he is unthinkable – he is infinite and 
recognized as such” (TI, 230/255–256). The essence of the claim that the singularity of the 
Other is revealed, is that the Other expresses itself, in this example through its will, and that 
these expressions cannot derive there sense from the subject itself. A final passage will 
illuminate the nature of this expression: “This way of undoing the form adequate to the Same 
so as to present oneself as other is to signify or to have a meaning. To present oneself by 
signifying is to speak. … Signification or expression thus contrasts with every intuitive datum 
precisely because to signify is not to give… It is preeminently the presence of exteriority. 
Discourse is not simply a modification of intuition (or of thought), but an original relation 
with exterior being. … It is the production of meaning… it is said and taught by presence” 
(TI, 66/61–62). The Other is thus revealed to us through its expressions. Levinas draws a 
distinction between actions and works on the one hand and expressions on the Other, the 
difference being that the former only refer indirectly to the author, while expression or 
discourse do so directly. Granting that one may consider language to be an act as well, he 
claims that the essence of language is “the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the 
face” (TI, 67/62).  
If what distinguishes the Other from works, actions, art, and non-living things, is that the 
Other expresses itself in a particular way by being present with its expression, we may again 
ask ourselves what Levinas means by this presence. This is never specified in the book, but in 
so far as we are speaking of the human Other, as Levinas most often seems to do, this 
92 
 
presence comes close to what Levinas describes as the singularity of the subject. On the one 
hand, it is the irreducible first-person perspective which allows a subject “to speak for himself 
or herself”; it is the ability to interpret or adopt the circumstances and conditions of one’s life; 
it is psychism. On the other hand, the expressions of singularity are often described 
throughout Levinas’ writings in terms of the Other’s vulnerability and suffering. These 
descriptions seem to be grounded on the analyses of the human subject as always being 
located within a shared world to which it is delivered. This comes close to the analyses of the 
subject’s enjoyment earlier in this essay. These analyses were intended to expose amongst 
other things, the vulnerability of the subject. It is thus something about the human existence, 
our being in the world, which grounds the vulnerability that is expressed through the face of 
the Other. And this vulnerability is exposed through the analyses of the subject, not of the 
radical Other. Thus, we seem to find ourselves in the position where the revelation of the 
Other is based on certain common traits between the subject and the Other, as it is only by 
having analysed the singularity of the subject that we are in a position to recognise the 
expression of the Other as expressions of singularity. It is only in so far as we have exposed 
and accepted certain proposition concerning the way the subject relates to itself and the world, 
that we can recognise the expressions of the Other as different from, not only objects such as 
trees and stones, but also works of human labour. This difference remains even as these latter 
works are often deemed to be endowed with an expression, such as for example artworks, 
dwellings or all other things that have been manipulated by human labour. Thus, the notion of 
the singularity of the Other seems to be derived by analogy from the notion of the singularity 
of the subject. That is to say, we do not bestow the singularity on the Other. This singularity is 
still produced through expression and living, and it still necessitates an irreducible first-person 
perspective. But it is only in so far as we accepted the notion of singularity as it was exposed 
through the analysis of the subject that we may adequately accommodate for the singularity of 
the Other. The possibility for singularity is not itself revealed through the Other’s expression 
since we may constantly fail to understand it as such, namely as an expression of singularity. 
This leads us to the final question posed by Charles Larmore, concerning the question of 
normativity. Is it the case that Levinas’ vitalistic vocabulary hides something important about 
the structure of subjectivity? The nature and status of the face of the Other is a controversial 
issue in Levinas’ philosophy which has not been settled, but given that, for example, the face 
of the Other expresses vulnerability, in what way does this demand a reaction or a certain 
behaviour from the subject that encounters it? What is the normative ground when Levinas 
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claims that the encounter with the face is a moral summon?: “The facing position, opposition 
par excellence, can be only as a moral summons. This movement proceeds from the other” 
(TI, 196/213). As we saw with the question of singularity, even though the singularity is 
produced by the being itself, we have to recognise it on the ground of our own singularity. If 
this is the case, it might be the case that the presence of the Other ushers responsibility, but it 
gives us no reason to accept this responsibility. Levinas’ solution to this problem is to claim 
that this responsibility is irreducible from our existence as human beings as it is grounded in 
our social existence. But then it is only in so far as we interpret this existence appropriately 
that we are in any position to recognise the responsibility in question. The conclusion seems 
to be inescapable, but the confusion seems to stem from the essential difference in the 
principles of identity Levinas’ offers. On the one hand he understands the subject to be a – to 
use Taylor’s term – self-interpreting animal which has the spontaneity to relate to the 
conditions of its own life. On the other hand the subject is also a being that is fundamentally 
passive, which is affected by its surroundings that it always has to relate to, actively or 
passively. In Levinas’ philosophy the human subject is both described as a being who actively 
relates to its surroundings and bestows importance and meaning on them, and as a being who 
finds itself located in a world which is always already meaningful. 
In his criticism of authenticity, Levinas not only tried to replace the vocabulary and pathos of 
the existentialistic tradition, but he also tried to change the perspective from the self to the 
Other. But from the twofold description of the human subject, it might seem that his disregard 
for the notion of authenticity was too categorical. Levinas’ claims about the realism of values 
only seem to have an existential importance if the subject commits itself to the values – or the 
meaningful world – it encounters. We may choose to disregard the suffering and pleas, and an 
indication towards our social existence will only make an impact given that the subject 
appropriately commits itself to holding those beliefs and desires that entail that suffering is 
wrong and that giving aid is right.  
The tension described in the subject’s relation to the Other stems from Levinas’ 
methodological commitments which he assumes from the phenomenological tradition where 
his examination takes the self as the point of departure.  Thus, the question of the Other is 
introduced as the question of how the subject relates to alterity without undermining this 
alterity. By describing the experienced asymmetry of this relation and the way the Other 
reveals itself to us rather than being revealed or constructed by us, Levinas only describes 
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how the Other appears to the subject. Thus it is never a question of how the Other appears 
outside of this relation, for example in relation to the world, as Levinas analysed the different 
relations of the subject. Nor is it a question of how the Other relates to the Same, from the 
Other’s perspective, as this again would violate the alterity of the Other and the authority of 
the first-person perspective. But even though Levinas describes how the Other appears as a 
singularity by being present with its expressions, Levinas never describes the commitment 
required on the side of the subject in order for it to recognise these expressions as expressions 
of singularity. These commitments seem to be based on an analogy from the nature of the 
singularity of the subject to the singularity of the Other as the ground for this presence is the 
same as the way the subject itself is present to its own expressions. 
Where does this leave us? In the beginning of this chapter I claimed that the analysis would 
be done against the spirit of Levinas’ writings. This analysis directs Levinas’ thought into an 
argument he would reject. The reason for this is that Levinas would claim that any attempt to 
explain the singularity of the Other by taking a detour through the idea of the subject would 
be to reduce the alterity of the Other to the interiority of the Same. The extraordinary notion 
of the Other, Levinas would claim, is not simply characterized by singularity, but by radical 
alterity. Levinas’ language of revelation was precisely intended to avoid the reduction of this 
alterity to the Same, or to put it otherwise, to avoid understanding the Other in terms of the 
subject. The crucial point in Levinas’ ethical thought is not how the subject accommodates 
the Other and convinces itself of its responsibility, but rather how it is only by virtue of the 
meeting with the radical alterity of the Other – its singularity – that the question of morality 
rises at all. And this meeting, Levinas would claim, is irreducible from the human existence. 
Any attempt to understand this meeting with the radical Other will take recourse in the 
interiority of the Same, usually by claiming that this meeting must be related to a 
corresponding faculty in the subject. That is in fact the nature of my argument in this chapter, 
but the questions that motivated this arguments arose from Levinas’ descriptions of the 
singularity of the Other and of its expressions, and as long as we pose these questions – even 
if Levinas would consider them to be inadequate – the tension of Levinas’ position remains. 
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6 Conclusions  
In this essay, my most fundamental move has been to shift the attention from the singularity 
of the Other to the singularity of the self. The motivation for this move was first and formost 
the feeling that most accounts of Levinas’ philosophy underplayed the central role of this 
singularity, by rather discussing the singularity of the Other. I have guided my reading of 
Totality and Infinity by the two methodological commitments Levinas makes in the preface, 
which were examined in chapter 2. Throughout the essay I have argued that Levinas offers 
several principles of identity which are connected to the different relations the subject engages 
in and which constitute the ground for this singularity. In chapter 3 we saw how this identity 
was produced in psychism – or the subject’s self-relation – through the temporal activity of 
the subject. This was then compared to Charles Taylor’s idea of the human subject as a self-
interpreting animal, which allowed me to claim that Levinas’ terminology of “adoption” and 
“inversion” were intended to show how the human subject is essentially self-interpreting. In 
chapter 4, this identity in psychism was then showed to be grounded on the second major 
principle of identity, which was to be found in the subject’s world-relation, namely the 
identity in enjoyment. Throughout this essay, I have claimed that Levinas defends a notion of 
a self which I defined as “minimally existentialistic”, and which Levinas describes in vitalistic 
terms. This definition of the Levinasian self allowed us to appreciate how close Levinas often 
comes to the existentialistic tradition, even though he also offers pressing criticism of this 
tradition. Finally, in chapter 5 I evaluated the merits and limits of the vitalistic vocabulary, 
considering whether Levinas was able to defend all his claims – particularly the moral claims 
about the status of the Other – by virtue of this vocabulary. The limitation of this vocabulary 
became apparent in that the notion of the singularity of the Other, in order to have normative 
power, rested on the possibility of this singularity achieved through the analysis of the 
singularity of the subject. This again presupposed that the subject adopted certain 
commitments, something which could not be described by virtue of the vitalistic terms. The 
dilemma Levinas ends up with stems from both his methodological commitment to 
commence his analysis by concrete experience and from his synthesis of the activity and 
passivity of the subject. 
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